Prater v. Wilkinson Cnty.

• Decision Date: 18 December 2014
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO: 5:13-cv-23-DCB-MTP
• Parties: EASTER PRATER PLAINTIFF v. WILKINSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; WILKINSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; WILL SEAL; BILL; BANKSTON; and JENNINGS NETTLES DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

EASTER PRATER PLAINTIFF v. WILKINSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; WILKINSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF SUPERVISORS;

WILL SEAL; BILL; BANKSTON; and JENNINGS NETTLES DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO: 5:13-cv-23-DCB-MTP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI WESTERN DIVISION

December 18, 2014

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

This cause is before the Court on Defendants', Bill Bankston, Jennings Nettles, and Will Seal, Motion to Dismiss [docket entry no. 43]. Having carefully considered the motion and response, applicable statutory and case law, and being otherwise fully informed in the premises, the Court finds as follows:

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Easter Prater began working for Defendant Wilkinson County, Mississippi, ("the County") on July 3, 1992. While she initially worked only as a dispatcher for the Wilkinson County Sheriff's Department, in 1997 Prater began a second full-time job as a Deputy Justice Court Clerk. Although Prater still works as a dispatcher, on February 29, 2012, she was terminated from her position as Deputy Justice Court Clerk by the Wilkinson County Board of Supervisors ("the Board") for what she alleges were political reasons. Prater alleges that her involvement in theWilkinson County, Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee ("the Executive Committee") and her complaint to the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor over overtime pay were the reasons for her termination.¹ Defendants Bill Bankston, Jennings Nettles, and Will Seal ("the Board Members") are members of the Board.

Prater is an African-American female, and through her work with the Executive Committee, she advocated for the election of Democratic candidates. A majority of the candidates whom the Executive Committee helped elect were also African-American. The Board Members are all Caucasian males. Prater claims that the Board Members were opposed to her political advocacy and opposed her public support of political candidates.

Further, Prater claims that she did not receive overtime pay while her white male colleagues did. Prater filed a complaint with the Department of Labor on December 17, 2012, alleging a lack of overtime pay from 1997 through February 29, 2012. She further alleges that every paycheck from that period represents a new andcontinuous violation of the federal overtime laws.

Prater filed her first complaint in federal court on February 20, 2013, alleging both federal and state law causes of action including violations of her freedom of speech, violations of wage and hour laws, violation of equal pay laws, violation of her equal protection rights, negligence and gross negligence. Compl., ECF No. 1. On March 21, 2013, the Board Members filed their first motion to dismiss Prater's federal claims based on qualified immunity and simultaneously a motion to stay this case under Local Uniform Civil Rule 16(b)(3)(B) and a motion to dismiss all of Prater's state law claims. See Mot. Dismiss Federal Constitutional Claims, ECF No. 8; Mot. Stay Case, ECF No. 10; Mot. Dismiss State Law Claims, ECF No. 11. On April 2, 2013, this case was stayed. Order, ECF No. 19. On November 5, 2013, the Court dismissed all of the state law claims but denied the motion to dismiss the federal claims. See Order, ECF No. 23 (denying without prejudice motion to dismiss federal claims); Order, ECF No. 24 (dismissing state law claims). Instead the Court ordered Prater to submit a Schultea reply.² Order p. 7, ECF No. 23.

Prater failed to submit the ordered reply brief, prompting the Board Members to renew their motion to dismiss on March 28, 2014.Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 25. Realizing her error, Prater then filed multiple motions arguing that the Court should allow her to put additional facts before the Court. See Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 27; Motion to Amend/Correct, ECF No. 28; Mot. File Out of Time, ECF No. 30. The Court ordered Prater to submit a proposed amended complaint, Order, ECF No. 35, and eventually, on October 28, 2014, granted her motion to file an amended complaint and again denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice, Order, ECF No. 39 (denying Prater's other pending motions, as well, and lifting stay).

