Commonwealth v. Manolo M.

• Citation: 486 Mass. 678,160 N.E.3d 1238
• Decision Date: 26 January 2021
• Docket Number: SJC-12967
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. MANOLO M., a juvenile (and three consolidated cases ).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

486 Mass. 678

160 N.E.3d 1238

COMMONWEALTH

v.MANOLO M., a juvenile (and three consolidated cases ¹ ).

SJC-12967

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk, Plymouth..

Argued November 4, 2020

Decided January 26, 2021

Johanna S. Black, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Eva G. Jellison, for Frederick F.

Melissa Allen Celli, for Angela A.

Michelle Menken, for Manolo M.

Joshua M. Daniels, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Dennis M. Toomey, Boston, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

KAFKER, J.

Four juveniles with no prior offenses were charged with varying combinations of minor misdemeanors and greater offenses, including a felony charge of inciting a riot, all arising from the same episode.² The primary issue presented is which of the charges constitutes a first offense of a minor misdemeanor pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 52. We conclude that all of the minor misdemeanors arising out of this single episode for each juvenile constitute a first offense for which the Legislature intended a second chance, and thus must be dismissed. Because § 52 makes no exception for greater offenses, the Commonwealth may proceed directly to arraignment on the greater offenses; however, in this case there is not probable cause to support the felony charge of inciting a riot in violation of G. L. c. 264, § 11. Although we decline the invitation to declare the entirety of § 11 unconstitutional on its face, as we do not decide constitutional questions unnecessarily, we do emphasize that the statute must be read consistently with the requirements of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969).³

1. Facts.⁴ Shortly after Brockton High School students were dismissed on October 3, 2019, Brockton police officers, including Officer Raymond Parrett and school police Officer Daniel Vaughn, were dispatched in response to the presence of a large crowd of teenagers who were walking in the street and refusing to disperse to let traffic pass. Police officers unsuccessfully used their cruisers' public address microphones, lights, and sirens to encourage the teenagers to move. While Parrett was driving on the same street, Frederick F. looked inside the police cruiser and yelled, "Fuck the police!" Parrett then got out of his cruiser to speak to the juvenile.

Angela A. approached Parrett as he spoke to Frederick. Angela shoved a cell phone in Parrett's face, while numerous other teenagers surrounded Parrett and Vaughn, shouting at them. Parrett told Angela several times to take the camera out of his face, and then pushed her hand from his face. Thomas⁵ then approached and shoved Parrett's shoulder, saying, "Yo what the fuck are you doing?" and "She's a female!" Parrett pushed Thomas back. Thomas then lunged at Parrett and swung his fist at Parrett's head. Parrett attempted to place Thomas into custody, and as Thomas physically resisted attempts to handcuff him, the two fell to the ground. Vaughn attempted to keep anyone else from approaching the arrest.

Manolo M. attempted to run past Vaughn, and Vaughn pushed him back several times. Manolo took up a fighting stance and yelled at Vaughan, "Mother fucker you wanna go! Let's go!" He then swung at Vaughn's head. Vaughn blocked his fist and struck him with a forward kick in an attempt to stop his momentum, and the two fell to the ground as Manolo resisted Vaughn's attempts to handcuff him.

Two other officers arrived and ordered the crowd of teenagers to stay back. Many of the teenagers, including Angela, filmed the officers. Another officer assisted Vaughn in handcuffing Manolo and placing him in a police cruiser.

While police attempted to disperse the crowd, Frederick began yelling, refusing to move and "enticing the crowd to stay." Vaughn advised Frederick that he was under arrest and ordered him to place his arms behind his back, but Frederick tensed up and pulled his arm away. Two officers attempted to handcuff Frederick, but he continued to pull away, move side to side, and throw his arms forward and away from the officers' grips. After warning Frederick that if he did not comply the officer would use his stun gun, a third officer issued a three-second drive stun to Frederick. Frederick then placed his hands behind his back and was handcuffed.

During the struggle with Frederick, Angela again approached and filmed the officers at close range, asking them why they were doing what they were doing and swearing at them. After telling her several times to back away, Parrett attempted to arrest her. She pulled away, and Parrett brought her to the ground. She refused several times to put her hands behind her back, and after warning her, Parrett gave her a one-second burst of pepper spray and placed her in handcuffs.

