Pruitt v. Glen Rose Independent School Dist. No. 1

• Decision Date: 17 July 1935
• Docket Number: No. 1558-6359.,1558-6359.
• Citation: 84 S.W.2d 1004
• Parties: PRUITT et al. v. GLEN ROSE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

84 S.W.2d 1004

PRUITT et al. v. GLEN ROSE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1.

No. 1558-6359.

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

July 17, 1935.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Tenth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by Glen Rose Independent School District No. 1 against J. O. Pruitt and others. Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals [50 S.W.(2d) 375] affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, and defendants bring error.

Affirmed in part, and reversed and rendered in part.

E. T. Adams, of Glen Rose, for plaintiffs in error.

Oxford & McMillan, of Stephenville, and S. G. Tankersley, of Glen Rose, for defendant in error.

RYAN, Commissioner.

The facts in this case, involving liability of sureties on the bond of a defaulting tax collector, may be stated chronologically, thus:

One Perry Kugle, in the Democratic Primary held on July 28, 1928, received the nomination for sheriff and tax collector of Somervell county and was thereafter, on November 5, 1928, elected to that office.

Having been theretofore, on October 23, 1928, appointed by the trustees of Glen Rose Independent School District No. 1, as collector of taxes for said independent school district, he, on November 8, 1928 (three days after his election as sheriff and tax collector), executed bond (which was accepted by the board of trustees) in the sum of $6,000 with J. E. Ward, J. O. Pruitt, and R. S. Darnaby, as sureties, payable to the board of trustees of the district and their successors in office, conditioned that "Whereas the said Perry Kugle was on the ____ day of October, 1928, duly appointed to the office of tax collector for said Glen Rose Independent School District in Somervell County, Texas, now therefore, if the said Perry Kugle shall faithfully perform and discharge all of the duties required of him by law as tax collector for said district, aforesaid, and shall pay over as the law directs all monies coming into his hands belonging to the said district to the persons legally authorized to receive the same, then this obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect." On the same day Kugle took the oath to faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon him as tax collector for said district, according to the best of his skill and ability and agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state, and immediately entered upon discharge of the duties of said position and collected the taxes for said district from that date until April 30, 1931, during which time he defaulted in the sum of $635.25, amount of taxes after allowing all due credits and commissions, collected by him and not accounted for to said district, its trustees, treasurer, or depositary, nor to any other person legally authorized to receive the money.

On January 1, 1929, Kugle took the oath of office and made the bond required by law, as the sheriff and tax collector of Somervell county and entered upon the duties of that office; he was elected to succeed himself in the fall election of 1930, and on or about January 1, 1931, again took the oath of office and entered into bond with sureties, as required by law, for the faithful performance of the duties of that office, which he continued to perform, actually doing so at the time of this trial in the district court.

The district was incorporated under the law as an independent school district long prior to November 8, 1928, and had elected to assess and collect its own taxes; the board of trustees had for the years 1928 to 1931, both inclusive, levied and caused a maintenance tax upon the taxable property within the district, to be assessed; the board had an assessor of taxes separate and apart from the tax assessor of Somervell county for said years, and the property within the district was for said school purposes assessed at a higher valuation than was the same property assessed for state and county purposes by the county assessor of Somervell county.

Suit was brought by the district, on August 24, 1931, against Kugle and the sureties on his bond to the district; by amended petition filed on September 14, 1931, the district claimed a balance due, amounting to $1,192.09. The defalcations occurred after Kugle assumed the office of sheriff and tax collector of Somervell county. Trial by the court, a jury having been waived, resulted in judgment on September 17, 1931, for the district in the sum of $635.25, with legal interest from April 30, 1931, which, upon appeal by the sureties, was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. Kugle v. Glen Rose Independent School District, 50 S.W. (2d) 375.

Opinion.

This district, as provided by Rev. Stat. 1925, art. 2758, as amended by Acts 1927, c. 238, § 2 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 2758), and article 2792, exercised the power to levy and collect its own taxes and to have its own assessor and collector therefor, which gave it the authority to assess property within its limits at a greater value than as assessed for state and county purposes.

The duties of the collector of the district in question extended only to the collection of taxes due the district as fixed by the assessment rolls made by the assessor of the district.

The sheriff and tax collector of Somervell county collects the taxes for state and county purposes, which under the statute (article 7254, Rev. Stat. 1925) prescribing his duties, may include those for "school, poor house or other purposes"—these based upon the assessment rolls or books of the county (article 7253, Rev. Stat. 1925).

The record here contains no statement of facts, only the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court, who concluded as a matter of law that although the district taxes were assessed by a special assessor of the district, they were collected only by the county tax collector and in law he had the right to collect the same, though they were assessed at a greater value than assessed for state and county purposes, citing article 2792, Rev. Stat. 1925. There is no finding of fact...