Public Hosp. Dist. No. 2 of Okanogan County v. Taxpayers of Public Hosp. Dist. No. 2 of Okanogan County

• Decision Date: 23 April 1954
• Docket Number: No. 32768,32768
• Citation: 44 Wn.2d 623,269 P.2d 594
• Parties: PUBLIC HOSPITAL DIST. NO. 2 OF OKANOGAN COUNTY, v. TAXPAYERS OF PUBLIC HOSPITAL DIST. NO. 2 OF OKANOGAN COUNTY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 623

44 Wn.2d 623

269 P.2d 594

PUBLIC HOSPITAL DIST. NO. 2 OF OKANOGAN COUNTY, v. TAXPAYERS OF PUBLIC HOSPITAL DIST. NO. 2 OF OKANOGAN COUNTY.

No. 32768.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

April 23, 1954.

Mansfield & Reeder, Okanogan, for appellant.

R. E. Young, Okanogan, for respondent.

DONWORTH, Justice.

This is an action a declaratory judgment to determine whether plaintiff hospital district is a validly organized municipal corporation and has a legal right to issue certain general obligation bonds in the amount of $110,000. The action was commenced under the provisions of RCW 7.24.010 et seq. and RCW 7.24.150 et seq.

The hospital district includes six precincts located at the upper end of the Methow Valley in Okanogan county.

After a trial on the merits, the court entered a decree dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff appeals, assigning as error only the making and entering of the decree dismissing the complaint and denying the relief prayed for therein.

The facts are not in dispute and need not be set out in detail because the trial court based its dismissal of the action solely on the fact that the proposition to establish the public hospital district was submitted to the voters of the proposed district at a special election held September 14, 1948, instead of being submitted at the general election held November 2, 1948.

Appellant's brief sets out the single question involved on this appeal as follows:

'Under the provisions of the Hospital District Act then in force, to-wit, Chap. 264, Laws of 1945, as amended by Chap. 225, Laws of 1947, now R.C.W. 70.44.010, et seq., was a Public Hospital District validly organized where the proposition to establish such public hospital district was submitted at a special election and not at a general election?'

Since we must interpret the legislative enactments referred to in order to arrive at an answer to the foregoing question, we should have in mind some of the applicable rules which this court has followed in construing acts of the legislature.

The primary rule is that the court should ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature which enacted the statute. Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wash.2d 390, 191 P.2d 858.

A second rule, just as fundamental, is that when the intent of the legislature is clear from a reading of the statute, there is no necessity for construction. Johnson v. Department of Labor and Industries, 33 Wash.2d 399, 205 P.2d 896.

Another rule which is applicable in this case is that a statute should, if possible, be so construed that no clause, sentence or word shall be held to be superfluous, void, or insignificant. Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Society, 39 Wash.2d 586, 237 P.2d 737.

The statute involved in this action is Chapter 264, Laws of 1945, as amended as to § 2 thereof by Chapter 225, Laws of 1947, cf. RCW 70.44.010 et seq. Chapter 264 of the Laws of 1945 provides for the establishment of public hospital districts in counties having less than 25,000 population (or parts thereof).

Section 2 thereof prior to its amendment provided:

'Municipal corporations, to be known as Public Hospital Districts, are hereby authorized and may be established within the State of Washington in counties having less than 25,000 population.'

Section 3 of the same act sets out in considerable detail the procedure to be followed prior to, and in connection with, the holding of an election to form such a hospital district. This section provides, inter alia, that:

'At any general election the Board of County Commissioners * * * shall, by resolution, submit to the voters of such county the proposition of creating a Public Hospital District * * *, and it shall be the duty of such county election board to submit such proposition to the voters at the next general election. * * *' (Italics ours.)

Section 4 of the 1945 act provides that a public hospital district may be formed in an area less than a whole county. The same procedure is prescribed for the formation of such a public hospital district as where its limits include an entire county.

