Propst v. Alexander, 83355

• Decision Date: 30 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 83355,83355
• Citation: 898 P.2d 141,1995 OK 57
• Parties: Lowell Ray PROPST, Appellee, v. Thomas ALEXANDER, Appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 141

898 P.2d 141

1995 OK 57

Lowell Ray PROPST, Appellee, v. Thomas ALEXANDER, Appellant.

No. 83355.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 30, 1995.

Rehearing Denied July 20, 1995.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Division I, Donald Thompson, Trial Judge.

The appellee, Lowell Ray Propst (Propst/the mechanic) worked as a mechanic for a gas station in Bristow, Oklahoma. A customer, Thomas Alexander (Alexander/the customer), accidently hit Propst while he was backing his car into the service bay of the gas station. The mechanic filed a claim for workers' compensation against his employer, and he sued Alexander for negligence. Following a jury verdict in his favor, the mechanic moved for a new trial, asserting that the jury considered the mechanic's workers' compensation claim in reaching its' verdict. The trial judge, Honorable Donald Thompson, granted the mechanic's motion. The Court of Appeals reversed. A trial court's decision to grant a new trial will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court materially and manifestly erred beyond all reasonable doubt. We find that it did not.

COURT OF APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

Jack B. Sellers, Jessie Huff Durham, Sapulpa, for appellee.

Ray H. Wilburn, Jane R. Cowdery, Scott R. Taylor, Tulsa, for appellant.

KAUGER, Vice Chief Justice:

The question presented is whether the trial court erred in granting a new trial. A trial court's decision to grant a new trial will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court materially and manifestly erred beyond all reasonable doubt. We find that it did not.

FACTS

On December 11, 1990, Thomas Alexander (Alexander/the customer) took his car to a gas station in Bristow, Oklahoma, to have the spark plugs changed. The gas station's mechanic Lowell Ray Propst (Propst/the mechanic) directed the customer to back his car into the service bay of the gas station. While he was backing his car into the bay, Propst signaled for Alexander to stop. The customer stopped, and the mechanic kicked a water hose out of the way. As Propst was walking back to his position of safety, Alexander accidently slipped his foot off of the brake and onto the accelerator. As a result, the vehicle pinned the mechanic against the grease barrels at the back of the service bay, breaking Propst's legs. ¹

The mechanic sought recovery for his injuries by filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits against his employer, and by bringing a negligence action against the customer, claiming $719,060.00 in damages. ² This cause concerns the negligence action. Before the parties conducted voir dire and selected a jury, the trial court granted the mechanic's motion in limine, which excluded from the trial any evidence, argument, inference or other reference to insurance or workers' compensation benefits or its availability.

However, during voir dire, it was revealed that at least one juror was familiar with workers' compensation, ³ and, contrary to the order in limine, Propst's orthopedic surgeon, while testifying at the trial, mentioned the mechanic's workers' compensation case. ⁴ The mechanic immediately moved for a mistrial, asserting that the surgeon violated the trial court's order in limine when he injected the words "workers compensation" into the trial, but the trial court overruled the motion. Subsequently, a juror approached the bailiff and asked if the juror could ask the trial court a question about the surgeon's testimony regarding workers' compensation. The trial court responded by instructing the juror to discuss any questions with the remaining jurors, and that unresolved questions should be written from the jury to the court. After the jury began deliberating, the jury sent a note to the trial judge. It questioned whether, because of the surgeon's testimony, the jury was allowed to know about workers' compensation, and it asked to know the amount which the mechanic received from workers' compensation benefits. ⁵ Propst moved for a mistrial, but the trial judge rather than granting the mechanic's motion, instructed the jury to disregard workers' compensation coverage. ⁶

The jury returned a verdict finding Propst 49% contributorily negligent and Alexander 51% negligent. It awarded the mechanic $70,000.00 in damages. ⁷ The mechanic moved for a new trial, asserting that the trial was unfair because the introduction of workers' compensation insurance information into the negligence trial was prejudicial. After a hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court granted the mechanic's motion, finding that Propst did not receive a fair trial because he was prejudiced by the surgeon's testimony. ⁸

Alexander appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order granting the mechanic a new trial; and it remanded the cause for the entry of judgment according to the jury verdict. We granted certiorari on March 21, 1995, to determine whether the trial court erred in granting a new trial.

A TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL WILL NOT BE

REVERSED ON APPEAL UNLESS IT IS SHOWN THAT THE

TRIAL COURT MATERIALLY AND MANIFESTLY

ERRED BEYOND ALL REASONABLE DOUBT.

The mechanic argues that because the introduction of workers' compensation into the negligence action was prejudicial, the trial court neither abused its discretion nor acted arbitrarily when it granted his motion for a new trial. Alexander contends that: 1) the trial was fair; 2) the mention of workers' compensation was not prejudicial; and 3) the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the new trial. ⁹

A trial court is vested with wide discretion on whether to grant a new trial. ¹⁰ When a trial court's decision to grant a new trial is appealed, this Court will indulge every presumption in favor of the correctness of the trial judge's ruling. ¹¹ An order granting a new trial will not be reversed on appeal unless the record clearly shows that the trial court either erred on a pure and unmixed question of law or acted arbitrarily or capriciously. ¹² If the new trial is granted by the same judge who tried the case, a much stronger showing of error or abuse of discretion is required for this Court to reverse than if a party appeals from a refusal to grant a new trial. ¹³ The Court's syllabus in Pfrimmer v. Johnson, 195 Okla. 33, 154 P.2d 765 (Okla.1944) holds that:

"This court will not reverse the ruling of the trial court granting new trial unless it can be seen beyond all reasonable doubt that the trial court has manifestly erred with respect to some pure, simple, and unmixed material question of law, and that except for such error the ruling of the trial court would not have been made. It will very seldom and very reluctantly reverse the decision or order of the trial court granting a new trial." ¹⁴

The rationale for this rule of law is that the trial court is in a much better position to appraise the fairness of a proceeding before it than can be garnered by review of the record by the appellate court. ¹⁵ A decision to grant a new trial should not be reversed unless it is shown beyond all reasonable doubt that the trial court materially and manifestly erred. ¹⁶

Counsel for the mechanic repeatedly objected to the injection of workers' compensation into this cause, and he several times, during the course of the trial, moved for a new trial. After the trial judge instructed the jury regarding workers' compensation and the jury returned its verdict, it reconsidered its' decision to grant a new trial and recognized that it had erred by not previously granting Propst a new trial. ¹⁷

The record clearly reflects that workers' compensation was injected into the negligence trial. Whether the injection of workers' compensation into a third-party negligence action is prejudicial to a litigant's rights to a fair trial depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. ¹⁸ Here, from the outset, it was revealed to the jurors that at least one member of the jury was familiar with workers' compensation and if the injury occurs on-the-job, workers' compensation provides benefits. ¹⁹ The surgeon's testimony referring to workers' compensation could have led the jury to infer that the mechanic's medical bills or other expenses had been paid by workers' compensation. In addition, after the surgeon mentioned workers' compensation, as evident from the jurors' questions about workers' compensation, the jury became curious about the workers' compensation case and what the mechanic recovered. The prejudicial effect of the mention of workers' compensation could have had an effect similar to the mentioning of insurance benefits in a personal injury case, which would require a new trial. ²⁰ The trial court appraised the proceedings and determined that the effect of the injection of workers' compensation was prejudicial and that the mechanic did not receive a fair trial. Under these facts, and our review of the record, ²¹ we cannot say that beyond all reasonable doubt, the trial court materially and manifestly erred in granting Propst's motion for a new trial. ²²

CONCLUSION

A trial court has wide discretion to grant a new trial ²³ and every presumption in favor of the correctness of the granting of a new trial is given to the trial judge's decision. ²⁴ If a new trial is granted by the judge who tried the case, a much stronger showing of error or abuse of discretion is required for reversal. ²⁵ The granting of a new trial will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court materially and manifestly erred beyond a reasonable doubt. ²⁶ The record clearly reflects that workers' compensation was injected into the trial, and that the jury may have erroneously considered workers' compensation in rendering its verdict. The trial court assessed the proceedings, and determined that the effect of these errors was prejudicial and that the mechanic did not receive a fair trial. We cannot say beyond all reasonable doubt,...