Primmer v. Healthcare Indus. Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14CA29.,14CA29.
• Parties: John PRIMMER, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. HEALTHCARE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, et al., Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

43 N.E.3d 788

John PRIMMER, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.HEALTHCARE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, et al., Defendants–Appellants.

No. 14CA29.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Athens County.

Sept. 24, 2015.

Tucker Ellis L.L.P., Susan M. Audey, Ernest W. Auciello, and Sarah A. Stover, Cleveland, OH, for appellants.

McHugh Fuller Law Group, Michael J. Fuller, Jr. and D. Bryant Chaffin, Hattiesburg, MS, for appellee.

Opinion

HARSHA

, J.

{¶ 1} John Primmer filed a complaint against the owners and agents of Hickory Creek Nursing Center in The Plains seeking damages for personal injuries he suffered while he was a resident. The nursing home responded with a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement Primmer's daughter signed upon his admission to Hickory Creek. The trial court denied the motion, finding Primmer never signed the arbitration agreement and his daughter lacked authority under the power of attorney for health care to bind him to arbitrate disputes.

{¶ 2} Hickory Creek asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. In resolving this question of law, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the health care power of attorney did not authorize Primmer's daughter to bind him to arbitrate disputes. The applicable Ohio statutory definitions of “health care” and “health care decision” governing powers of attorney for health care and the interpretation of similar issues by foreign jurisdictions support the conclusion that a decision to waive the right to litigate in favor of arbitration is legal in nature rather than being a health care decision. Furthermore, the mere fact that Primmer's daughter signed other admission documents on his behalf at the same time she signed the arbitration agreement did not vest her with apparent authority; Primmer himself did not engage in any negotiations concerning admission or arbitration. And he was incompetent at the time so he would not have knowingly permitted his daughter to act on his behalf when she executed the arbitration agreement. Therefore, we overrule Hickory Creek's assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

II. FACTS

{¶ 3} In August 2012, Primmer used a form entitled “VA Advance Directive: Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care and Living Will,” to appoint his daughter, Pamela McCathern, to “make decisions about [his] health care” if he “cannot make those decisions.” The form specified that it “is an official document where you can write down your preferences about your medical care” and “[i]f someday you become unable to make health care decisions for yourself, this advance directive can help guide the people who will make decisions for you.” The form further noted that it permitted the principal “to appoint a specific person to make health care decisions for you in case you become unable to make decisions for yourself” and if the person became “too ill to make decisions for yourself, your Health Care Agent will have the authority to make health care decisions for you, including decisions to admit you to and discharge you from any hospital or health care institution.” The form also stated that “[y]our Health Care Agent can also decide to start or stop any type of clinical treatment, and can access your personal health information, including information from your medical records.” The power of attorney included no definition of “health care,” but both Primmer and his daughter were residents of Ohio at the time they executed it.

{¶ 4} At some point after executing the durable power of attorney, Primmer was no longer competent to handle his own affairs because his cognitive and physical skills were impaired. In November of 2012, McCathern signed an agreement admitting her father into the Hickory Creek Nursing Center. He remained a resident there until January 2013. On the same date that she signed the admission agreement, McCathern signed several other documents, including an arbitration agreement. That agreement provides for the waiver of the resident's right to a trial in court or a trial by jury for any legal claims against the nursing home and for final and binding arbitration of any claim arising out of the admission agreement, including all claims based on breach of contract, negligence, medical malpractice, tort, breach of statutory duty, and resident's rights. The agreement emphasized that “[a]greeing to arbitrate legal disputes is not a condition of admission, and care and treatment will be provided whether or not they agree to arbitrate (if they do not wish to sign this Agreement then they are under no requirement to do so).”

{¶ 5} After leaving the facility Primmer filed a complaint in the Athens County Court of Common Pleas against 51 The Plains, Inc. dba Hickory Creek Nursing Home, BCFL Management, Inc., BCFL Holdings, Inc., dba Provider Services, Inc., Provider Services, Inc., and Dave Miller (collectively “Hickory Creek”). In his subsequently amended complaint Primmer raised multiple claims, including negligence, medical malpractice, and premises liability related to personal injuries and damages he allegedly suffered while a resident at the nursing home.

