Commissioner of Welfare of City of New York v. Jones
| Decision Date | 11 April 1973 |
| Citation | 343 N.Y.S.2d 661,73 Misc.2d 1014 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Paternity Petition of COMMISSIONER OF WELFARE OF the CITY OF NEW YORK (Dorothy Hamilton)*, Petitioner, v. Stanley JONES*, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Family Court |
This is a proceeding brought by the Commissioner of Social Services (formerly known as the Commissioner of Welfare) of the City of New York seeking to declare the respondent to be the father of a male child born to one Dorothy Hamilton on February 20, 1969. The instant petition was instituted by verified complaint dated August 31, 1972.
Respondent asserts that the proceeding is barred by the two-year statute of limitations as set forth in Section 517(a) of the Family Court Act and moved to declare unconstitutional subdivision (b) of said section which extends to ten years from the date of birth of the child the time limit when the proceeding is brought by the Commissioner of Welfare.
The Attorney-General of the State of New York, pro se, intervenes at the Court's request and in accordance with his duty pursuant to Section 71 of the Executive Law to defend the laws of the State. The Court is indebted to the Assistant Attorney General whose legal brief assisted the Court immeasurably in formulating its opinion.
Respondent claims that he is being denied the equal protection of the laws because pursuant to Section 517(b) of the Family Court Act, the Commissioner of Welfare can bring a paternity suit until ten years after the birth of the child if the child is receiving public assistance while the natural mother, a private litigant, is limited to two years under Section 517(a).
Respondent argues that Section 517 is unconstitutional and discriminatory in that it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States for it provides a poor person with greater rights against a respondent in a paternity action than a rich person, and moreover, it grants unto the Commissioner of Welfare greater rights than the natural mother, and others similarly situated. He strongly urges that the purpose of a statute of limitations is to require that any necessary litigation to be brought within such time as the particular facts and circumstances may be proved with the utmost certainty and before adequate proof has become stale or entirely lost citing Leitch v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 388 Ill. 236, 58 N.E.2d 16, Ann. 155 A.L.R. 835.
Respondent also relies upon Matter of Wales v. Gallan, 61 Misc.2d 681, 306 N.Y.S.2d 614, wherein my learned colleague Judge Nanette Dembitz declared the dual statute of limitations in direct violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and held that the natural mother is entitled to the same ten-year statute of limitations as does the Commissioner of Welfare.
The rules of statutory construction provide that a strong presumption of constitutional validity attaches to statutes (Fenster v. Leary,20 N.Y.2d 309, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739; National Association of Harness Drivers v. New York State Racing Commission, 57 Misc.2d 135, 291 N.Y.S.2d 475) and any attack based upon the ground that a statute is unconstitutional must be sustained beyond a reasonable doubt (Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579, 149 N.E.2d 869; Fenster v. Leary, Supra; Martin v. State Liquor Authority, 43 Misc.2d 682, 252 N.Y.S.2d 365, affirmed 15 N.Y.2d 707, 256 N.Y.S.2d 336, 204 N.E.2d 496; Matter of Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876, 209 N.E.2d 539).
It has been held that this presumption attaches even if the classification results in some inequality (Matter of Pratt v. Tofany, 37 A.D.2d 854, 326 N.Y.S.2d 257; Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625, 242 N.E.2d 802; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 N.E.2d 393 (1961)). In this case the delineation between the mother and the Department of Social Service is not Per se offensive to the Constitution as long as the discrimination is based on reasonable facts to justify it (Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, Supra; Matter of Pratt v. Tofany, Supra).
Questions of the wisdom of the classification are for the Legislature, Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246, 61 S.Ct. 862, 85 L.Ed. 1305 (1941), and a statutory discrimination may not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Matter of Pratt v. Tofany, Supra.
According the sovereign treatment different from the private litigant is firmly grounded in the common-law. Public revenues are entitled to such special protection that it was not until fairly recently that the State was allowed to be sued at all and can now be sued only under special circumstances and under special procedures. See Court of Claims Act.
In paternity proceedings the State has set a self-imposed limit of ten years in which to protect the public revenue. The reason for allowing the City a greater length of time to bring a paternity action goes to the very nature of the City's role as provider of funds for public support of those children on public assistance who reside in families where the father is absent. The City certainly should be given the widest latitude in trying to retrieve from an available source monies expended on public assistance, as the public interest is at stake.
