Division of Employment Sec. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Commission

• Decision Date: 26 May 1981
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 617 S.W.2d 620
• Parties: DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Appellant, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, International Harvester Company and Beverly K. Cowing, Respondents. 31986.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 620

617 S.W.2d 620

DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Appellant, v. LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, International

Harvester Company and Beverly K. Cowing, Respondents.

No. WD 31986.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

May 26, 1981.

Modified June 2, 1981.

Rick V. Morris & Susan P. Haag, Jefferson City, for appellant.

Catherine J. Barrie, Jefferson City, for Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n of Mo.

Arlyn D. Haxton, Kansas City, for Intern. Harvester Co.

Paul D. Cowing, Kansas City, for Beverly K. Cowing.

Before MANFORD, P. J., and DIXON and NUGENT, JJ.

MANFORD, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from a circuit court judgment affirming (without hearing) the ruling of the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, which declared an employee eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The judgment is reversed with instructions.

This cause originates and is governed by Chapter 288, RSMo 1978, the Missouri Employment Security Law. Judicial review is governed by § 288.210 and absent any question of law, review is limited to the determination of whether or not, upon the whole record, the decision of the Commission is supported by competent and substantial evidence and whether or not the Commission could have reasonably made its findings and reached the result it in fact reached, see LaPlante v. Industrial Commission, 367 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Mo.App.1963). Neither the circuit court nor this court is permitted to substitute its own judgment upon the evidence in lieu of the judgment of the Commission. The courts are to consider all the evidence, along with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the Commission's ruling; and are not to set aside the ruling unless it is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, see Beal v. Industrial Commission, 535 S.W.2d 450 (Mo.App.1975); Union-May-Stern Co. v. Industrial Com'n, 273 S.W.2d 766 (Mo.App.1954) and Meyer v. Industrial Com'n of Missouri, 240 Mo.App. 1022, 223 S.W.2d 835 (1949). Further review is upon the record of the administrative agency and not the circuit court, see Ingram v. Civil Service Commission, 584 S.W.2d 633 (Mo.App.1979).

This court, however, is not bound by the Commission's conclusions of law, including the interpretation of statutes. It is the duty of the courts to interpret and determine legislative intent of the Missouri Employment Security Law, see Sain v. Labor and Industrial Relations Com'n, 564 S.W.2d 59 (Mo.App.1978); Bussmann Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Com'n, 335 S.W.2d 456 (Mo.App.1960) and Bussmann Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Com'n of Missouri, 327 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.App.1959).

The purpose of Missouri's Employment Security Law, § 288.020(2), RSMo 1978, is to require a liberal construction and to benefit "persons unemployed through no fault of their own ..." Beal v. Industrial Commission, supra, at 458. See also § 288.020(1). The term "fault" as used within the statute has been interpreted as being not limited to "conduct of the employee which is blameworthy, culpable, wrongful or worthy of censure, but means failure of volition." See Neeley v. Industrial Com'n of Mo., Div. of Emp. Sec., 379 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Mo.App.1964). An employee is deemed to have left work voluntarily when he leaves of his own accord as opposed to his being discharged, dismissed or subjected to layoff by the employer, see Neeley, supra. The benefits under § 288.050.1(1) are limited and by virtue thereof, its provisions relating to disqualification are to be strictly construed. See Sain, Bussmann, and Citizens Bank of Shelbyville v. Industrial Com'n, 428 S.W.2d 895 (Mo.App.1968).

In this case, the claimant employee was employed for three years by the International Harvester Company as an accounts receivable clerk. On September 1, 1978, she requested a leave of absence so she could tend to her husband, who was seriously ill. She told an employer representative that she wanted to continue working. However, due to the anticipated irregularity or disruption of regular work days, it was suggested to her that she take a leave of absence. She expressed a willingness to continue regular employment to retain her group insurance benefits.

