Public Employment Relations Com'n v. City of Kennewick

• Decision Date: 16 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 48950-5,48950-5
• Citation: 99 Wn.2d 832,664 P.2d 1240
• Parties: , 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3282 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondent, v. CITY OF KENNEWICK, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 832

99 Wn.2d 832

664 P.2d 1240, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3282

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondent, v. CITY OF KENNEWICK, Appellant.

No. 48950-5.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

June 16, 1983.

William Cameron, City Atty., Kennewick, for appellant.

Ken Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Richard A. Heath, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondent.

STAFFORD, Justice.

This case involves both the constitutionality of RCW 41.56.190 and the proper scope of review to be accorded in an enforcement proceeding brought pursuant to its provisions. We hold that the trial court properly rejected the constitutional challenge; however, it erred in failing to review the merits of the underlying unfair labor practice decision before issuing its enforcement order.

Prior to January 1978, appellant, City of Kennewick, employed two persons to do janitorial work at city hall. The classification and wage rate for these positions were included in the January 1, 1978 to December 31, 1979 collective bargaining agreement between the City and the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 350. When one of the positions became vacant in early January 1978, the City filled the vacancy by subcontracting that portion of the janitorial work to a private firm. This was done without prior notification of the Union and without any attempt to bargain over the issue.

Upon discovering the janitorial work had been subcontracted, the Union asserted a contract violation. When the city manager refused to change his position on the subcontracting issue, the Union filed a formal grievance under the collective bargaining agreement. It also filed an unfair labor practice charge with respondent, Public Employment Relations Commission asserting the refusal to bargain, in violation of RCW 41.56.140(4).

The formal grievance ended in an arbitration award in favor of the City. The arbitration panel reserved judgment on the alleged statutory violation, however. A hearing was held on the unfair labor practice charge on January 18, 1979. On October 5, 1979, the Hearing Examiner issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, declaring the City had committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain about the janitorial service. The City appealed this decision to the full Commission. On January 16, 1980, the Commission affirmed the Hearing Examiner's findings with some modification and issued a remedial order requiring the City to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct as well as requiring other affirmative action.

The City did not appeal the Commission's decision pursuant to RCW 34.04.130 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Rather, on March 10, 1980, the City formally notified the Commission that it refused to comply with the remedial order. Pursuant to its authority under RCW 41.56.190, the Commission filed a petition in Benton County Superior Court for enforcement of its remedial order. ¹

The City cross-petitioned by filing a writ of prohibition, contending that by enforcing a remedial order that benefited the labor union, the Commission was expending the underlying public monies in violation of Const. art. 8, § 5. The trial court denied the writ, holding the authority granted to the Commission under RCW 41.56.190 was necessary to effectuate an important public purpose and was therefore constitutional.

The City appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals Commissioner ruled that the City's appeal from the denial of the writ would not become moot if the proceedings continued. Thus, the matter was returned to the trial court for argument on the enforcement petition. The trial court granted the petition, holding that the order was a proper and reasonable exercise of authority. The trial court further concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the unfair labor practice decision because the City failed to appeal that decision pursuant to RCW 34.04.130.

The City appeals from both the denial of the writ of prohibition and the trial court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the underlying decision. We turn first to the City's contention that RCW 41.56.190 authorizes an unconstitutional expenditure of public funds in violation of Const. art. 8, § 5.

I

The constitutionality of any challenged statute must be determined within the framework established by our rules of constitutional construction. We have consistently held that a statute is presumed to be constitutionally valid and that the burden of overcoming that presumption is upon the party challenging the statute. State ex rel. Albright v. Spokane, 64 Wash.2d 767, 394 P.2d 231 (1964); State v. Primeau, 70 Wash.2d 109, 422 P.2d 302 (1966). Moreover, we accept as a verity any legislative declaration of the statute's public purpose, unless it is arbitrary or unreasonable. In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wash.2d 255, 258, 634 P.2d 877 (1981). Given these precepts, the City must demonstrate that, in enforcing its remedial orders pursuant to RCW 41.56.190, the Commission is spending public funds for the benefit of a private association in violation of Const. art. 8, § 5. ²

RCW 41.56.190 is part of a detailed statutory scheme enacted "to promote the continued improvement of the relationship between public employers and their employees." RCW 41.56.010. This legislatively declared purpose recognizes the important right of public employees to join labor organizations and be represented in matters concerning their employment. This purpose is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary and, therefore, we accept the statement. See In re Marriage of Johnson, supra.

