Pratt v. Tofany

• Decision Date: 18 October 1971
• Citation: 37 A.D.2d 854,326 N.Y.S.2d 257
• Parties: In the Matter of George W. PRATT, III, etc., Respondent, v. Vincent L. TOFANY, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 257

326 N.Y.S.2d 257

37 A.D.2d 854

In the Matter of George W. PRATT, III, etc., Respondent, v. Vincent L. TOFANY, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Oct. 18, 1971.

George C. Pratt, pro se, as parent of George W. Pratt III.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Philip Kahaner, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, for appellant; Charles A. La Torella, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel.

Before RABIN, P.J., and HOPKINS, MUNDER, GULOTTA and BRENNAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a proceeding pursuant to article 78 of the CPLR which has been treated by Special Term as an action for a declaratory judgment, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated March 4, 1971, which (1) declared that paragraph b of subdivision 1 of section 501 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law is unconstitutional insofar as it provides that junior operators' licenses do not entitle the licensees thereunder to operate a motor vehicle in Nassau County and (2) denied appellant's motion to dismiss the petition.

Judgment reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and petition dismiss on the merits.

The infant petition, 16 years of age at the time of the commencement of this proceeding, is a resident of Nassau County who challenges the restriction imposed upon his junior operator's license prohibiting him from driving within Nassau County. This restriction is authorized by paragraph b of subdivision 1 of section 501 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which provides, in part, that such a license 'shall not entitle a licensee to operate a motor vehicle in a city having a population of one million or more or in the county of Nassau, except, within the county of Nassau, for the purpose of driving to and from a state approved cooperative work-study educational program.' The phrase bringing Nassau County into the restriction became effective on October 1, 1960 (L.1960, Ch. 186), the restriction previously having been only applicable in a city having a population of one million or more.

Special Term has held that the statute, insofar as it prohibits junior operators from driving in Nassau County, is unconstitutional, as a violation of the principle of equal protection of the laws under the State and Federal Constitutions. We do not agree. The burden imposed upon one who asserts the invalidity of a legislative enactment is a heavy one. In Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N.Y. 537, 540--541, 132 N.E.2d 829, it was held: 'Every legislative enactment carries a strong presumption of constitutionality including a rebuttable presumption of the existence of necessary factual support for its provisions. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209, 210, 55 S.Ct. 187, 79 L.Ed. 281. If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court's power of inquiry ends. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 58 S.Ct. 778 82 L.Ed. 1234. Questions as to wisdom, need or appropriateness are for the Legislature. Olsen v. State of Nabraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 246, 61 S.Ct. 862, 85 L.Ed. 1305. Courts strike down statutes only as a last resort, Matter of Ahern v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 303 N.Y. 545, 555, 104 N.E.2d 898, 903, affd. 344 U.S. 367, 73 S.Ct. 340, 97 L.Ed. 395, and only when unconstitutionality is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369; Matter of Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 206, 207, 52 N.E.2d 97, 98. But, for all that, due process need or appropriateness are or arbitrary and that it be reasonably related and applied to some actual and manifest evil. Matter of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 110; Fisher Co. v. Woods, 187 N.Y. 90, 79 N.E. 836; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940.'

A State may enact laws affecting only a particular class of people and such a classification will not be violative of equal protection of the laws when it is reasonable and is based upon some real or substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the matter in respect of which the classification is imposed (Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 337, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254). While we recognize that there is authority for the proposition that there need not be a reasonable basis for the creation of a territorial classification (Matter of Hogan v. Rosenberg, 24 N.Y.2d 207, 216, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424, 429, 247 N.E.2d 260, 264, revd. on other grounds Sub nom. Baldwin v. New York 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437; Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 551, 74 S.Ct. 280, 98 L.Ed.2d 281; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427, 81...