Waddell v. Williams

• Decision Date: 31 July 1872
• Citation: 50 Mo. 216
• Parties: JOHN W. WADDELL et al., Respondents, v. DAVID WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

50 Mo. 216

JOHN W. WADDELL et al., Respondents,

v.DAVID WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1872.

Appeal from Lafayette Court of Common Pleas.

Ryland & Son, for appellant.

The only question before this court is, has the defendant saved enough upon the record to ask the interposition of this court? The facts are, beyond doubt, for the defendant. We contend that he has. (Scott v. Brockway, 7 Mo. 61; Bauer v. Bauer, 40 Mo. 61; Morris v. Barnes, 35 Mo. 412; Bransteter v. Rives, 34 Mo. 318-321.) Defendant's motion for a new trial brought this matter properly before the court.

The evidence in this case mainly consists of deeds and other documents, and it was the duty of the court, as a matter of law, to construe them properly. (Fagin v. Connoly, 25 Mo. 94.) No declarations of law were necessary to call the attention of the court to the proper construction of the deeds.

The filing of the transcript of the judgment of Justice Currie in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court of Lafayette county, made it the judgment of the Circuit Court from the date of the filing of it; it was a lien on the real estate of the defendant, against whom it was rendered, and the execution on said judgment issued by the clerk, and sale by the sheriff of defendant Dickson's real estate passed the title of the real estate to the purchaser thereof under the sheriff's deed.

The clerk of Lafayette Circuit Court had the power and authority to issue the execution on the transcript, and his execution was properly issued. (See Murray v. Laften et al., 15 Mo. 621; Franse v. Owens, 25 Mo. 329; Burke v. Miller, 46 Mo. 260; Dillon v. Rash, 27 Mo. 243; Gray v. Payne, 43 Mo. 205; Norton, Guardian et al., v. Quimby, 45 Mo. 389; Rubey v. Hann. & St. Jo. R.R. Co., 39 Mo. 480.)H. C. Wallace, for respondents.

I. This court will not disturb the finding below, nor reverse the judgment of the lower court, in such a case as this. (Taylor v. Russell, 8 Mo. 701; Little v. Nelson, 8 Mo. 709; Fugate v. Muir, 9 Mo. 355; Von Phul v. City of St. Louis, 9 Mo. 49; Vaughn v. Bank of Missouri, 9 Mo. 379; Polk v. The State, 4 Mo. 549.)

If it does not appear from the record upon what ground the court below, sitting as a jury, based its decision, if there be any evidence on which its finding could be predicated, it will not be disturbed. (McEvoy, to use, etc., v. Lane et al., 8 Mo. 47, 48; Wilson v. North Mo. R.R. Co., 46 Mo. 36.)

II. Where matters of fact and of law are submitted to a court sitting as a jury, the parties must separate the matters of law from the facts, and have the opinion of the court on the points of law, so that it can be seen on what ground the court decided the case, before the exceptions can be taken to the finding of the court below; and unless this is done, this court will not disturb the finding or judgment below. (Taylor v. Russell, 8 Mo. 701-2; Little et al. v. Nelson et al., 8 Mo. 709-10; Polk v. The State, 10 Mo. 549.)

BLISS, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiffs bring ejectment, and derive title from one Dickson, through a mortgage executed November 18, 1863, and a sheriff's deed to them of October 4, 1869, given upon sale under a foreclosure of the mortgage.

Defendant also derives title from Dickson, through a sheriff's sale upon execution against him. The judgment satisfied by the execution was originally recovered before a justice of the peace in July, 1862; a transcript was filed in the Circuit Court on the 2d of February, 1863. An execution directed to a constable having been returned nulla bona, one was issued to the sheriff on the first of October, 1863, under which the land was sold and deeded by the sheriff, and through subsequent sales it finally came into the hands of the defendant.

The cause was submitted to the court, which found for the plaintiff and gave him judgment. No declarations of law were asked, but the defendant asked for a new trial, mainly upon the ground that the finding was against the law and the evidence; and the motion being overruled, he appealed.

The finding and judgment of the court were erroneous. The lien of the judgment against Dickson dates from the 2d of February, 1863, and the sale under the execution issued upon it passed a perfect title. (Gen. Stat. 1865, ch. 183, §§ 13, 14; Wagn. Stat. 839; Bunding v. Miller, 10 Mo. 445.) There is no evidence to invalidate this sale, and the proceedings upon which it was founded were regular, and quite as formal as we usually find them.