{¶ 6} Hickory Creek filed a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement Primmer's daughter signed on his behalf and the power of attorney for health care Primmer executed appointing his daughter as his health care agent. The matter proceeded to a hearing where Cathy Hunter, the Hickory Creek Director of Social Work, testified that she considered the arbitration agreement to be a health care decision, but she conceded that it did not have any impact on the care and treatment that Primmer received, regardless of whether he had signed it. In a detailed decision the trial court denied the motion based on the language of the power of attorney for health care, Ohio statutory provisions governing health care powers of attorney, and cases from other jurisdictions addressing the issue. The trial court also rejected Hickory Creek's alternative claim based on McCathern's apparent authority.

This appeal ensued.¹

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 7} Hickory Creek assigns the following error for our review:

The trial court erred in denying Defendants–Appellants' Motion to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 8} We have held that in general “[a]n appellate court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to compel arbitration or stay the proceedings under the abuse of discretion standard.” Fields v. Herrnstein Chrysler, Inc., 4th Dist. Pike No 12CA827, 2013-Ohio-693, 2013 WL 772822, ¶ 12

, citing K.M.P., Inc. v. Ohio Historical Society, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 03CA2, 2003-Ohio-4443, 2003 WL 21995291, ¶ 14. Nevertheless, “ ‘[a] trial court's decision granting or denying a stay of proceedings pending arbitration is * * * subject to de novo review on appeal on issues of law, which will commonly predominate because such cases generally turn on issues of contractual interpretation * * *.’ ” McFarren v. Emeritus at Canton, 2013-Ohio-3900, 997 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.), quoting Hudson v. John Hancock Fin. Servs., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP–1284, 2007-Ohio-6997, 2007 WL 4532704, ¶ 8 ; see also

Duncan v. Wheeler, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 09CA3296, 2010-Ohio-4836, 2010 WL 3852276, ¶ 5 (in appeal from denial of motion to stay proceedings and to compel arbitration, we observed that “appellate courts employ a de novo standard when reviewing a trial court's interpretation of contract provisions, including arbitration provisions”); see also

Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 117 Ohio St.3d 352, 2008-Ohio-938, 884 N.E.2d 12, ¶ 37 (rejecting an abuse-of-discretion standard of review and applying a de novo standard of review in reviewing decision granting motion to stay litigation and compel arbitration when the underlying issue was whether the arbitration provision was unenforceable because of alleged unconscionability).

{¶ 9} The issue here is a legal one, i.e. whether the health care power of attorney Primmer executed authorized his health care agent, his daughter, to bind him to the nursing home's arbitration agreement. The answer to that question is dependent upon our interpretation of the written instruments, applicable statutes, and case law. Therefore, we review the trial court's decision using a de novo standard of review.

IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Health Care Power of Attorney

{¶ 10} In its sole assignment of error Hickory Creek asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. “Both the Ohio General Assembly and Ohio courts have expressed a strong public policy favoring arbitration.” Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 122 Ohio St.3d 63, 2009-Ohio-2054, 908 N.E.2d 408, ¶ 15

, citing R.C. Chapter 2711 and Taylor at ¶ 27. Arbitration is favored because it provides an expeditious and economical means of resolving a dispute and has the added benefit of lessening the burden on crowded court dockets. Hayes at ¶ 15.

{¶ 11} R.C. 2711.02(B)

provides for the enforcement of an arbitration agreement when a party requests a stay of litigation pending arbitration:

If any action is brought upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, the court in which the action is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in the action is referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until the arbitration of the issue has been had in accordance with the agreement, provided the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with arbitration.

{¶ 12} “In light of the strong presumption favoring arbitration, all doubts should be resolved in its favor.” Hayes at ¶ 15. This presumption applies equally to arbitration agreements between nursing home residents and nursing homes. Id....