At the time of the event, Manolo, Frederick, and Angela were seventeen years of age, and none of them had ever been charged with a delinquency offense or criminal conduct.

2. Procedural history. Manolo, Frederick, and Angela⁶ were all charged with disorderly conduct (a minor misdemeanor), disturbing the peace (a minor misdemeanor), resisting arrest (a major misdemeanor), and inciting a riot (a felony). In addition, Manolo and Frederick were charged with the common-law offense of interfering with a police officer (a minor misdemeanor). Manolo also was charged with assault and battery on a police officer (a major misdemeanor).⁷

Following motions to dismiss pursuant to Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 998 N.E.2d 1003 (2013), and over the Commonwealth's objection, a Juvenile Court judge dismissed the charges of inciting a riot in violation of G. L. c. 264, § 11, against all three juveniles. The judge stated that the statute is "not an appropriate law to apply," that "it has lost its vitality," and that it was not applicable to this particular situation, involving juveniles, as a matter of law.

Manolo moved to dismiss the minor misdemeanor charges pursuant to Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 128 N.E.3d 581 (2019). The Commonwealth moved for arraignment on all of the charges, arguing that Wallace W. is inapplicable to a complaint charging multiple, simultaneous offenses. The Juvenile Court judge rejected this argument, concluding that the juveniles could be arraigned on the major but not the minor misdemeanors. The minor misdemeanors were continued for a Wallace W. hearing, at which the Commonwealth would be given the opportunity to prove that those charges were not subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction as "first offense" misdemeanors. The Commonwealth appealed from the dismissal of the felony charges to the Appeals Court and also petitioned this court for extraordinary relief from the judge's decision not to immediately arraign on the minor misdemeanor charges. The single justice reserved and reported the cases to the full court, regarding the application of G. L. c. 119, § 52, to charges arising from the same incident; transferred sua sponte the Commonwealth's pending appeal from the dismissal of the felony charges to this court; and ordered that the matters be consolidated.

3. Discussion. a. Multicount complaints and Wallace W. hearings. General Laws c. 119, § 52, excludes from the definition of "delinquent child," and therefore from the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, any child between the ages of twelve and eighteen years old who commits "a first offense of a misdemeanor for which the punishment is a fine, imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than [six] months or both such fine and imprisonment." See G. L. c. 218, § 60 (Juvenile Court shall have jurisdiction over cases of delinquent children). In Wallace W., 482 Mass. at 800-801, 128 N.E.3d 581, we delineated the process for establishing a first offense: so-called Wallace W. hearings, at which the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile has committed a prior offense. We also described how an adjudication of delinquency at a Wallace W. proceeding would be reported and recorded. We explained that where a juvenile had no prior delinquency adjudications, the first offense of a minor misdemeanor would be dismissed, even if the first offense was proved at a Wallace W. hearing. The Commonwealth could then, however, proceed to arraignment on subsequent minor misdemeanor charges. Id. at 799-800, 128 N.E.3d 581.

We anticipated, however, apparently correctly, analytical complexities in the application of Wallace W. to cases involving "a juvenile accused of committing two or more six months or less misdemeanors, or a six months or less misdemeanor and a greater offense or offenses." Id. at 800, 128 N.E.3d 581. The instant cases present these issues to the court for resolution in the context of a single episode of criminal misconduct. We now affirm, for the reasons explained in more detail infra, that the Legislature's clear intention was to provide juveniles with a second chance in regard to minor misdemeanor conduct. The Legislature did not intend that this second chance would be defeated simply because multiple minor misdemeanors could be charged based on the same isolated incident. An isolated instance of misconduct was to be distinguished from a pattern of behavior. See id. at 795, 128 N.E.3d 581. Therefore, multiple minor misdemeanors arising from the juvenile's first episode of minor misdemeanor misconduct must all be dismissed as a "first offense." The Commonwealth may, however, proceed to arraign the juvenile on major misdemeanors or felonies accompanying the minor misdemeanors. The second chance provided by § 52 expressly applies to minor misdemeanors, not major misdemeanors or felonies.

"Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature ...." AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Barnstable, 477 Mass. 296, 300, 76...