Counsel claim that under our practice we should not look into the evidence, but that upon the facts the finding of the trial court should be taken as correct. The rule is that controverted facts, especially when the evidence is contradictory, will be considered, in actions triable by jury, as correctly found in the trial court. But when documents or records are submitted in evidence, their legal effect is matter of law. The legal effect of the filing and record in the Circuit Court of the judgment against Dickson, with the subsequent proceedings thereon, was to pass the title out of him into the defendant's grantors; and a finding that the title still remained in Dickson and passed to the plaintiffs, through a mortgage executed after the date of the judgment lien, is contrary to law and evidence. The evidence of title is on paper, and the court committed error in misjudging its legal effect.

The consideration expressed in defendant's deed shows that he purchased at a high price. The land is doubtless valuable, yet the plaintiffs bid it in for $5, being notified at the time that the title was in others. They are entitled to no special consideration, and the judgment will be reversed and judgment entered against them in this court.

The other judges concur.

MOTION FOR REHEARING.

Alexander & Childs, with Wallace & Mitchell, for respondents.

To attempt to review this case would be to express the opinion of the appellate court simply upon the weight of evidence. And in the majority of these cases, where this doctrine has been so forcibly laid down by this court, the trial was by the lower court, sitting as a jury, and the evidence documentary. The decision in this cause is in direct conflict with and a contradiction of the opinion of this court, delivered by Judge Wagner, in the case of Weilandy et al. v. Lemuel, 47 Mo. 322. (See also Taylor v. Russell, 8 Mo. 701; Little v. Nelson, 8 Mo. 709; Kurlbaum v. Roepke, 27 Mo. 161; Easly v. Elliott, 43 Mo. 289; McEvoy v. Lane, 9 Mo. 48; Wilson v. North Mo. R.R. Co., 46 Mo. 36.)

The decision in this case is contrary to the terms of an express statute. Section 17 of article VII, chapter 90, p. 961, R. C. 1855, provides that no execution shall be sued out of the court where the transcript is filed, if the defendant is a resident of the county, until an execution shall have been issued by the justice, directed to the constable of the township in which the defendant resides, and returned that the defendant had no goods and chattels whereof to levy the same. No pretense is made by appellant that this was done. The justice's docket and transcript shows the contrary. The execution under which the land was sold to appellant's grantor shows the contrary.

The sale of land under an execution is a sale in invitum, and if the power to sell does not exist no title passes. (See Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119.)

The decision in this cause, that the proceedings in enforcing the lien of the transcript, without a compliance with the law, “are quite as regular as we usually find them,” and divested Dickson of his title to the land, in effect decides that the positive requirements of an express statute may be dispensed with, and that he was deprived of his title without observing the law of land, by the acts of ministerial officers, which is in conflict with the former decisions of this court. (Coonce v. Munday, 3 Mo. 373; Burk et al. v. Flournoy, 4 Mo. 116; Carr v. Youse, 39 Mo. 346; id. 43 Mo. 28; Tanner v. Stine, 18 Mo. 580.)

Appellant's grantor was a co-mortgagee, under the foreclosure of which respondent purchased. He stood in the relation of a trustee of the mortgagor and his co-mortgagee. Whatever interest he acquired under the outstanding encumbrance inured to the benefit of the mortgagor and his co-mortgagee, and was held by him in trust for them, and could not be conveyed to him by the appellant. When he foreclosed the mortgage, respondents acquired this interest at the sale under the foreclosure. The appellant does not plead that he had no notice of this relationship, and the records affect him with it. (Price v. Evans' Heirs, 26 Mo. 30; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur. 1016; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 307 et seq.)

BLISS, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court on motion for rehearing.

Plaintiffs desire rehearing for the reasons:

1. That former decisions are overruled in considering the evidence in an action at law. This point was made in argument and considered. We pass upon no disputed question of fact, but hold that the court erred as to the legal effect of undisputed facts. A formal declaration of law could not have made the error more apparent, and the trial court was only called upon to decide as to the effect of certain proceedings in passing title, and this is a question of law which we must review.

2. It is claimed that the decision overrules the statute and its settled construction. The defendant claims title through an execution sale upon a judgment recovered before a justice of the peace. Previous to the levy and sale by the sheriff and filing of the transcript in the Circuit Court, an execution had been issued to a constable of the county, who returned no goods, etc. The record does not show affirmatively that it was issued to a constable of the township where the defendant resided. This, it is claimed, is such an irregularity as rendered the subsequent proceedings void, and hence no title passed by the sheriff's sale after the transcript was filed in the Circuit Court; and...