The respondent asks in his motion on what legical grounds the delineation can be justified. The answer traces the history of paternity statutes back to Elizabethan times. The chief purpose of the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1576 (18 Eliz. I, c. 3), the progenitor of modern paternity statutes, was not for the protection of the child but rather the indemnification of the parish for the expense of the child's support. (Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, 162 (1968)). See also Matter of Roe v. Roe, 65 Misc.2d 335, 316 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1970). In 1898, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in People ex rel. Kirkpatrick v. Crowley, 25 App.Div. 175, 176--177, 49 N.Y.S. 214, 215, de scribed the paternity statute of that time as 'an enactment intended to protect the taxpayers of a community against a burden imposed through the gratification of individual lusts . . ..' The protection of the public interest is in the fore-front of legislative intent in the enactment of paternity statutes: 'A statute which has for its object the protection of the community against burdensome taxation produced by the acts of individuals in derogation of public policy.' Id. at p. 178, 49 N.Y.S. at p. 215 (People ex rel. Smith v. McFarline, 50 App.Div. 95, 63 N.Y.S. 622 (4th Dept. 1900); Millett v. Baker, 42 Barb. 215 (1864); People ex rel. Moore v. Beehler, 63 Hun 42, 17 N.Y.S. 418 (1892)).
It is because of this recognized public policy of preserving and protecting revenues meant to be expended for the benefit of the public that the sovereign was exempt from the operation of statutes of limitations at common law and remains exempt to this day in the absence of statutory authority. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States,304 U.S. 126, 132, 58 S.Ct. 785, 82 L.Ed. 1224 (1938). As the Supreme Court stated (304 U.S. at 133, 58 S.Ct. at 789):
'So complete has been (the acceptance of the public policy rationale of sovereign exemption) that the implied immunity of the domestic 'sovereign,' state or national, has been universally deemed to be an exception to local statutes of limitations where the government, state or national, is not expressly included.'
Where a sovereign entity is not named in a limitations statute, it can bring suit after the limitations period has run. Matter of Smathers, 249 App.Div. 523, 293 N.Y.S. 314 (2d Dept. 1937). Therefore, the recognized difference in status between a sovereign entity, as protector of funds for the general welfare, and a private litigant, as suing solely in his or her individual capacity, plainly justifies differences in treatment. See also Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961); United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489, 25 L.Ed. 194 (1878). If the sovereign could constitutionally be totally exempted from limitations in the absence of being named in the statute, it clearly can be held to a more liberal statutory limitations period.
Respondent correctly points out that a purpose of a statute of limitations is to protect against stale claims. However, there is nothing absolute about this type of protection. All statutes of limitations strike a balance between the rights of plaintiffs with just claims and the rights of defendants to have them promptly litigated. This is the very purpose of the tolling statutes, which allow claims to be brought long after the applicable statute of limitations has run where the plaintiff was under a disability such as infancy, insanity or imprisonment (CPLR 208) or was unable to bring suit because of adverse political conditions (CPLR 209).
Notwithstanding the decision in Howard v. Robinson, 32 A.D.2d 837, 302 N.Y.S.2d 347 (2d Dept. 1969), the respondent is in no different position from a defendant who remains liable to suit past the limitations period because of the happenstance that the plaintiff is an infant or an incompetent. The Legislature has determined that municipalities should be in a similarly protected position where revenues are concerned. As the Court of Appeals has stated '(a)...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Department of Social Services on Behalf of Sandra C. v. Thomas J.S.
...L., 95 Misc.2d 507, 408 N.Y.S.2d 276; Matter of Jay v. Wolfe, 76 Misc.2d 680, 351 N.Y.S.2d 301; Matter of Commissioner of Welfare of City of N.Y. v. Jones, 73 Misc.2d 1014, 343 N.Y.S.2d 661; Matter of Mores v. Feel, 73 Misc.2d 942, 343 N.Y.S.2d 220). Nevertheless, appellant argues that the ......
-
Com'r of Social Services of City of New York, In re
...by a woman who is being supported with her children by public assistance is of limited significance. Cf. Matter of Commissioner of Welfare v. Jones, 73 Misc.2d 1014, 343 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Fam.Ct. Queens Co. 1973) and Doe v. Lavine, 347 F.Supp. 357 The argument of respondent's attorney going to ......
-
Hoyle v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa
...in paternity actions in 1776. Eighteen Elizabeth, chapter 3 was one of the Elizabethan Poor Laws. Commissioner of Welfare v. Jones, 73 Misc.2d 1014, 1016, 343 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (1973). These laws required English parishes to support the paupers who could claim a legal settlement within thei......
-
Department of Social Services on Behalf of Katherine McL. v. Jay W.
...look to the status of the parties at the time of the filing of the petition (Family Ct.Act, § 522; Commissioner of Welfare of the City of New York v. Jones, 73 Misc.2d 1014, 343 N.Y.S.2d 661). In the instant case, the sworn statement of an official of the Michigan Department of Social Servi......