Pokorny v. Salas

• Decision Date: 12 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-241.,02-241.
• Citation: 81 P.3d 171,2003 WY 159
• Parties: Richard POKORNY and Julia Goldensohn, Appellants (Intervening Counterclaim Plaintiffs), and Snake River Holdings, LLC, Appellant (Defendant), v. Patrick D. SALAS and Kathleen L. Salas; Sal G. Giacinto and Linda T. Giacinto (Trustees); Donald L. Wadsworth and Gwenn E. Wadsworth (Trustees), Appellees (Plaintiffs), and Porcupine Creek Ranch Limited Liability Company; Hereford-Bally Ranch Limited Liability Company; Creed Law and Alta Clarene Law, Appellees (Intervening Plaintiffs).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

81 P.3d 171

2003 WY 159

Richard POKORNY and Julia Goldensohn, Appellants (Intervening Counterclaim Plaintiffs), and Snake River Holdings, LLC, Appellant (Defendant), v. Patrick D. SALAS and Kathleen L. Salas; Sal G. Giacinto and Linda T. Giacinto (Trustees); Donald L. Wadsworth and Gwenn E. Wadsworth (Trustees), Appellees (Plaintiffs), and Porcupine Creek Ranch Limited Liability Company; Hereford-Bally Ranch Limited Liability Company; Creed Law and Alta Clarene Law, Appellees (Intervening Plaintiffs).

No. 02-241.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

December 12, 2003.

Representing Appellant(s): Christopher Hawks of Christopher Hawks, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee(s): Peter F. Moyer, Jackson, Wyoming; David K. Larson and Matthew E. Turner of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, Jackson, Wyoming.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] This case concerns two easements in the Game Creek Plateau area of Teton County, Wyoming. Due to the area's topography, the easements provide the only viable access to various properties within the Game Creek Plateau. The original owners of a large portion of the land created the two easements to provide access to residential subdivisions in the area and to guarantee future access to the land they retained, which otherwise was inaccessible. Both appellants and appellees are successors in interest to the original owners, yet the former contend neither easement provides such access, while the latter argue both easements do just that. The district court held both easements provide access to all owners in the area. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] The issues presented are: (1) Whether appellants are estopped by the doctrines of collateral estoppel, res judicata and/or judicial estoppel from claiming that the 1972 right of way easement does not grant access rights to the appellees; and (2) Whether the 1978 reserved easement is appurtenant or in gross?

FACTS

The 1972 Easement

[¶ 3] The original Game Creek Plateau landowners, Hugh and Donna Marie Soest (Soests), owned a large parcel of land contiguous to the only public access, the Game Creek Road. In 1972, the Soests granted a 60-foot wide right-of-way easement to Squaw Creek Ranches, Inc., a subdivision. Without the easement, the Squaw Creek Ranches property owners would have been landlocked. The easement also granted access to "any other person or persons, for his or their benefit and advantage, at all times freely to pass and repass ..." over and across Squaw Creek Road from the terminus of the Game Creek Road¹ through lands owned by the Soests. Their land was ultimately divided into four separate contiguous parcels which lie south of the Game Creek Road terminus: Segment One, adjoining the road, the Squaw Creek Draw 40, the Reardon 40 and the Hayfields (see attached map, Appendix A). The easement terminated at the south end of the Squaw Creek Draw 40 property, and did not continue south to the remainder of the Soests' property (the Reardon 40 and the Hayfields).

The 1978 Easement

[¶ 4] After granting the 1972 easement, the Soests began selling parcels of their land. A portion of Segment One, now called "The Horse Palace," was one of the first parcels to be sold and was conveyed to James and Patty Scott (Scotts) in 1974. In a 1978 warranty deed, the Soests conveyed forty acres to the Reardon group (Reardon 40). In a 1979 warranty deed, the Soests conveyed another forty acres to a different buyer (Squaw Creek Draw 40). The Reardon 40 is located just south of the Squaw Creek Draw 40 and north of the large tract of land retained by the Soests (Hayfields).