Prater filed her amended complaint on October 29, 2014, and the Board Members for the third time moved to dismiss her federal claims based on qualified immunity on November 12, 2014. See Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 43. On November 26, the Board Members moved again to stay the case pending the outcome of their qualified immunity defense motion. Mot. Stay Case, ECF No. 49. On December 4, 2014, the parties participated in a case management conference before Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker, and after the conference the motion to stay was granted. Order, ECF No. 51.

This case has now been pending before the Court for almost two years, and for the overwhelming majority of that time, the discovery and disclosure deadlines normally attached to a civil lawsuit have been stayed.

II. Analysis

The Board Members have moved to dismiss Prater's federalconstitutional claims against them in their individual capacities for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6).³ None of Prater's other claims against the Board Members or the County, including her claims against them in their official capacities and her claims for unpaid overtime, are at stake in this motion.

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). The plaintiff must plead sufficient facts so that the Court may reasonably infer the defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct. Id. "[A] plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions cannot unlock the doors of discovery." Doe v. Robertson, 751 F.3d 383, 393 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).

When a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, it creates a heightened pleading standard. See Schultea, 46 F.3d at 1430 (finding "that nothing in Leatherman[ v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993),]disturbed our holding in Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985), that complaints in [cases involving the qualified immunity of individual defendants] be pled with factual detail and particularity"). "Heightened pleading requires allegations of fact focusing specifically on the conduct of the individual who caused the plaintiff['s] injury." Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999). "To overcome the qualified immunity defense at the pleading stage, [a plaintiff] must allege that the objectionable conduct violated a right that was 'clearly established at the time,'" Morgan v. Swanson, 755 F.3d 757, 759 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009)), and was not "objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law," Nunez v. Simms, 341 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2003).

The Court will look at Prater's claims under the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment separately.

A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

For Prater to recover for a free speech retaliation claim, she must satisfy four elements: "(1) the plaintiff must suffer an adverse employment decision; (2) the plaintiff's speech must involve a matter of public concern; (3) the plaintiff's interest in commenting on matters of public concern must outweigh the defendant's interest in promoting efficiency; and (4) the plaintiff's speech must have motivated the defendant's actions." Finch v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F.3d 555, 563 (5th Cir.2003). In satisfaction of these elements, Prater argues

(1) she was fired from her second job, (2) for speaking out about getting Democrats, who happened to be black, elected to office to affect public policy and complaining about not being paid overtime when white male employees were paid overtime, (3) her interest in commenting on the matter of public concern outweighed the defendants' interest in promoting efficiency, and (4) her speech motivated the defendants' action in firing her.

Mem. Opp. p. 8, ECF No. 46. The Board Members do not argue that Prater has failed to make out a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, but rather they argue that she has not met her burden under the heightened pleading standard. Mem. Supp. p. 6-7, ECF No. 44. The Court assumes arguendo that Prater has stated a First Amendment retaliation claim, but the Court previously found that the allegations in Prater's initial complaint "fail[ed] to meet the applicable heightened pleading standard." Order p. 5-6, ECF No. 23. In granting her motion to amend, the Court found that "Prater's [] amended complaint is substantially similar to her original complaint[] and identifie[d] five changes." Order p. 5, ECF No. 39. But none of these changes relate to her First Amendment claim. Therefore, the Court finds that Prater has failed to meet the heightened pleading standard on this claim.

Prater now argues that the heightened pleading standard should not apply to this claim based on a decision from the Ninth Circuit holding that "[w]here the constitutional tort does not require an inquiry into the defendant's state of mind, . . . the heightened pleading standard is inapplicable." See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v.Mendocino Cnty., 14 F.3d 457, 462 (9th Cir. 1994). Another district court in the Fifth Circuit has already considered the ruling in Mendocino and rejected it as incongruent with Fifth Circuit law. See Todd v. Hawk, 861 F. Supp. 35, 37 (N.D. Tex. 1994), reversed on other grounds 72 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1995). Although some case law may suggest further abrogation of the heightened pleading standard,⁴ the Fifth Circuit has continued to apply it in cases of qualified immunity against government officers in their individual capacity,⁵ and the Court is bound to follow controlling precedent.

Prater has not...