Powell v. Grant Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 05 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01AP-754.,01AP-754.
• Citation: 148 Ohio App.3d 1,2002 Ohio 443,771 N.E.2d 874
• Parties: POWELL et al., Appellants, v. GRANT MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

771 N.E.2d 874

148 Ohio App.3d 1

2002 Ohio 443

POWELL et al., Appellants, v. GRANT MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee.

No. 01AP-754.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided February 5, 2002.

Linehan & Associates, L.P.A., and Margaret A. Smith; Burk, Schultz & Harman and Lawrence M. Schultz, Martinsburg, WV, for appellants.

Lane, Alton & Horst, Gregory D. Rankin and Jennifer A. Otis, Columbus, for appellee.

PEGGY L. BRYANT, Judge.

{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the Civ.R. 56 summary judgment motion of defendant-appellee, Grant Medical Center.

{¶ 2} Plaintiffs are seven children of Charlotte Campbell, who passed away on July 17, 1999, while hospitalized at Grant Medical Center. The decedent was placed in a body bag, and a medical center security officer transported the decedent from the critical-care unit of the hospital to the morgue located in the basement of the hospital. While the security officer was transferring the decedent from the transport cart onto a lift mechanism to raise the body to the height level with the cooler drawer, the cooler tray unexpectedly malfunctioned, the telescoping rails of the cooler tray collapsed, and the decedent fell head first approximately four feet to the floor. The security officer immediately advised his supervisor and the hospital chaplain who was on duty. The chaplain on duty unzipped the body bag, and observed blood but not bruises or cuts. Shortly after the incident, a representative of Cardaras Funeral Home arrived to take the decedent to the funeral home.

{¶ 3} The following day, plaintiffs went to the funeral home to make funeral arrangements for the decedent. The funeral director informed plaintiffs that the decedent had fallen on her face in the morgue and had injuries, including a bruised and swollen right eye, a knot on her head, cuts on her right cheek, lip and forearm, and a dislocated left ring finger. The funeral director told plaintiffs that he would attempt to repair and hide the injuries. Plaintiffs did not view the decedent until one hour before the scheduled viewing hours. According to one of the plaintiffs, the decedent's face was dark from makeup that was used to cover the bruising and discoloration, and a laceration of the decedent's cheek was evident despite the funeral home's attempt to repair it.

{¶ 4} On July 23, 1999, all but one of the plaintiffs went to Grant Medical Center to speak to the chaplain who was on duty the day their mother died. Because plaintiffs did not have a scheduled meeting, that hospital chaplain was unavailable, so plaintiffs met with an assistant chaplain and representatives from the hospital's patient relations and risk management departments. The assistant chaplain and the representative from risk management informed plaintiffs that the tray in the morgue had broken, causing the decedent's body to fall. Although the hospital representatives denied plaintiffs' request to see the incident report, the risk management representative offered to send plaintiffs information explaining exactly which piece of equipment in the morgue had malfunctioned, and the representative subsequently mailed correspondence to one of the plaintiffs that provided additional information regarding the accident.

{¶ 5} On May 12, 2000, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to recover damages for emotional distress they allegedly suffered as a result of the injuries to the decedent's body arising from its fall to the floor and the hospital's handling of the incident. Plaintiffs asserted three theories of recovery: (1) negligent infliction of emotional distress based on negligent handling of a dead body, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (3) breach of contract.

{¶ 6} On May 15, 2001, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granted defendant's summary judgment motion, finding that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each claim of plaintiffs' complaint. The trial court concluded that although the decedent was plaintiffs' mother, plaintiffs did not bring forward evidence that their feelings rose to the level of a serious or debilitating injury, and presented no evidence that defendant acted intentionally or had any knowledge that the telescoping trays were malfunctioning or would collapse and cause the decedent to fall. Thus, the court found no negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Regarding the breach-of-contract claim, the trial court found no evidence that plaintiffs paid consideration for any promise by defendant to take care of the decedent, the evidence showed defendant was performing its obligation to care for the decedent when the unfortunate accident occurred, and plaintiffs neither asserted nor presented evidence of monetary damages for an alleged breach of contract. On June 6, 2001, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs appeal, assigning the following errors:

{¶ 7} "I. The trial court committed reversible error in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellants' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of the appellee's mishandling of appellants' mother's corpse.