[¶ 5] In the Reardon 40 transaction, the Soests reserved for themselves an easement (the 1978 easement) to preserve access across the Reardon 40 to the Hayfields. This easement, together with the 1972 easement, provided access all the way from the Game Creek Road, through Segment One, through the Squaw Creek Draw 40, and through the Reardon 40 to the retained Hayfields. No other access to the Hayfields existed at the time the 1978 easement was created.²

The 1981 Litigation

[¶ 6] In 1981, litigation ensued concerning the 1972 easement (Scott v. Squaw Creek Ranches, Inc.). The Scotts, owners of the only land contiguous to the Game Creek Road, which was the singular public access to the Game Creek Plateau, sought quiet title to their land against all individuals using the 1972 easement who did not own property in the Squaw Creek Ranch subdivision, a grantee of the easement which is south of the Scotts' property. In other words, the Scotts sought a court ruling to the effect that only Squaw Creek property owners could use the 1972 easement, and all other property owners in the Game Creek Plateau area would be barred from using it, including the owners of the Hayfields and the other subdivisions in the area. The defendants in that 1981 litigation, who did not own property in Squaw Creek, argued the express terms of the 1972 easement granting access to "any other persons" provided them and all of the Game Creek Plateau residents access. Some of the appellants in this action who seek to defeat the 1972 easement are successors to those defendants who took the opposite position in the 1981 litigation.

[¶ 7] At trial, the district court granted a directed verdict³ motion and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Although the Scotts filed a notice of appeal, the appeal was dismissed on February 1, 1982.

The Present Case

[¶ 8] Over fifteen years after the 1981 litigation ended, the current Hayfields Property Owners,⁴ apparently seeking to confirm their easement, requested that the appellants,⁵ landowners in the Reardon 40 and the Squaw Creek Draw 40, sign a document entitled "Confirmation." When the appellants refused to do so, the Hayfields Property Owners sued seeking a declaratory judgment that the easements allowed them access over and across the Squaw Creek Draw 40 and the Reardon 40, all the way through to the Hayfields. The appellants asserted the Hayfields Property Owners did not have access under the 1972 easement because it was not intended for general use. They also contended the Hayfields Property Owners had no access across the Reardon 40 under the 1978 easement because it was not appurtenant to the Hayfields and terminated when the Soests sold their property.

[¶ 9] The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on November 13, 2001. After a hearing on November 19, 2001, the district court entered an order granting the Hayfields Property Owners' motion for summary judgment finding that the 1972 easement granted access to the general public, which included the Hayfields Property Owners. Further, the court held the 1972 easement was confirmed by the 1981 judgment in Scott v. Squaw Creek Ranches, Inc. Thus, the appellants were barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel from denying the Hayfields Property Owners and their heirs and successors access across the 1972 easement.

[¶ 10] As to the 1978 easement, the district court held it was a valid, enforceable easement appurtenant to the Hayfields. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The 1972 Easement

[¶ 11] The appellants claim the 1972 easement is not a public easement⁶ and its use is limited to successors in interest to the Squaw Creek Ranch subdivision which was specifically named as a grantee of the easement. Further, they argue this claim is not barred by judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, or res judicata. Conversely, the Hayfields Property Owners argue that the 1972 easement is a public easement, and the doctrines of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, and/or res judicata do apply. For reasons set forth below, we need discuss only the latter two doctrines.

[¶ 12] Collateral estoppel and res judicata are analogous, but not synonymous. Although they share a common interest in finality, the doctrines themselves are different. Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 238 (Wyo. 1997). We recently reiterated their differences:

In Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶¶ 15-20, 25 P.3d 511, ¶¶ 15-20 (Wyo.2001), we extensively recognized that res judicata and collateral estoppel are related but distinct concepts.

Res judicata bars the relitigation of previously litigated claims or causes of action. Slavens v. Board of County Commissioners, 854 P.2d 683, 686 (Wyo.1993). Four factors are examined to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies: (1) identity in parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them. Id. Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of previously litigated issues and involves an analysis of four similar factors: (1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Id. (Quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4443 at 382-85 (1981)).

Polo Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 15, ¶ 12, 61 P.3d 1255, ¶ 12 (Wyo.2003).

[¶ 13] Collateral estoppel is issue preclusion, while res judicata is claim preclusion. Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d 511, ¶ 15 (Wyo. 2001). The appellants' claims in this case are not, in their entirety, identical to the previous claims in the 1981 litigation. However, an issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to an issue presented in this case and,...