Pollard v. Steffens

• Decision Date: 01 February 1961
• Docket Number: No. A-7170,A-7170
• Citation: 343 S.W.2d 234,161 Tex. 594
• Parties: Harry S. POLLARD, Petitioner, v. Mrs. C. Louis STEFFENS, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 234

343 S.W.2d 234

161 Tex. 594

Harry S. POLLARD, Petitioner, v. Mrs. C. Louis STEFFENS, Respondent.

No. A-7170.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Feb. 1, 1961.

Rehearing Denied March 8, 1961.

Cofer & Cofer, Austin, for petitioner.

Coffee, Cain, Read & McCracken, Dallas, for respondent.

CULVER, Justice.

Our former opinion in this case is withdrawn and the following substituted in lieu thereof.

By bill of review filed against respondent, Mrs. Steffens, petitioner's stepmother, in September, 1956, the petitioner, Pollard, sought to set aside a judgment of probate court rendered in July, 1953, on the ground of a mutual mistake of law. The probate court having denied the relief sought, upon appeal to the district court, judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Mrs. Steffens. 319 S.W.2d 447.

The mistake of law that petitioner asserts is with respect to the validity of a survivorship agreement executed by Mrs. Steffens and her deceased husband, the father of petitioner, pertaining to certain building and loan shares and Federal Credit Union deposits that were purchased with their community funds. The Building & Loan agreement provided that:

'It is understood and agreed that the shares hereby subscribed for and issued by the association, as well as all accumulations thereon, are to be held by the association for our joint account, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, as at common law, and not as tenants in common; that the funds represented by said shares may be withdrawn by either party hereto before or after the death of either, subject to the laws of the State of Texas, and to the by-laws of the association, and either party is authorized to pledge the same as collateral security to a loan and either may draw the dividends thereon.'

The Federal Credit Union agreement was in similar form.

The Court of Civil Appeals, omitting any discussion on the right of petitioner to maintain the bill of review, passed directly upon the survivorship agreement holding it to be valid and vesting title to all of the building and loan shares in Mrs. Steffens. The Court considered our recent decision in Ricks v. Smith, 318 S.W.2d 439, to be controlling.

We granted petitioner's application for writ of error with the view of passing upon this question and resolving the conflict between this decision of the Dallas court and its former holding in Reed v Reed, 283 S.W.2d 311, but upon further consideration we are of the opinion that even conceding that the decision in Reed v. Reed is correct, as petitioner contends here, nevertheless the mistake, if any, is not one for which equity will grant relief. Therefore, under well-recognized appellate judicial procedure we do not reach or decide the question as to whether or not under the above-mentioned survivorship agreement, Mrs. Steffens, as a matter of law, was entitled to all or to only her community half of the building and loan shares.

The judgment attacked by petitioner is an 'order approving final report of temporary administratrix, ordering distribution of estate, and terminating temporary administration.' This order was entered in accordance with a statutory duty enjoined upon the probate court by Article 3641, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Stats. (now Section 408 of the Probate Code, V.A.T.S.) ¹ which provides that:

'Upon a settlement of an estate, if there by any of the estate remaining in the hands of the executor and administrator, and the heirs, devisees or legatees of the estate, or their assignee, or either of them, are present or represented in court, the county judge shall order a partition and distribution of the estate to be made among them.'

On its face, the order sought to be set aside by petitioner does not purport to be an agreed or consent judgment. It is recited therein that:

'(I)t further appearing to the Court from the evidence adduced that all debts owed by and chargeable to the estate of the decedent herein, have been fully paid and discharged by the Temporary Administratrix that there is no further necessity for administration herein and that the surviving heirs of the decedent entitled to receive the remainder of the estate herein are Mrs. Edith T. Steffens, the widow and Harry S. Pollard, the son of C. Louis Steffens, deceased * * * and that the remaining estate in the hands of the Temporary Administratrix is subject to partition and distribution in accordance with the laws of descent and distribution of Texas, as modified by the express written directions of said decedent * * *.