On September 25, 1978, she received through the mail a form captioned "Request for Leave of Absence". This form was not signed by any employer representative. The form also contained the following wording,

"... and that my return to work will be subject to employment conditions existing at the time of such return."

This form indicated that the period of the leave of absence was from September 11, 1978 to September 1, 1979. A few days later, on September 30, 1978, the employee received a letter from the employer which informed her that she had been placed on personal leave of absence from September 11, 1978 to December 31, 1978. The letter also contained the following sentence: "Your return is contingent upon your availability and an opening in accounting." Enclosed with that letter was another leave request form containing the dates of September 11, 1978 to December 31, 1978. She did not return this second form because the accompanying letter informed her of the leave of absence.

Under the employer's policy concerning leaves of absence, when an employee was granted a leave, the employee was no longer an active employee but did have reinstatement rights. Had there been a job opening on December 31, 1978, the employee would have been rehired without loss or disruption of continued service with the employer.

In the period between September 11, 1978 and December 31, 1978, the employee retained vacation, pension, seniority and insurance benefit rights. After the first 30 days of leave, she was required to make partial payment of the insurance premium (which she did) to maintain her insurance benefits. While the employee retained (during the leave period) certain employee rights, the employer could not expressly guarantee the availability of a job position. An employer representative described this leave as "... a termination with reinstatement rights", but stated that he might not have expressed that statement to the employee in those precise words.

During the period from September 11, 1978 to November 26, 1978, the employee had discussions by phone with a representative of the employer. The employee testified that these discussions included her expression or indication that she would like to return to work, the assurance by the employer's representative that a position would be available by December 1, 1978, (because of an anticipated maternity leave by another employee) and the fact that the employer representative would "probably more than likely have a position open" by December 1, 1978 and that she could return to work then.

The testimony of the employer's representative concerning his discussions with the employee was less certain. He testified he had a general discussion with the employee about her returning to work on an indefinite date if a job was available; however, he felt that there was nothing said about her returning to a specific position. He stated that he could have told the employee that she could take the job of an employee expected to take maternity leave, although he did not recall any specific discussion of the subject. He further testified that he "more than likely" intended to return the employee to work and at the time, thought it possible that the company would have a position for her.

On November 26, 1978, the employee wrote the employer representative, informing him that she was available for work and requesting that she be notified when a position became available. Accompanying the letter was a check for the payment of insurance premiums to ensure continuation of insurance coverage should the leave of absence continue past December 1, 1978. On January 1, 1979, she received a notice which advised her of "no position available" and that she was terminated. On December 31, 1978, at the end of her leave of absence, her position was not available and the employee expected to take maternity leave was still working.

The employee then filed a claim for unemployment compensation. On January 25, 1979, a deputy for the Division of Employment Security ruled the employee disqualified for benefits until she had earned wages equal to ten times her weekly benefit after December 31, 1978, in conformity with the statute. The deputy also found that the employee had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to her work or to her employer. The employee filed a timely appeal with the Division, which sustained the deputy's ruling after a hearing on the appeal. On March 12, 1979, the employee filed her application for review by the Commission. On January 28, 1980, the Commission reversed the decision of the Division and declared the employee qualified for benefits. The Division then filed a petition for judicial review with the 16th Judicial Circuit Court. The circuit court affirmed the Commission ruling without hearing. The Division then lodged this appeal.

The question on this appeal may be summarized thusly: Is an employee who takes a leave of absence, the terms of which provide that at the end of the period, the return to work is contingent upon the availability of a job, deemed to have voluntarily left the job without cause attributable to the job or employer, for the purpose of disqualification for unemployment benefits claimed for a period after the employer failed to reemploy at the expiration of the leave period?

As stated above, this court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Commission wherein the evidence is competent and substantial to support the Commission's findings. However, this review limitation has no application to conclusions of law.

The above question is interrelated with the single point raised on this appeal, which alleges that the trial court erred in affirming the Commission's decision which declared that...