Reed v. Reed, 14988

• Decision Date: 30 September 1955
• Docket Number: No. 14988,14988
• Citation: 283 S.W.2d 311
• Parties: Edna REED, Appellant, v. Arthur J. REED et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 311

283 S.W.2d 311

Edna REED, Appellant, v. Arthur J. REED et al., Appellees.

No. 14988.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Sept. 30, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 28, 1955.

Gullett & Gullett and Robert L. Doss, Denison, for appellant.

Freeman, Wolfe, Henderson & Bryant, James E. Henderson, Sherman, for appellees.

YOUNG, Justice.

This controversy involves the ownership of certain Savings Certificates, Edna Reed, widow of Mack C. Reed, deceased, claiming then as her separate property; Arthur Reed and other children by his first wife contending that same continued to be assets of the Mack C. Reed community estate. These children (three sons and a daughter) had appealed from a County Court ruling adverse to their contention, and upon District Court trial the items of property in question were determined to be community property, as to which the surviving children were entitled to a one-half interest; the widow Edna Reed here complaining of such judgment.

The appeal is upon an agreed statement of facts accurately summarized in brief of appellant as follows: Mack C. Reed died November 22, 1952 with no children born to his marriage with Edna Reed. His legal heirs surviving him were his wife and above mentioned children of a prior marriage, Mrs. Maxine Reed Hill, Arthur J., Paul, and John D. Reed; Mrs. Edna Reed qualifying as Temporary Administratrix and the litigation above noted following in sequence.

On October 19, 1950, deceased and appellant had purchased fifteen shares of paid-up stock (value $1,500) in the Metropolitan Building & Loan Assn. of Dallas, receiving its Certificate No. 7368; on same date they executing and delivering to the Company an instrument designated 'Membership of Joint Holdes, with Right of Survivorship,' and providing in part: 'It is understood and agreed that the shares hereby subscribed for and issued by the Association, and all monies paid, or that may hereafter be paid thereon by either party hereto, as well as all accumulations thereon, are to be held by the Association for our joint account, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, as at common law, and not as tenants in common; that the funds represented by said shares may be withdrawn by either party hereto before or after the death of either, subject to the laws of the State of Texas, and to the ByLaws of the Association, and either party is authorized to pledge the same as collateral security to a loan and either may draw the dividends thereon.' They likewise purchased $2,500 worth of stock in the Oak Cliff Savings & Loan Association, viz.: On July 9, 1952, ten shares, Certificate No. 2718, and on July 16, 1952, fifteen shares, Certificate No. 2749; executing and delivering to the County an instrument styled, 'Application, Signature Card, and Proxy,' along with another paper designated 'Joint Account Agreement,' providing in part: '(1) That the shares hereby subscribed for shall be issued by the Association in the joint names of the undersigned as joint tenants with right of survivorship as at common law and not as tenants in common, and (2) that all monies paid, or that may hereafter be paid thereon, by either party hereto, and all additions thereto and accumulations thereon are and shall be held by this Association for the joint account of the undersigned as joint tenants with right of survivorship as at common law and not as tenants in common, and (3) that the redemption or withdrawal value of such account and dividends or other rights relating thereto may be paid or delivered, in whole or in part, to either of the undersigned and either is authorized to pledge said account as collateral security for a loan.' On face of each of above mentioned Certificates it was recited that same was issued to 'M. C. Reed and/or Edna Reed, or the Survivor of either, as Joint Tenants and not as Tenants in Common.'

Erarlier, in March and April of 1946, deceased and appellant had made two deposits with the Postal Savings System, one of $1,500, the other of $1,000. 39 U.S.C.A. § 754, setting up the Postal Savings System, provides: 'Opening accounts and making deposits. Accounts may be opened and deposits made in any postal savings depository established under this chapter by any person of the age of ten years or over, in his or her own name, and by a married woman in her own name and free from any control or interference by her husband; but no person shall at the same time have more than one postal savings account in his or her own right.' Rules and regulations of the Postal System are to like effect; it being stipulated by the parties that, under said Federal regulations, 'one person may only deposit and be issued certificates for an amount not exceeding $2,500.00, but said system will accept and issue certificates for a deposit of $2,500.00 in the name of a husband and an additional $2,500.00 in the name of a wife.' Still earlier than the date of the investments just listed, Mack C. Reed had deposited with the Postal Savings System in his own name the sum of $2,500, which item is not involved in this appeal; having been accounted for by appellant in her final report as community property. It is undisputed that the source of all above investments (Building & Loan and Postal) was from community funds.

Appellant complains of the trial court's ruling that the foregoing assets remained a part of the community estate; in other words, the court's denial of her claim to the whole thereof as separate property because of: (1) 'The building and loan association stock in question having been made the subject of a specific agreement of joint tenancy with right of survivorship between deceased and appellant and the associations involved, and appellant being the owner thereof under said agreement's terms'; and (2) 'The postal savings certificates in question representing deposits of appellant in her own name and free from any control or interference by her husband, and it being unlawful for the deposits to be made or accepted other than in her own individual right.'

It is argued that the arrangements of joint tenancy with right of survivorship set up by this husband and wife with the loan associations were legal and enforceable transactions; appellant relying chiefly on the holdings of Chandler v. Kountze, Tex.Civ.App., 130 S.W.2d 327 (writ ref.), and Shroff v. Deaton, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 489, for the contentions made. The Galveston Court in Chandler v. Kountze, supra (130 S.W.2d 329), has construed art. 2580, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., abolishing the common-law doctrine of jus accrescendi, to mean that: 'While the wording of Article 2580 indicates a legislative intent to abolish the relationship of joint tenancy where it would otherwise have been created by law, including the common-law doctrine of survivorship, there is nothing in the subject matter of the act which would, in our opinion, justify the presumption that the legislature intended to thereby prevent the parties to a contract, a will, or a deed of conveyance, from providing among themselves that the property in question should pass to and vest in the survivor as at common law.' (Emphasis ours.) In Shroff's appeal, the rule above emphasized was discussed as having application to a transaction between husband and wife involving building and loan stock; the Texarkana Court finally holding in effect that if it be mistaken in applicability of Chandler v. Kountze, the case should nevertheless be affirmed on basis of a valid gift of the stock, made by Deaton to the surviving wife shortly before his death.

On the other hand, the following rules and construction of relevant statutes are regarded as controlling of the transactions here in question: (1) Property of a wife takes its status as separate or community property at time of its acquisition. Henry v. Reinle, Tex.Civ.App., 245 S.W.2d 743; Van v. Webb, Tex.Civ.App., 237 S.W.2d 827; Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777. (2) 'Separate property of either spouse may be conveyed to the other in such way as to become his or her separate property, and community property may be so conveyed by the husband to the wife as to make it hers separately, but spouses cannot by mere agreement partition and transfer their community property one to the other and thereby change the class of the estate which the law fixes in each. Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. arts. 4613, 4614, 4616; Vernon's Ann.St.Const. art. 16, § 15.' Bruce v. Permian Royalty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 186 S.W.2d 686, syl. 5; King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803, 171 A.L.R. 1328. (3) In McDonald v. Stevenson, Tex.Civ.App., 245 S.W. 777, 781 (writ ref.) art. 4610, V.A.C.S., has been construed as prohibiting a change, by agreement of husband and wife, of community property into separate property of each; the court holding that 'While the laws of Texas have ever...