Potts v. State
| Decision Date | 08 June 1992 |
| Citation | 833 S.W.2d 60 |
| Parties | Francis W. POTTS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Brett Stein, Memphis, for petitioner-appellant.
Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Kathy Principe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for respondent-appellee.
The appellant, Francis W. Potts, appeals directly to this Court from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Potts asks us to declare that the three-year statute of limitations on the filing of post-conviction petitions constitutes an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, in violation of the provisions of Article I, Sec. 15 of the Tennessee Constitution. For the reasons set out below, we find no merit to this contention and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On August 24, 1990, Potts was indicted for a third offense DUI. On the date set for trial, he entered a guilty plea to the basic DUI charge but took issue with the charge that he was a third-time offender. Potts filed a "Motion in the Nature of a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," challenging the validity of prior guilty pleas that he had entered in 1982 and 1983 to charges of DUI. The motion also requested a consolidation of the petition with the pending DUI case. The state agreed to consolidate the post-conviction action with the guilty plea submission, but argued that the post-conviction challenge to the prior guilty pleas was time-barred by the provisions of T.C.A. Sec. 40-30-102. The trial judge agreed with the state and dismissed the post-conviction petition. The court then adjudged Potts guilty of a third-offense DUI and sentenced him accordingly. This appeal followed, pursuant to the jurisdictional provision in T.C.A. Sec. 16-4-108.
In 1986, the General Assembly enacted T.C.A. Sec. 40-30-102. Pursuant to that provision:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of this state must petition for post-conviction relief under this chapter within three (3) years of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken or consideration of such petition shall be barred.
By its terms, the new provision was to take effect on July 1, 1986.
However, prior to the enactment of Sec. 40-30-102, there had been no limitation on the filing of post-conviction petitions in Tennessee. Consequently, in order to avoid due process problems, the courts of this state ruled that the new statute of limitations would be given prospective application only. See, e.g., State v. Masucci, 754 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988); State v. St. John, 751 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988); Abston v. State, 749 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988). Thus, a routine challenge to a pre-1986 conviction has to have been lodged no later than June 30, 1989. Masucci, 754 S.W.2d at 91.
The appellant's petition challenging his pre-1986 DUI convictions was filed after June 30, 1989, and, on the basis of case authority set out above, the trial court held that the post-conviction petition was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal Potts contests the constitutionality of T.C.A. Sec. 40-30-102. He argues that in imposing a statute of limitations on post-conviction proceedings, the legislature has unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Potts relies in this regard on Article I, Sec. 15 of the Tennessee Constitution, which provides that "the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion, the General Assembly shall declare the public safety requires it."
We find the appellant's contention misplaced. The statute of limitations on the filing of post-conviction petitions is inapplicable to habeas corpus proceedings, because the two avenues of collateral attack are theoretically and statutorily distinct.
The post-conviction process, set out in T.C.A. Secs. 40-30-101 et seq., provides for challenges to convictions that are alleged to be either void or voidable because of the abridgement of constitutional rights. T.C.A. Sec. 40-30-105. In contrast,...
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