McMackin v. Johnson County Healthcare Center
Decision Date | 01 August 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 01-214.,01-214. |
Citation | 73 P.3d 1094,2003 WY 91 |
Parties | Leslie McMACKIN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Harriette R. Brown, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. JOHNSON COUNTY HEALTHCARE CENTER, a Wyoming Hospital District; Mark S. Schueler, M.D.; Lawrence E. Kirven, M.D. Medical Associates of Johnson County, P.C.; Jennifer Sather, R.N.; and Vicki Blakely, L.P.N., Appellees (Defendants). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Don W. Riske and James R. Salisbury of Riske & Arnold, P.C., Cheyenne, WY, Representing Appellant. Argument by Mr. Riske.
Michael K. Davis of Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, WY, for Johnson County Healthcare Center, Sather and Blakey; George E. Powers, Jr. of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, WY for Dr. Schueler; Jeffrey C. Brinkerhoff and Timothy M. Stubson of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, WY, for Dr. Kirven and Medical Associates of Johnson County, Representing Appellees. Argument by Messrs. Davis, Brinkerhoff, and Powers.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN1, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶ 1] Appellant, Leslie McMackin (McMackin), seeks review of the district court's order granting summary judgment to Appellees, Johnson County Healthcare Center (JCHC), Jennifer Sather, R.N. (Nurse Sather), Vicki Blakely, L.P.N. (Nurse Blakely), Mark S. Schueler, M.D. (Dr. Schueler), Lawrence E. Kirven, M.D. (Dr. Kirven), and Medical Associates of Johnson County, P.C. (MAJC). McMackin is the daughter of, and personal representative for the estate of, Harriette R. Brown (Brown), and she prosecuted these wrongful death and medical malpractice actions against the Appellees after her mother's death. Brown died of a stroke, and it is McMackin's contention that the Appellees were negligent in their treatment of Brown. The district court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the "causation" prong of the elements necessary to constitute a medical malpractice claim and, on that basis, granted summary judgment for the Appellees.
[¶ 2] We will reverse on the basis that McMackin's malpractice claims fall under the "loss of chance" doctrine and the facts alleged in her complaint and contained in her evidentiary submissions opposing the Appellees' summary judgment motions satisfy the causation element, at least for purposes of summary judgment, i.e., those facts structure a genuine issue of material fact. The matter will be remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[¶ 3] McMackin articulates these issues:
JCHC, Nurse Sather, and Nurse Blakely rephrase the issue to be:
Did the trial court err in granting the Appellees' motions for summary judgment when Appellant could not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not any medical intervention would more probably than not have prevented the death of her mother?
Dr. Schueler states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment in a wrongful death case when the plaintiff failed to respond to the Defendants['] Motions for Summary Judgment with evidence which demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact remained on the issue of causation.
Dr. Kirven and MAJC state the issues as:
[¶ 4] In her amended complaint, McMackin averred that Brown was a resident at the Amie Holt Care Center in Buffalo from 1990 until her death on March 21, 1999. The Amie Holt Care Center is a part of JCHC. Nurse Sather and Nurse Blakely were employed at JCHC and provided care to Brown at various times pertinent to this matter.
[¶ 5] In July of 1998, Brown began exhibiting symptoms of transient ischemic attacks (TIA's, also referred to as ministrokes), during which she would be confused and unable to verbalize. These symptoms were noted many times on Brown's chart and they continued to occur at irregular intervals after July of 1998. It is alleged that the Appellees took no action to refer Brown for a neurological workup, test her for causes of the TIA's, further diagnose, or prescribe meaningful treatment for her condition.