'It is therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed, by the Court that Mrs. Edith T. Steffens, the surviving widow, and Harry S. Pollard, the surviving son of C. Louis Steffens, deceased, be and each is hereby vested with title to the following property of said estate remaining in the hands of the Temporary Administratrix:

'To Mrs. Edith T. Steffens:

'* * * All United States Savings Bonds, Series E. payable to C. Louis Steffens or Mrs. Edith T. Steffens, and payable to Mrs. Edith T. Steffens as beneficiary;

'All Building and Loan Shares:

'The T E C C O Deposit in the name of C. Louis Steffens, with right of survivorship to Mrs. Edith T. Steffens in the amount of $1102.24 * * *.

'To Harry S. Pollard: (Here follows description of property awarded to Pollard.)'

Petitioner is a practicing attorney. The relations between him and his stepmother were normal and pleasant. Upon his father's death intestate, petitioner counseled with and assisted her in settling up the affairs of the estate. He prepared the papers incident to her appointment as temporary administratrix and her final report and account. He drew up the decree purporting to vest title and ordering distribution to Mrs. Steffens of all of the building and loan shares and the Federal Credit Union deposits and caused it to be entered by the probate court. It likewise distributed all of the remaining property of the estate, specifically mentioning and setting aside to Mrs. Steffens 17 other items of property and 16 items to the petitioner-son. That part awarded to him was of substantial value. Petitioner, before drawing up and consenting to the entry of the decree, was familiar with the decisions in the case of Chandler v. Kountze, Tex.Civ.App., 130 S.W.2d 327, wr. ref., and Shroff v. Deaton, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 489. He says that it was not until three years later in 1956 that he became aware of this mistake, shortly before filing this bill, when the Dallas court handed down its decision in Reed v. Reed, supra, declining to follow Shroff v. Deaton and holding that such a survivorship agreement as we have here does not operate to vest title to all of the community interest in the survivor. Therefore, he contends that the decree should be set aside, the mistake corrected, and that he be awarded his father's community interest in these shares.

The following facts, among others, were found by the trial court: That the building and loan shares were awarded to Mrs. Steffens as a result of a mutual mistake; that Mrs. Steffens has suffered no injury by the mistaken entry of the probate judgment and has all of the property intact; that the petitioner was not mistaken through negligence and relief is not barred by limitation or laches; that the judgment was entered by agreement and that the intention of the parties was that the estate be distributed according to the laws of descent and distribution.

(1) The rule as stated in Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed., Vol. 3, § 1246, thus:

'But in the absence of some element of fraud or misconduct on the part of the adverse party, equity will never interpose to vacate or enjoin a judgment on the ground of mistake or ignorance of law, nor because of a mistake of law caused by the opinions or suggestions of the judge before whom the cause was tried.'

Similarly, in 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 365, and to the same effect:

'It is no ground for relief in equity that the party was prevented from making his defense at law by a mistake of law, not induced by the fraud or misconduct of the other party, or by reason of mistaking or misunderstanding his rights in the premises.'

In this case petitioner does not suggest that any fraud was practiced upon him or that he relied upon the respondent, that he was misled by her or that she had any superior knowledge as to the law.

Petitioner does not disagree, we think, with the foregoing rule, but he says that he was mistaken with reference to his own antecedent and existing private legal rights as distinguished from a mistake of law generally, and that therein lies an exception to the rule. He relies on the statement in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 3 (5th Ed.) § 849a, p. 311, as follows:

'Wherever a person is ignorant or mistaken with respect to his own antecedent and existing private legal rights, interests, estates, duties, liabilities, or other relations, either of property or contract or personal status, and enters into some transaction the legal scope and operation of which he correctly apprehends and understands, for the purpose of affecting such assumed rights, interests, or relations, or of carrying out such assumed duties and liabilities, equity will grant its relief, defensive or affirmative, treating the mistake as analogous to, if not identical with a mistake of fact. * * *' The petitioner, from an examination of the decisions and the statutes, must have determined that he was barred from any claim of ownership in the building and loan shares. The effect of his contention now is that after satisfying himself as to the status of the law he agreed to the probate decree impliedly upon the condition that if a subsequent decision of the appellate courts determined the law to be otherwise he would not be bound by the probate decree and it would be subject to avoidance. We are of the opinion that this position is untenable.

(2, 3) A change in judicial interpretation or view of...