Rahim v. Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist.

• Decision Date: 31 December 2020
• Docket Number: SJC-12884
• Citation: 159 N.E.3d 690,486 Mass. 544
• Parties: Rahimah RAHIM v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR the SUFFOLK DISTRICT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

486 Mass. 544

159 N.E.3d 690

Rahimah RAHIM

v.DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR the SUFFOLK DISTRICT.

SJC-12884

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk..

Argued September 11, 2020.

Decided December 31, 2020.

Kate R. Cook (Tristan P. Colangelo also present) for the plaintiff.

Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney, for the defendant.

Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant United States Attorney General, Hashim M. Mooppan, Deputy Assistant United States Attorney General, H. Thomas Byron, III, & Joshua K. Handell, of the District of Columbia, Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, & Brian M. LaMacchia, Assistant United States Attorney, for the United States, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Kafker, JJ.¹

LOWY, J.

During the course of investigating a fatal shooting by Federal and State law enforcement officials, the office of the district attorney for the Suffolk district (district attorney) requested and received assorted materials related to the incident from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We now decide whether these materials qualify as public records under G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a ), of the Massachusetts public records law (public records law) and, if so, whether they are exempt from disclosure under either G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a ) (exemption [a ]), or G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (f ) (exemption [f ]).²

Background. In June 2015, the FBI and the Boston police department jointly investigated Usaamah Rahim for suspected ties to the terrorist organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Among its various terrorist activities, ISIL had encouraged followers to target and kill members of law enforcement in the United States. In response to evidence that Rahim was planning imminent acts of violence against members of law enforcement, surveilling officers from the joint investigation approached him in a Boston parking lot. Rahim, carrying a large knife, walked toward the officers. After he failed to comply with orders to drop the knife, the officers fired their service weapons at Rahim, killing him.

The district attorney then opened an investigation into Rahim's death. To aid in this effort, the FBI provided various materials (FBI materials) to the district attorney.

The FBI delivered the materials accompanied by a letter asserting that the materials remained FBI property, were being loaned temporarily to the district attorney, and were not to be disclosed upon a Massachusetts public records law request. The district attorney concluded its investigation, determining that the officers had acted lawfully.

In 2017, Rahimah Rahim, Rahim's mother,³ filed a public records request seeking documents relating to Rahim's death. The district attorney provided Rahimah with 783 pages of documents, 373 photographs, and unedited surveillance footage from the investigation, but denied her access to all the FBI materials. Rahimah then sued the district attorney in the Superior Court, seeking a declaration that the FBI records were public records that must be produced under G. L. c. 66, § 10.⁴ After the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, the district attorney provided an index listing brief descriptions of each item of the FBI materials, along with brief explanations of why each was being withheld. Additionally, the United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts filed a statement of interest on behalf of the FBI, arguing that the FBI materials should not be disclosed under the Massachusetts public records law.

The judge granted the district attorney's motion for summary judgment, holding that the FBI materials were not public records because they were not "made or received by" the district attorney as that phrase is used in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, the statute that defines "public records" in the Massachusetts public records law. See G. L. c. 66, § 10. Additionally, the judge concluded that even if the FBI materials were public records, they were exempt from disclosure as "investigatory materials" under exemption (f ).⁵ Rahimah appealed. We granted her application for direct appellate review.

We now hold that the FBI materials qualify as "public records" under the public records law; that the materials do not qualify for exemption (a ); and that some of the materials qualify for exemption (f ), but the rest must be remanded to determine whether exemption (f ) applies.

Discussion. "Where the parties have cross-moved for summary judgment, we review a grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the unsuccessful opposing party and drawing all permissible inferences and resolving any evidentiary conflicts in that party's favor, the successful opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Dzung Duy Nguyen v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 479 Mass. 436, 448, 96 N.E.3d 128 (2018).

1. Public records. Two statutes primarily govern public records requests. General Laws c. 66, § 10 (a ), of the public records law requires State governmental entities to provide access to "public records" upon request.⁶ The definition of "public records" is provided in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, and includes all "documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee" of any Massachusetts governmental entity (emphasis added). The district attorney maintains, and the Superior Court held, that "received" implies ownership and, therefore, the FBI materials are not public records under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, because the materials belong to the FBI, not the district attorney.⁷ We disagree.

"A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result." Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360, 758 N.E.2d 110 (2001). See also Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd. 483 Mass. 600, 604, 135 N.E.3d 702 (2019), quoting Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 118, 92 N.E.3d 724 (2018) ("When conducting statutory interpretation, this court strives ‘to effectuate’ the Legislature's intent by looking first to the statute's plain language").

"Receive" means "to take possession or delivery of"; it does not mean own.⁸ Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1894 (1993). See also Black's Law Dictionary 1522 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "receive" as "To take [something offered, given, sent, etc.]; to come into possession of or get from some outside source"). Not only would construing "received" to be synonymous with "owned" contravene the plain meaning of the word, it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the public records law: to provide "the public broad access to governmental records." Worcester Tel. & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 436 Mass. 378, 382-383, 764 N.E.2d 847 (2002) ( Worcester Tel.). If every public records request also required the requestor to conduct something akin to a title search, then the public would necessarily be stymied in its quest for greater government transparency. By using the word "received" in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend a result so starkly at odds with the purpose of the law.

Consequently, because the district attorney received the FBI materials, the materials are "public records" under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. Cf. Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 755, 840 N.E.2d 518 (2006) (reports created by private university would qualify as public records "[o]nce in the custody of the department of State police").

The FBI's assertion that the materials are Federal property and outside the purview of the public records law does not alter this conclusion. The public records law does not vest agencies with the authority to determine the statute's scope by making interagency agreements. See Champa v. Weston Pub. Sch., 473 Mass. 86, 98, 39 N.E.3d 435 (2015), quoting Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1339 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("It will obviously not be enough for the agency to assert simply that it received the file under a pledge of confidentiality to the one who supplied it"). That duty is the province of the supervisor of public records, the Superior Court, and, ultimately, this court. See Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 414 Mass. 609, 615, 609 N.E.2d 460 (1993). See also Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 Mass. 478, 481, 852 N.E.2d 1061 (2006), citing Cleary v. Cardullo's, Inc., 347 Mass. 337, 343-344, 198 N.E.2d 281 (1964) ("the duty of statutory interpretation rests in the courts").

2. Exemptions. Although the definition of "public records" under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, is intentionally broad,⁹ the statute exempts twenty-one categories of information from disclosure. See G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a )-(v ), as amended through St. 2019, c. 41, § 4. Because the statute presumes disclosure, these exemptions "must be strictly and narrowly construed." Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Department of Pub. Health, 482 Mass. 427, 432, 124 N.E.3d 127 (2019), quoting Globe Newspaper Co., 439 Mass. at 380, 788 N.E.2d 513. "Despite this general presumption, the decision whether an exemption to disclosure applies requires careful case-by-case consideration." WBZ-TV4 v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 408 Mass. 595, 603, 562 N.E.2d 817 (1990). Here, the district attorney claims that both exemption (a ) and exemption (f ) apply to the FBI materials.

a. Exemption ( a ). A public record custodian may invoke exemption (a ) to prevent disclosure in two scenarios. First, exemption (a ) exempts a custodian from disclosing public records "where another statute -- the ‘exempting statute’ -- expressly prohibits disclosure." Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v....