Police, Lodge 142 v. City of Perkins, 102,113.

• Decision Date: 23 June 2006
• Docket Number: Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 3.,No. 102,113.,102,113.
• Parties: FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 142 and Tom Hankins, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. CITY OF PERKINS, Oklahoma, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 829

146 P.3d 829

2006 OK CIV APP 122

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE 142 and Tom Hankins, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. CITY OF PERKINS, Oklahoma, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 102,113.

Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 3.

Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division 3.

June 23, 2006.

Certiorari Denied October 3, 2006.

Appeal from the District Court of Payne County, Oklahoma; Honorable Donald L. Worthington, Judge.

AFFIRMED

Douglas D. Vernier, James R. Moore & Associates, P.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiffs/Appellants.

Tony G. Puckett, Ronald T. Shinn, Jr., McAFee & Taft, A Professional Corporation, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant/Appellee.

BAY MITCHELL, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs/Appellants the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 142 (Police Lodge) and Tom Hankins appeal from an order of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendant/Appellee City of Perkins. City terminated Hankins as a police officer because he could not fulfill his duties after he was banned from using the dispatching and jail facilities of the Iowa Tribe with which City contracted for services. The Police Lodge and Hankins filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that required binding arbitration. The arbitrator found City did not have just cause to terminate Hankins, and ordered City to reinstate Hankins and make him whole of all wages and benefits of employment. City refused to comply with the arbitrator's award.

¶ 2 The Police Lodge and Hankins filed an action to enforce the arbitrator's award in district court, and City filed a counterclaim asking the court to vacate the award. The Police Lodge and Hankins moved for partial summary judgment for enforcement, and the City counter-moved for summary judgment to vacate the award. The court awarded summary judgment to the City. The court found the arbitrator's decision did not draw its essence from the CBA because he imposed requirements not required by the CBA, and the award was based on considerations of fairness and equity instead of the terms of the CBA.¹

¶ 3 Oklahoma law requires binding and final arbitration of labor disputes for police departments. 11 O.S.2001 § 51-111. The purpose of arbitration is to prevent court intervention into the merits of disputes when arbitration has been provided for contractually. Voss v. City of Oklahoma City, 1980 OK 148, ¶ 5, 618 P.2d 925, 927. An arbitrator's power is both derived from, and limited by, the collective bargaining agreement. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 67 L.Ed.2d 641, 655 (1981).

¶ 4 In reviewing an arbitrator's decision, the district court must afford the arbitrator great deference, and cannot review the merits of the award, including any of the factual or legal findings. City of Yukon v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2055, 1990 OK 48, ¶ 8, 792 P.2d 1176, 1179. Because the parties bargain for the arbitrator's construction of the contract, a reviewing court cannot overturn that decision merely because it disagrees with the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). An arbitration award is only legitimate if it "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). If the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this duty, the reviewing court has no choice but to refuse to enforce the award. Id. The Sixth Circuit has stated an arbitrator's award does not draw its essence from the CBA when it:

1. conflicts with express terms of the collective bargaining agreement;

2. imposes additional requirements that are not expressly provided in the agreement;

3. is without rational support or cannot be rationally derived from the terms of the agreement; or

4. is based on general considerations of fairness and equity instead of the precise terms of the agreement.

Cement Divisions, National Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 793 F.2d 759, 766 (6th Cir.1986) (internal citations omitted). See also Local No. 7 United Food and Commercial Workers International Union v. King Soopers, Inc., 222 F.3d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir.2000) (citing Mistletoe Express v. Motor Expressmen's Union, 566 F.2d 692, 694 (10th Cir.1977)) ("... an award does not draw its essence from the CBA if it is contrary to the express language of the contract ... or ... is so unfounded in reason and fact, so unconnected with the working and purpose of the agreement as to manifest an infidelity to the obligation of the arbitrator .... [or] if viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention, it is without factual support."); Conoco, Inc. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, 26 F.Supp.2d 1310 (N.D.Okla.1998) (arbitration award draws its essence from CBA if it is "rationally inferable" in "some logical way" from the agreement).

¶ 5 After reviewing the entire record and considering our limited standard of review, we affirm the district court's order vacating the arbitrator's award. The award did not draw its essence from the CBA because it imposed additional requirements on the City, and the decision was based on considerations of equity and fairness instead of the terms of the CBA.

¶ 6 At the time of Hankins discharge, the City of Perkins Police Department employed four officers, including the Police Chief, Robert L. Williams, and an officer serving on each of three patrol shifts. Officer Hankins was on the night patrol shift. Perkins has a population of approximately 2,300 and is 2.2 square miles in area. The City is also contiguous to the Iowa Indian Reservation, which encompasses 75 square miles. Significantly, City did not have its own radio dispatch capability or its own jail, so it relied on three agreements with the Iowa Tribe to provide these services.

¶ 7 First, the City and the Tribe had a "Memoranda of Understanding" to share the Tribe's dispatching service for 911 calls, traffic calls and other police calls for a monthly fee of $750. If the City had to purchase and maintain its own dispatching, it would greatly exceed this cost. Prior to this agreement, the City was only able to contract for part-time dispatching service until 2:00 a.m. The other two agreements were titled "Intergovernmental Co-operative Agreements." In the first of these, the two departments agreed to cross-deputize their officers by issuing special commissions to officers from the other department to respond to calls in either jurisdiction. This resolved jurisdictional problems that had previously existed between the two departments. The other agreement gave the City use of the Iowa Tribe's jail and booking services for the incarceration of people for municipal warrants and for municipal ordinance misdemeanors. Prior to this agreement, the City had no method of jailing people for City purposes. The City paid a per-booking and per-day fee for the use of this facility. This agreement could be cancelled on 72-hours notice by either party if they objected to "any law, rule, policy or regulation of the other." The first two agreements were for the term of one year, but allowed for cancellation or amendment by either party by giving written notice. The agreements also required the use of best efforts to negotiate any differences in order to provide the public with the best law enforcement services.

¶ 8 By...