RCW 41.56 established the Commission as the forum for implementing the legislative goal of peaceful public employment relations. Under this chapter, aggrieved parties may bring complaints to the Commission if they believe their employment rights have been violated. RCW 41.56.140 proscribes several unfair labor practices. ³ In the instant case, the Commission found the City had committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union before subcontracting work covered in the collective bargaining agreement. RCW 41.56.140(4). As a necessary corollary to its finding the Commission issued an order commanding the City to bargain with the union.

If there were no means to enforce this kind of remedial order, the entire public employment relations statutory scheme would be rendered meaningless. Even the most blatant unfair labor practices could go unremedied if there were no authority to force the offending party to comply with the Commissioner's remedial order. It is against this backdrop that we must analyze the City's constitutional challenge.

To support its argument of unconstitutionality, the City necessarily engages in a strict construction of the constitutional prohibition against the giving of public funds. The City notes that even legislation such as RCW 41.56.190 which is enacted for a laudable public purpose must fall if it authorizes a gratuitous expenditure for which the public neither expects nor receives consideration. Ackerley Communications, Inc. v. Seattle, 92 Wash.2d 905, 602 P.2d 1177 (1979). See also Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 141 P. 892 (1914); Lassila v. Wenatchee, 89 Wash.2d 804, 576 P.2d 54 (1978). Unlike the cases cited by the City, however, the expenditure of public funds necessary to enforce the Commissioner's cease and desist order is precisely the kind of expenditure for which the public does expect and receive consideration.

Under our recent analysis in In re Marriage of Johnson, supra, a statute which authorizes the exercise of a "recognized public governmental function" is viewed as the "consideration" for the expenditure. The Commission has a statutorily imposed duty to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices. By enforcing that duty, albeit to the benefit of a private association, the Commission exercises an important public function. Private parties may indeed benefit incidentally as a result of the exercise of that important function; however, as long as the private benefit is incidental to the public purpose served, the legislation is not unconstitutional. State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 265, 510 P.2d 233, 59 A.L.R.3d 1209 (1973).

In bringing an enforcement action pursuant to RCW 41.56.190, the Commission was merely protecting the interests of the public in requiring a public employer to comply with the law. The Commission did not subject any of the State's assets to loss nor did the Commission lend credit within the meaning of Const. art. 8, § 5. See State ex rel. Graham v. Olympia, 80 Wash.2d 672, 497 P.2d 924 (1972); In re Marriage of Johnson, supra. We therefore find that the expenditure of public funds involved in the implementation of RCW 41.56.190 does not violate Const. art. 8, § 5.

II.

The trial court found that our State Administrative Procedure Act provides the exclusive means of judicial review in administrative cases. RCW 34.04.130 provides:

Any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, whether such decision is affirmative or negative in form, is entitled to judicial review thereof only under the provisions of this 1967 amendatory act, and such person may not use any other procedure to obtain judicial review of a final decision, even though another procedure is provided elsewhere by a special statute or a statute of general application.

(Italics ours.) The question before us is whether failure to invoke the review mechanism of the APA precludes review on the merits of the Commission's unfair labor practice decision in an enforcement proceeding brought pursuant to RCW 41.56.190.

At the outset, it should be noted that the express language of RCW 34.04.130 that precludes other means of judicial review is not absolute. We have stated that provisions of a specific statute will prevail if there is a conflict with the APA and the specific statute has...