Section 20, upon which appellant relies as authority for the submission of the proposition of its creation at the special election in 1948, is set out here verbatim as follows:

'After this act becomes effective a special election may be called at any time by the election board prior to the next general election, to create such hospital districts where the petition for the creation of such districts so provide[s] or were ordered by the County Commissioners.' (Italics ours.)

Section 21 provides, in part:

'* * * The rule of strict construction shall have no application to this act, but the same shall be liberally construed, in order to carry out the purposes and objects for which this act is intended. * * *'

In 1947 the legislature amended § 2 of chapter 264 of the Laws of 1945 so as to extend the benefits of the act to all counties in the state, instead of confining its operation to counties having less than 25,000 population.

The amendatory act, chapter 225, Laws of 1947, which we quote in full, contains this language:

'Chapter 225.

'Public Hospital Districts.

'An Act relating to Public Hospital districts, amending section 2, chapter 264, Laws of 1945 (sec. 6090-31, Rem.Rev.Stat.; sec. 636-72(53) PPC), and declaring an emergency.

'Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:

'Section 1. Section 2, chapter 264, Laws of 1945 (sec. 6090-31, Rem.Rev.Stat.; sec. 636-72(53) PPC), is hereby amended to read as follows:

'Section 2. Municipal corporations, to be known as Public Hospital Districts, are hereby authorized and may be established within the several counties of the state as hereinafter provided.

'Sec. 2. This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public institutions and shall take effect immediately.'

No other section of chapter 264, Laws of 1945 was amended by this latter act except section 2.

It is the contention of appellant that the legislature, by adding the emergency clause to chapter 225, Laws of 1947, thus making the act take effect immediately upon being signed by the governor, intended to make the provisions of § 20, chapter 264, Laws of 1945, applicable to elections for the formation of hospital districts in all counties regardless of population.

Respondents urge, and the trial court agreed, that the obvious intent of the legislature in incorporating § 20 in chapter 264, Laws of 1945, was to provide for the holding of special elections for the formation of hospital districts only between the date the act became effective (June 6, 1945) and the date of the general election in November, 1946. In other words, respondents' position is that § 20 should be held to be a temporary act which ceased to have any effect after November 5, 1946.

In its oral opinion the trial court said:

'It seems to me the statute of 1945 is pretty definite. I don't see how we can place any other interpretation upon section 20 of this Act other than what the words therein express. This section taken with the other provisions of the Act provides these elections should be held at the next general election when the petition for the formation of these municipal incorporations of submitted after the general election of 1946. The Act provides for special elections to be held only between the effective date of the Act, in June, 1945, and the general election in 1946.' (Italics ours.)

The trial court also considered appellant's contention that the addition of the emergency clause to the 1947 amendment had the effect of making § 20 of the 1945 act apply to elections for the formation of hospital districts in all counties of the state. On that issue, the court observed:

'To take this view we would have to read a lot into the Act of 1947 that is just not there. All that Act did was extend the right to form these districts to counties that were not provided for in the original Act. There were possibly many other reasons for the legislature including the emergency provision in the 1947 Act. It has been suggested by counsel the emergency clause gave an additional ninety days to these new counties within which to form such districts. * * * The Act provides that one or more districts might be formed in the county. This presented numerous possible proposals. The people of a small area of the county might feel it to their advantage to form a district which covered only a small portion of the county while others of the county might deem it best to have a county-wide district. These are questions that would merit considerable debate before the Board of County Commissioners. The additional ninety days provided by the emergency clause could have been vital in the board making its decision in time for the matter to be placed on the ballot at the general election in 1948.'

We approve of the trial court's interpretation of the 1945 hospital district act and of the 1947 amendment thereto. Parenthetically, we might point out that the 1947 amendment was signed by the governor on March 19, 1947, and without the emergency clause it would have become law on June 11, 1947, so that the additional time allowed for the institution and carrying out of the procedure to create such hospital districts was eighty-five days, instead of ninety days. However, this does not detract from the soundness of the trial court's interpretation of the 1947 amendment.

When we analyze the whole of the 1945 hospital district act, including § 3 thereof providing for the submission of proposition...