Presley v. State

• Decision Date: 29 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 4D15–683.,4D15–683.
• Parties: Antonio Jermaine PRESLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

199 So.3d 1014

Antonio Jermaine PRESLEY, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D15–683.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 29, 2016.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Emily Ross–Booker, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly T. Acuña, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

TAYLOR, J.

Antonio Presley appeals the denial of his motions to withdraw his plea and vacate his sentences, arguing that the trial court fundamentally erred in holding a hearing on these motions without first holding a hearing to determine his competency. We agree and reverse for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant was charged by information with eight crimes in three separate cases. In November 2012, appellant pled no contest to all his charges and agreed to perform substantial assistance, with the understanding that he would receive a minimum sentence of five years in prison regardless of how well he performed. The state informed appellant that it might seek an enhanced sentence and that the maximum sentence he faced was 55 years.

Appellant's plea form indicated that he had been treated for bipolar disorder in 2011. During the plea colloquy, appellant stated that he had been on medication in the past, but that he was not currently on medication and he understood the plea. The trial court accepted his plea.

Before sentencing, two experts, Dr. Beltran and Dr. Landrum, evaluated appellant and found him incompetent to proceed. In June 2013, the trial court entered an agreed order adjudicating appellant incompetent to proceed and committing him to the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”).

In early October 2013, Dr. Buse, a psychologist, evaluated appellant and determined that he was competent to proceed. The hospital administrator at appellant's mental health facility then sent the trial court a Notice of Restoration of Pre–Trial Competence, together with a Competency Evaluation Report prepared by Dr. Buse. The trial court issued an order to transport appellant to court for a status hearing.

At the status hearing in late October 2013, the trial court informed the parties that it was advised by DCF that appellant had been restored to competency and that he no longer met the criteria for continued commitment. Defense counsel requested a continuance to have appellant re-evaluated for competency before sentencing. The trial court granted the continuance.

At a status hearing in November 2013, defense counsel again requested a continuance for a re-evaluation of appellant. At the third status hearing, held in January 2014, defense counsel requested a continuance, this time to investigate appellant's mental state at the time he entered his plea to the charges.

Defense counsel later filed a motion to withdraw appellant's plea, alleging that appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea because at the time of his plea he had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and was not on his medications.

At the hearing, defense counsel presented testimony from appellant's parents and sister concerning appellant's history of mental illness. In addition, a forensic specialist who supervised appellant at the New Horizons mental health facility testified about appellant's diagnosis as a paranoid schizophrenic with depression and his treatment at the facility from July 2009 until January 2011. She discussed a psychological evaluation of appellant that was performed in December 2012, wherein he was described as thought-disordered and paranoid. However, she could not testify as to his level of competency at the time appellant entered his pleas.

The state presented two witnesses, a detective and appellant's trial counsel, who testified that appellant understood the terms of the plea and did not appear delusional.

In a written order, the trial court denied appellant's motion to withdraw plea, finding that “immediately preceding and contemporaneously with entering his plea the defendant was not suffering with any mental health illnesses that interfered with his ability to understand.” The trial court further noted that appellant was declared to be incompetent and committed to a forensic hospital, but “was returned to this Court after his competency was restored and this Motion followed.”

The court adjudicated appellant guilty on all counts and sentenced him to a cumulative total of 25 years in prison.

On appeal, appellant argues that after the trial court determined he was incompetent to proceed, it was required to hold a new hearing and adjudicate him competent before proceeding further. Appellant thus contends that the trial court committed fundamental error by holding a hearing on the motion to withdraw plea and sentencing appellant without first conducting a competency hearing.

The state responds that the trial court did not commit fundamental error in going forward with appellant's motion to withdraw his plea, because: (1) appellant was restored to competency; (2) the trial court reviewed the report determining that appellant had been restored to competency; (3) defense counsel agreed appellant was restored to competency; and (4) the trial court's statement at the October 2013 status hearing constituted an oral pronouncement that appellant was restored to competency.

The issue of whether the trial court fundamentally erred in failing to hold a competency hearing before proceeding on appellant's motion to withdraw and sentencing him presents a pure question of law and thus is subject to de novo review. See Plott v. State, 148 So.3d 90, 93 (Fla.2014) (stating that pure questions of law are reviewed de novo).

The state may not proceed against a person at any material stage of a criminal proceeding while the person is mentally incompetent. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(a). Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.210 through 3.212 establish “the required competency hearing procedures for determining whether a defendant is competent to proceed or has been restored to competency.” Dougherty v. State, 149 So.3d 672, 677 (Fla.2014).

“An individual adjudicated incompetent is presumed to remain incompetent until adjudicated restored to competence.” Samson v. State, 853 So.2d 1116, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). An incompetent defendant may be committed for treatment to restore his or her competence to proceed. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(c)(3). “If, at any time after such commitment, the court decides, after hearing, that the defendant is competent to proceed, it shall enter its order so finding and shall proceed.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(c)(7) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, “when the court receives notice that a defendant has regained competence, the court shall hold a hearing to determine if a defendant is competent to proceed.” Roman v. State, 163 So.3d 749, 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). A proper hearing to determine whether competency has been restored generally requires calling court-appointed expert witnesses, but where the parties and the trial court agree, the court “may decide the issue of competency on the basis of the written reports alone.” Dougherty, 149 So.3d at 677–78 (quoting Fowler v. State, 255 So.2d 513, 515 (Fla.1971) ).

A defendant's legal status does not change merely because DCF makes a determination that the defendant has regained competency. Erickson v. State, 965 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Likewise, “a defendant cannot stipulate that he is competent, particularly where he has been previously adjudicated incompetent during the same criminal proceedings.” Dougherty, 149 So.3d at 678. This is because “a defendant's stipulation to his own competency does not absolve the trial court from its duty to independently make a determination of a defendant's competency to proceed.” Id. at 673 ; accord Macaluso v. State, 12 So.3d 914, 915 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that the trial court improperly decided the competency issue where defense counsel advised the court that the defendant's competency had been restored, and the trial court—without further hearing or evidence—declared defendant competent to proceed).

A status hearing may constitute a sufficient competency hearing if the court reviews a written competency...