{¶ 8} "II. The trial court committed reversible error in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellants' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of the appellee's mishandling of appellants' mother's corpse.

{¶ 9} "III. The trial court committed reversible error in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellants' claims for breach of contract."

{¶ 10} Because plaintiffs' first two assignments of error are interrelated, we address them jointly. Together they assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant on plaintiffs' claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs contend that they met the requirement of genuine, serious emotional injury to sustain their claims of tortious infliction of emotional distress.

{¶ 11} Summary judgment shall not be rendered unless the moving party demonstrates that (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, with the nonmoving party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in its favor. Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343. Appellate review of summary judgment motions is de novo. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Natl. Dairy Herd Improvement Assn., Inc. (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 269, 275, 750 N.E.2d 1169. Accordingly, we stand in the shoes of the trial court and conduct an independent review of the record.

{¶ 12} Absent an actual, contemporary physical injury, plaintiffs must establish that defendant intentionally, recklessly, or negligently caused them "serious" emotional distress for plaintiffs to sustain a claim for tortious infliction of emotional distress. Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 131, 136, 4 OBR 376, 447 N.E.2d 109 (involving negligent infliction of serious emotional distress); Paugh v. Hanks (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 6 OBR 114, 451 N.E.2d 759, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus (concerning negligent infliction of serious emotional distress); Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 374, 6 OBR 421, 453 N.E.2d 666 (adopting for intentional infliction of serious emotional distress the standard established in Paugh that emotional injury be serious). The Supreme Court in Paugh explained the standard of "serious" emotional distress as follows:

{¶ 13} "* * * By the term `serious,' we of course go beyond trifling mental disturbance, mere upset or hurt feelings. We believe that serious emotional distress describes emotional injury which is both severe and debilitating. Thus, serious emotional distress may be found where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case.

{¶ 14} "A non-exhaustive litany of some examples of serious emotional distress should include traumatically induced neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia." Paugh, supra, at 78, 6 OBR 114, 451 N.E.2d 759. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.)

{¶ 15} A plaintiff claiming severe and debilitating emotional distress must present some "guarantee of genuineness" in support of his or her claim to prevent summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Paugh, supra, at 76, 6 OBR 114, 451 N.E.2d 759, Schultz, supra, at 134-135, 4 OBR 376, 447 N.E.2d 109; Knief v. Minnich (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 103, 658 N.E.2d 1072; Grote v. J.S. Mayer & Co. (1990), 59 Ohio App.3d 44, 47-48, 570 N.E.2d 1146. Expert opinion frequently is helpful in proving the genuineness of a plaintiff's claim. As the Supreme Court has observed, in a case involving the tortious infliction of emotional distress, "expert medical testimony can assist the judicial process in determining whether the emotional injury is indeed, serious," Paugh, supra, at 80, 6 OBR 114, 451 N.E.2d 759, and "[i]n most instances, expert medical testimony will help establish the validity of the claim of serious emotional distress." (Emphasis added.) Schultz, supra, at 135, 447 N.E.2d 109.

{¶ 16} Nonetheless, expert medical testimony is not indispensable to a claim of serious emotional distress. Uebelacker v. Cincom Sys., Inc. (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 268, 276, 549 N.E.2d 1210; see, also, Dobbs, 2 Law of Torts (2001), 832, Section 306 (noting medical testimony is not ordinarily required to demonstrate the severity of the distress or its cause, but severe distress must be demonstrated and must be caused in fact by the defendant's...