Proctor v. Kelley

• Decision Date: 20 December 2018
• Docket Number: No. CV-18-144,CV-18-144
• Citation: 562 S.W.3d 837
• Parties: Terrance PROCTOR, Appellant v. Wendy KELLEY, Appellee
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

562 S.W.3d 837

Terrance PROCTOR, Appellant

v.Wendy KELLEY, Appellee

No. CV-18-144

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: December 20, 2018

Davenport Law, PLLC, Little Rock, by: Cara Boyd Connors, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Associate Justice

Appellant, Terrance Proctor, who is currently serving a cumulative 240-year sentence, appeals the circuit court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For reversal, Proctor argues (1) that the circuit court's dismissal of his petition was clearly erroneous because it fails to address whether he has a "meaningful opportunity of release" pursuant to Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and (2) that the circuit court erred by dismissing his petition due to the disproportionality of his sentence. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Proctor committed a string of robberies in 1982 when he was seventeen years old. On January 13, 1983, Proctor pled guilty in the Pulaski County Circuit Court to ten counts of aggravated robbery and one count of robbery. Proctor was sentenced to life imprisonment for one of the aggravated-robbery counts. For the remaining offenses, he was sentenced to a total of 200 years' imprisonment with the sentences to be served consecutively to his life sentence.

After the Supreme Court's ruling in Graham , which declared unconstitutional life-without-parole sentences for juveniles who did not commit a homicide offense, Proctor petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County Circuit Court and alleged that pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Graham , his sentence of life imprisonment for the nonhomicide offense of aggravated robbery was illegal. The circuit court granted the writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court concluded that, pursuant to our decision in Hobbs v. Turner , 2014 Ark. 19, 431 S.W.3d 283, the remedy for a Graham violation is to reduce the petitioner's life sentence to the maximum term-of-years sentence available for the crime at the time it was committed. The circuit court also determined that Proctor was not entitled to a resentencing proceeding in the circuit court in which he was convicted, and the court therefore reduced Proctor's life sentence to forty years. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Therefore, Proctor was sentenced to a 240-year cumulative sentence, which he is now serving. We affirmed on appeal. Proctor v. Hobbs , 2015 Ark. 42, 2015 WL 603211.

Proctor filed another petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County Circuit Court on August 9, 2017. Proctor argued that the 240-year cumulative sentence he is now serving is a de facto life sentence in violation of the holding of Graham. Proctor also argued that his sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crimes under an individualized Eighth Amendment analysis.¹ The circuit court denied his petition, and Proctor appealed.

II. Standard of Review

A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its face or when a trial court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Benson v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 333, 561 S.W.3d 327. Under our statute, a petitioner who does not allege his or her actual innocence must plead either the facial invalidity of the judgment or the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and make a showing by affidavit or other evidence of probable cause to believe that the petitioner is being illegally detained. Id. ; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016). Unless the petitioner can show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the judgment is facially invalid, there is no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Williams v. Kelley , 2017 Ark. 200, 521 S.W.3d 104.

A circuit court's decision on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. Johnson v. State , 2018 Ark. 42, 538 S.W.3d 819. A decision is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.

III. Analysis

The United States Supreme Court has developed "two strands of precedent" reflecting its concern with unconstitutionally disproportionate punishments. Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 470, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The first strand "has adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty." Id. at 470, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Beginning in 2005, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases adopting categorical bans for certain sentences for juvenile offenders. First, the Court determined that the execution of individuals who were under the age of 18 when they committed a capital crime violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). Next, in Graham , the Court concluded that the Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide. Finally, in Miller , the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for juveniles. The second strand of precedent involves a "case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry," Graham , 560 U.S. at 77, 130 S.Ct. 2011, that evaluates "all the circumstances in a particular case." Id. at 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Proctor argues that his sentence is unconstitutional under either analysis.

A. De Facto Life Sentence

Proctor first argues that the circuit court erred by failing to address whether he has a meaningful opportunity for release as required by Graham. According to Proctor, he will not be eligible for parole until he is 87 years old. Citing various statistical reports, Proctor asserts that his life expectancy is less than 87 years. Therefore, he argues, his 240-year cumulative sentence is a de facto life-without-parole sentence and is illegal under Graham.

A brief discussion of the facts in Graham is necessary for an understanding of its application to this case. Graham pled guilty to committing armed burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed robbery. Graham committed the offenses in Florida when he was sixteen years old, but he was charged as an adult. The court withheld adjudication of guilt, and Graham received concurrent three-year terms of probation. Graham was required to serve twelve months in a county jail, which he had already served while awaiting trial. Less than six months after his release, Graham was arrested on suspicion of his involvement in a robbery and an attempted robbery. Graham's probation officer filed an affidavit with the trial court asserting that Graham had violated the terms of his probation by possessing a firearm, by committing crimes, and by associating with persons engaged in criminal activity. At a hearing, Graham admitted violating his probation by fleeing. The court found that Graham admitted violating his probation when he admitted attempting to avoid arrest, and further found that he had violated his probation by committing a home-invasion robbery, by possessing a firearm, and by associating with persons engaged in criminal activity. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Graham to life in prison for the armed burglary and fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery. Parole was not available, and Graham's challenges to his sentence in the Florida courts were fruitless. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. In holding that Graham's life sentence for a nonhomicide offense violated the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court wrote that

[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance. It bears emphasis, however, that while the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it does not require the State to release that offender during his natural life.

Graham , 560 U.S. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011.

Proctor invites this court to "lead the tide with other jurisdictions" and to extend Graham to prohibit sentences for juveniles when the cumulative time to serve before parole eligibility exceeds the individual's life expectancy. Because of the number of years he must serve before his parole-eligibility date, Proctor argues, he has no meaningful opportunity for release, despite his maturity and rehabilitation. In response, the State argues that Graham applies only to life-without-parole sentences imposed for nonhomicide offenses and that the holding in Graham should not be extended to include offenders who have been sentenced to a term of years.²

Proctor's sentence differs in significant ways from Graham's. First, Proctor was not sentenced to life without parole. Rather, Proctor received a cumulative sentence of 240 years, and the fact that he has a parole eligibility date is undisputed. Additionally, Proctor's 240-year sentence is the result of multiple sentences, any one of which would not amount to a life sentence or, presumably, even a de facto life sentence.³

Proctor argues that other jurisdictions have held that sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to aggregate sentences that amount to a life sentence is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. We recognize that some courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that Graham 's reach extends to a lengthy aggregate term-of-years sentence for a juvenile offender. See, e.g. , State v. Moore , 149 Ohio St.3d 557, 76 N.E.3d 1127 (2016), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 138...