Pryor v. State, 45828

Decision Date28 September 1970
Docket NumberNo. 45828,45828
Citation239 So.2d 911
PartiesWilliam Lee PRYOR v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

John David Pennebaker, W. L. McDonough, New Albany, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Timmie Hancock, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

RODGERS, Justice:

The appellant, William Lee Pryor, was indicted, tried and convicted of the crime of armed robbery in the Circuit Court of Union County, Mississippi, and was sentenced to serve a term of fifteen (15) years in the state penitentiary. He has appealed to this Court and contends here that he should have been granted a directed verdict of acquittal.

The evidence in the record shows that three young Negro boys, Eugene Miller, Andrew Milsap and the appellant, William Lee Pryor, drove from Kansas City to Tupelo, Mississippi, to visit Milsap's aunt. Milsap and Miller slept in the home of Milsap's aunt, but the appellant slept in the automobile. They drove to New Albany to visit a cousin of Milsap. They parked the automobile on Highway 78 some distance south of Littlejohn's Grocery. Milsap and Miller left the appellant in the automobile and went to the Littlejohn grocery store. They made some effort to buy food and then robbed Mr. Littlejohn with the use of a firearm. They then rushed back to the automobile and drove away but were apprehended by a highway patrolman.

The prosecution obtained, and read to the jury, the 'don't have to know guilt' instruction. In the instant case this instruction is couched in the following language:

'The Court instructs the jury for the State of Mississippi that you do not have to know that the defendant is guilty before you can convict him. It is only necessary that you should believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of very other reasonable hypothesis, that he is guilty, and if you do so believe from all of the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis, that the defendant is guilty, then it is your sworn duty to so find.'

This Court has condemned this instruction many times, Pieratt v. State, 235 So.2d 923 (Miss.1970); Carroll v. State, 215 So.2d 871 (Miss.1968), but the State has continued to use it, and finally, in an effort to stamp out this unfair practice, we have decided to require a new trial in this case because this instruction was used.

The case now before the Court is a good example of the unfairness of this instruction since it is now being used in a circumstantial evidence case.

The case must be reversed because of the foregoing instruction. The problem we have here is whether or not a new trial should be required or whether the defendant should be discharged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish guilt.

The appellant contends that he had been drinking intoxicants and was asleep at the time of the robbery and knew nothing about what had occurred until they were arrested by the highway patrolman. The State, however, contends that the defendant was guilty within the meaning of Section 1995, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956), which is as follows:

'Every person who shall be an accessory to any felony, before the fact, shall be deemed and considered a principal, and shall be indicted and punished as such; and this whether the principal have been previously convicted or not.'

The Attorney General argues that 'a conviction of armed robbery under that statute requires evidence sufficiently clear and convincing to satisfy the jury beyond every reasonable doubt that the crime charged had actually been committed and that the appellant had aided and abetted in its commission.'

The brief filed by the State recognizes that it was necessary to prove that the defendant 'aided and abetted in the commission of the crime.' The case of West v. State, 233 Miss. 730, 103 So.2d 437 (1958), is cited wherein this Court said:

'* * * 'Aiding and abetting involves some participation in the criminal act'...

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26 cases
  • Whittington v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • March 16, 1988
    ...However, this court has also held that the instruction does not constitute reversible error. 235 So.2d at 925. In Pryor v. State, 239 So.2d 911 (Miss.1970), Justice Rodgers, for the Court, This Court has condemned this instruction many times, (citations omitted), but the State has continued......
  • Bell v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • May 24, 1978
    ...v. State, 241 So.2d 826 (Miss.1970), a burglary case; Spencer v. State, 240 So.2d 260 (Miss.1970), a drug abuse case; Pryor v. State, 239 So.2d 911 (Miss.1970), an armed robbery case; McGill v. State, 235 So.2d 451 (Miss.1970), a manslaughter case. This Court having heretofore ruled so clea......
  • Hughes v. State, No. 2007-KA-00209-SCT.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • March 27, 2008
    ...Criminal law does not recognize guilt by association. Davis v. State, 586 So.2d 817, 821 (Miss.1991) (citing Pryor v. State, 239 So.2d 911, 912 (Miss.1970)). Mere presence, even with the intent of assisting in the crime, is insufficient "unless the intention to assist was in some way commun......
  • Davis v. State, 90-KA-0477
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • September 18, 1991
    ...276, 2 So.2d 822, 823 (1941). Guilt by association is neither a recognized nor tolerable concept in our criminal law. Pryor v. State, 239 So.2d 911, 912 (Miss.1970); Matula v. State, 220 So.2d 833, 836 Davis strenuously argues that he never possessed or controlled guns, and in a certain sen......
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