Prew v. Emp. Ret. Sys. of Providence

• Citation: 139 A.3d 556
• Decision Date: 13 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2014–270–M.P.,2014–270–M.P.
• Parties: Patrizia PREW v. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF the CITY OF PROVIDENCE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

139 A.3d 556

Patrizia PREW

v.EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF the CITY OF PROVIDENCE.

No. 2014–270–M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 13, 2016.

Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Esq., John D. Meara, Esq., Warwick, for Petitioner.

Kenneth B. Chiavarini, Esq., for Respondent.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG

, for the Court.

The petitioner, Patrizia Prew (Prew), filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision by the City of Providence (city) Retirement Board (board) that denied her application for accidental-disability retirement. This Court granted the petition, and this case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on March 2, 2016, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. Having carefully considered the memoranda submitted by the parties and the arguments of counsel, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown, and the appeal may be decided at this time. We quash the decision of the board.

Facts and Travel

On March 5, 2013, Prew, who held the rank of detective after more than fifteen years of service in the Providence Police Department, injured her right hand and wrist as she attempted to detain a juvenile following a disturbance outside his school. Thereafter, her status was “injured on duty,” and she was diagnosed with post-traumatic carpal tunnel syndrome

. Her physician recommended surgery, but, due to a fear of surgical complications, Prew opted against surgery and elected treatment with nonsurgical measures.

In August 2013, Prew underwent a series of tests to determine whether her injury interfered with her ability to handle a firearm. It did. The Providence Police Department concluded that Prew no longer could operate a firearm safely and took possession of her service weapon. Later that month, on August 23, Prew applied to the board for accidental-disability retirement.

In accordance with the applicable ordinance, Prew was evaluated by three independent medical examiners (IMEs) who were retained by the board. In letters mailed from the city's human resources department, they were asked to determine whether Prew had a disability and if so, whether the disability was “caused by an accident while on the performance of * * * her duty.” The letters further requested that, should the IMEs deem Prew to have a work-related disability, the IMEs submit “a statement as to whether [Prew] can perform the duties of * * * her job. If not, a statement as to what work [Prew] can perform.” The IMEs also were asked for “[a] statement concerning prognosis, the necessity of further treatment, and expectation of return to work.”

All three IMEs diagnosed Prew with right carpal tunnel syndrome

, which each found to be causally related to her on-the-job injury. The records reflect that, during their examinations, each IME informed Prew about the benefits of surgical release of the carpal tunnel, but Prew declined this course of treatment. Michael P. Bradley, M.D., concluded that, although he could not “guarantee” improvement, surgery is the best course of treatment and, without it, Prew is “rendered * * * completely disabled” and unable to work. Philip J. Reilly, M.D., reported to the city that Prew will be unable to perform her duties as a detective “so long as she elects to proceed on a conservative path and avoid surgery.” Manuel F. DaSilva, M.D., determined that Prew “is currently partially disabled, unable to perform her full[-]duty job requirements.”¹ He further opined that:

“It is well proven that carpal tunnel release

done by a certified hand surgeon has a 90% to 95% success rate with improvement even if not complete improvement of the symptoms. This means that the vast majority of people are able to go back to their occupation. * * * I find it very difficult for me to agree that [Prew] is unable to do her job due to the fact that she has one of the most treatable ailments that we see in the hand.”

On July 23, 2014, the board voted to deny Prew's application for accidental-disability retirement. In its written decision, issued on August 14, 2014, the board stated:

“The evidence provided does not establish that Prew is incapacitated for the performance of her job duties if she elects not to have surgery to release the carpal tunnel

of her right wrist. Prew, who would otherwise be found permanently disabled, failed without justifiable cause to follow the treatment prescribed by her treating physician.

“ * * * The record * * * indicates that Prew's condition is easily correctable with a surgical release of the carpal tunnel and, by virtue of her ‘failure’ to follow prescribed treatment, she cannot be found disabled. As a result, the [b]oard denies Prew's [a]pplication due to her failure to follow prescribed medical treatment and her failure to mitigate an injury resulting in a permanent disability.”

Prew filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on October 6, 2014, which was granted by this Court on June 8, 2015.