[¶ 6] At some time prior to 9:00 p.m., on March 7, 1999, a JCHC employee discovered that Brown was having difficulty talking and was crying. This was reported to Nurse Sather, who examined Brown and noted in her chart that Brown's speech was slurred, that she was crying and suffering anxiety, had slight facial drooping on the left side, and her left eye was closed. McMackin contends that there should have been an immediate medical response to her mother's condition, but there was not. Nurse Sather examined Brown periodically between 11:00 p.m., on March 7, 1999, and 4:30 a.m. the following day, but took no action until 4:30 a.m., at which time she called Dr. Kirven who advised Nurse Sather to wait for Brown's treating physician, Dr. Schueler. At 8:00 a.m. on March 8, 1999, Nurse Blakely examined Brown and noted the symptoms which had persisted throughout the night. Nurse Blakely called Dr. Schueler and noted on Brown's chart that the doctor would be there in about 30 minutes. At about 9:00 a.m. on March 8th, Dr. Schueler examined Brown and diagnosed a cerebrovascular accident (stroke) and arranged for her to be transferred to the hospital. Brown did not recover from the stroke, and she died on March 21, 1999, as a consequence of it.
[¶ 7] All Appellees filed motions for summary judgment. The record is voluminous; however, the basis for the grant of summary judgment is narrowly focused. The district court's order granting the motions for summary judgment contains these conclusions:
We will utilize other facts in the context of our discussion of the issues.
[¶ 8] When we review a summary judgment, we have before us the same materials as did the district court, and we follow the same standards which applied to the proceedings below. The propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reed v. Miles Land and Livestock Company, 2001 WY 16, ¶ 9, 18 P.3d 1161, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or defense. We, of course, examine the record from a vantage point most favorable to that party who opposed the motion, affording to that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that fairly may be drawn from the record. Central Wyoming Medical Laboratory, LLC v. Medical Testing Lab, Inc., 2002 WY 47, ¶ 15, 43 P.3d 121, ¶ 15 (Wyo.2002); Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶ 15 (Wyo.2001). If the evidence leads to conflicting interpretations or if reasonable minds might differ, summary judgment is improper. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission v. Mills Company, 701 P.2d 819, 821 (Wyo.1985).
[¶ 9] That standard of review is refined somewhat when applied to a negligence action and, in particular, a malpractice case:
Summary judgment is not favored in a negligence action and is, therefore, subject to more exacting scrutiny. Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, Inc., 927 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Wyo.1996). This is particularly true in malpractice suits. DeHerrera v. Memorial Hospital of Carbon County, 590 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Wyo.1979) (quoting Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40, 46 (Fla.1966)
). We have, however, affirmed summary judgment in negligence cases where the record failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405 (Wyo.1997) ( ); Popejoy v. Steinle, 820 P.2d 545 (Wyo.1991) ( ); MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776 (Wyo.1990) ( ); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo.1986) ( ); and Fiedler v. Steger...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Mohr v. Grantham
...a cause of action in lost chance cases. See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 452 Mass. 1, 16, 890 N.E.2d 819 (2008); McMackin v. Johnson County Healthcare Ctr., 2003 WY 91, ¶¶ 16–17, 73 P.3d 1094, 1100, adhered to on reh'g, 2004 WY 44, 88 P.3d 491; Tory A. Weigand, Loss of Chance in Medical Ma......
-
Matsuyama v. Birnbaum
..."fails to deter" medical negligence because it immunizes "whole areas of medical practice from liability." McMackin v. Johnson County Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094, 1099 (Wyo.2003), S.C., 88 P.3d 491 (Wyo.2004). It fails to provide the proper incentives to ensure that the care patients rece......
-
Parents v. Green, A11–0402.
...‘whole areas of medical practice from liability.’ ” See, e.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 830 (quoting McMackin v. Johnson Cnty. Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094, 1099 (Wyo.2003)); see also King, supra, at 1377–78 (describing how the all or nothing approach to causation subverts the compensatory......
-
Parkes v. Hermann
...disease. Much of the American health care dollar is spent on such treatments, aimed at improving the odds." McMackin v. Johnson Cnty. Healthcare Ctr. , 73 P.3d 1094, 1099 (Wyo. 2003), on reh'g , 2004 WY 44, 88 P.3d 491 (Wyo. 2004).Further, I firmly disagree with the majority's conclusion th......
-
So You're Telling Me There's a Chance: an Examination of the Loss of Chance Doctrine Under Nebraska Law
...Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983); McMackin v. Johnson Cty. Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094 (Wyo. 2003). Overall, twenty-seven states have adopted the loss of chance doctrine: Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kans......