Standard of Review

“This Court reviews decisions of the board by a writ of certiorari.” Pierce v. Providence Retirement Board, 15 A.3d 957, 961 (R.I.2011)

. Considering questions of law de novo, this Court's duty is to scrutinize the record to determine whether the board's decision is supported by “any legally competent evidence” and whether reversible errors of law were made. Id. (quoting Sobanski v. Providence Employees' Retirement Board, 981 A.2d 1021, 1022 (R.I.2009) (mem.)). A decision of the board must be quashed if it is not supported by “competent facts” or if it contains legal errors so egregious that they “infect[ ] the validity of the proceedings.” Id. (quoting Cullen v. Town Council of Lincoln, 850 A.2d 900, 903 (R.I.2004) ).

“[F]rom a medical point of view[,] the advisability of [an] operation presents a question of fact, [but] the issue of whether an employee can be forced to undergo * * * an operation is a question of law.” Guilmette v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 114 R.I. 508, 511, 336 A.2d 553, 554 (1975)

(appeal from a decree of the then-Workmen's Compensation Commission) (citing Mancini v. Superior Court, 78 R.I. 373, 380–81, 82 A.2d 390, 393–94 (1951)

(workers' compensation case)).

Analysis

While this Court previously has been called upon to examine eligibility requirements for Providence city employees seeking accidental-disability retirement, this case presents a novel issue for our review: Does the Providence Code of Ordinances (Providence Code) require an otherwise eligible employee to mitigate her injury by undergoing a surgical procedure in order to qualify for an accidental-disability pension? We hold that it does not.

Accidental-disability retirement is one of the three retirement schemes encompassed within the City of Providence Retirement System (retirement system). See Providence Code of Ordinances, Supp. No. 1, § 17–189 (June 13, 2016) (Supp. No. 1); see also Pierce, 15 A.3d at 961

. The other two schemes are known as service retirement and ordinary-disability retirement. Section 17–189(a), (d). Service retirement is available to employees² based on their age and length of service. Section 17–189(a). Employees who became disabled as a result of an injury that was suffered in the line of duty are eligible for accidental-disability retirement, § 17–189(f), and ordinary-disability retirement is available to all other participating employees who can no longer work due to disability, § 17–189(d).

Section 17–189(f) of the Providence Code governs eligibility requirements for employees in pursuit of an accidental-disability pension.³ This Court recently had the occasion to review a previous version of § 17–189(f) in Morse v. Employees Retirement System of Providence, 139 A.3d 385, 391–92, 2016 WL 3141754 (R.I.2016)

,⁴ and, in so doing, concluded that “the ordinance is not well drafted and is certainly not clear and unambiguous.” This determination governs our analysis in this case.

We interpret an ordinance in the same manner in which we interpret a statute. Pierce, 15 A.3d at 963

(noting that the rules of construction applied to statutes also apply to ordinances). If its language is “clear and unambiguous,” this Court must apply its “plain and ordinary meaning” and abstain from judicial construction. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Zoning Board of Review of South Kingstown, 959 A.2d 535, 541 (R.I.2008) ). However, when we are confronted with unclear or ambiguous language, as we are here, we “examine the entire statute to ascertain the intent and purpose of the Legislature.” Trant v. Lucent Technologies, 896 A.2d 710, 712 (R.I.2006) (quoting Jeff Anthony Properties v. Zoning Board of Review of North Providence, 853 A.2d 1226, 1230 (R.I.2004) ). In so doing, this Court “consider[s] the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections.” In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I.2006) (quoting Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 128 (R.I.1994) ).

“[O]ur interpretation of an ambiguous statute ‘is grounded in policy considerations[,] and we will not apply a statute in a manner that will defeat its underlying purpose.’ ” Hough v. McKiernan, 108 A.3d 1030, 1035 (R.I.2015)

(quoting Town of Burrillville v. Pascoag Apartment Associates, LLC, 950 A.2d 435, 446 (R.I.2008) ). Accordingly, this Court generally will refrain from “read[ing] into a statute a requirement that the drafters omitted,” Commerce Park Associates 1, LLC v. Houle, 87 A.3d 1061, 1067 (R.I.2014), and will do so only if “the clear purpose of the legislation would fail without the implication,” Wehr, Inc. v. Truex, 700 A.2d 1085, 1088 (R.I.1997) (quoting State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1264 (R.I.1980) ).

In interpreting the language of a statute, we apply the presumptions of statutory construction. We presume that the drafters “intended each word or provision of...