Public School v. Com'n On Human Rights

• Decision Date: 14 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. WD 65106.,WD 65106.
• Citation: 188 S.W.3d 35
• Parties: PUBLIC SCHOOL RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF KANSAS CITY, Missouri, and Cecelia Carter, Appellants, v. MISSOURI COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS and Donna Cavitte, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

188 S.W.3d 35

PUBLIC SCHOOL RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF KANSAS CITY, Missouri, and Cecelia Carter, Appellants, v. MISSOURI COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS and Donna Cavitte, Respondents.

No. WD 65106.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

February 14, 2006.

Application for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied March 28, 2006.

Application for Transfer Denied May 2, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles W. Hatfield and Khristine A. Heisinger, Jefferson City, MO, for appellants.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Shannon L. Hamilton, Assistant Attorney General, James R. Layton, State Solitor, Jefferson City, MO, for respondents.

Before EDWIN H. SMITH, C.J., and LOWENSTEIN and HOWARD, JJ.

EDWIN H. SMITH, Chief Judge.

The Public School Retirement System (PSRS) of the Kansas City School District (KCSD) and PSRS's executive director, Cecelia Carter, appeal the summary judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, for the respondents, the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) and its executive director, Donna Cavitte, on the PSRS and Carter's petition against the MCHR¹ for a writ of mandamus. In their petition, they sought a writ from the circuit court mandating that the MCHR vacate and set aside the right-to-sue letter it had issued, pursuant to § 213.111.1,² to an employee of the PSRS, Mary Taylor (Taylor), concerning an age-discrimination complaint she had filed with the MCHR against the PSRS and Carter,³ pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), chapter 213, specifically § 213.075.1; see also Green v. City of St. Louis, 870 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Mo. banc 1994). The MHRA was enacted by the Missouri General Assembly, inter alia, "to eliminate and prevent discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, [and] age as it relates to employment." § 213.030.1(1).

The PSRS raises two points on appeal. In Point I, it claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. In Point II, it claims that the trial court erred in granting the MCHR's motion for summary judgment.

We affirm as to the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the MCHR on the PSRS' petition for mandamus and dismiss as to the trial court's denial of summary judgment to the PSRS on its petition.

Facts

On October 2, 2003, Taylor, who was employed by the PSRS, filed an age-discrimination complaint with both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency charged with investigating employers accused of violating the Civil Rights Act, Title VII, and the MCHR against her employers, who she named in the complaint as the KCSD and the PSRS. Pursuant to a "work-sharing" agreement with the EEOC, as authorized by § 213.075.2, her complaint filed with the EEOC was deemed filed with the MCHR. In her EEOC and MHRA complaints, Taylor, who was 61 years old at the time, alleged that her immediate supervisor, Carter, told her that if she did not resign, she would be fired; and, when she refused to resign, Carter announced to the entire staff that Taylor was retiring. Taylor alleged that because of this stressful situation, she became ill and took sick leave beginning August 29, 2003.

Prior to the filing of her complaint, Taylor had sent a letter, dated September 22, 2003, to Carter and the Board of Directors of the KCSD advising them of Carter's demand that she resign and Taylor's belief that such demand constituted unlawful discrimination based on age. On September 30, 2003, Taylor received a letter from Carter notifying her that she had been terminated, prompting the filing of Taylor's complaint. The PSRS did not receive notice of the filing of Taylor's complaint.

Pursuant to the work-sharing agreement between the EEOC and the MCHR, Taylor's complaint was initially processed and investigated by the EEOC alone. With respect to Taylor's complaint against the KCSD, it was processed by the EEOC as Charge No. 281-2003-03725, while her complaint against the PSRS was processed as Charge No. 281-2003-00789. On October 17, 2003, the EEOC terminated its proceedings as to Charge No. 281-2003-03725, without deciding whether the KCSD had engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices, and issued a "right-to-sue letter," a letter of probable cause that the complainant's employer had engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices. On November 7, 2003, the EEOC terminated its proceedings as to Charge No. 281-2003-03725, without deciding whether the PSRS had engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices, and issued a right-to-sue letter. Taylor's MHRA complaint against the KCSD and the PSRS remained pending before the MCHR.

On January 21, 2004, pursuant to § 213.111.1, Taylor filed a written request for the MCHR to issue a right-to-sue letter. On April 2, 2004, because the MCHR had not completed its investigation within 180 days, it issued her a right-to-sue letter. However, the letter only referenced the KCSD and made no mention of the PSRS. Taylor's complaint before the MCHR was dismissed upon the issuance of the letter. On April 27, 2004, the MCHR, having realized that Taylor's right-to-sue letter had failed to reference the PSRS, vacated the dismissal of Taylor's complaint and re-opened it. On April 28, 2004, the MCHR re-issued a right-to-sue letter to Taylor, referencing both the KCSD and the PSRS, and again dismissed her complaint. Although the record is not clear as to exactly when, at some point, Taylor, having been issued a right-to-sue letter, filed suit in the circuit court seeking damages against both KCSD and the PSRS for unlawful discrimination based on age.

On May 28, 2004, the PSRS filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, seeking to compel the MCHR: (1) to vacate the right-to-sue letter it issued on April 28, 2004, pursuant to 8 CSR 60-2.025(7)(D); (2) to comply with 8 CSR 60-2.025(8), by serving a copy of the complaint on the PSRS and Carter, and with 8 CSR 60-2.025(9), by giving the PSRS an opportunity to respond to the complaint; (3) to comply with § 213.075.3, by promptly investigating the complaint; and, (4) to process the complaint in accordance with state statutes, and properly promulgated rules and regulations. On September 20, 2004, the appellants filed a motion for summary judgment. On October 20, 2004, the respondents filed a motion for summary judgment. On November 19, 2004, the trial court denied the appellants' motion for summary judgment. On January 4, 2005, the trial court granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment.

This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a summary judgment, we review de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993).

The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially. The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law. As the trial court's judgment is founded on the record submitted and the law, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court's order granting summary judgment.

Id. (citation omitted). Summary judgment will be upheld on appeal if: (1) there is no genuine dispute of material fact; and (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 380.

When considering appeals from summary judgments, the [c]ourt will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Facts set forth by affidavit or otherwise in support of a party's motion are taken as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party's response to the summary judgment motion. We accord the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.

Id. at 376 (citations omitted).

I.

In Point I, the PSRS claims that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment on its petition for a writ of mandamus. Because we must determine our jurisdiction, sua sponte, in every case, In re Care and Treatment of Bowles v. State, 83 S.W.3d 93, 94 (Mo.App. 2002), and the denial of a summary judgment motion is not a final judgment subject to appeal, In re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Land Taxes by Action in Rem, 150 S.W.3d 364, 371 n. 3 (Mo.App. 2004), we must dismiss Point I.

II.

In Point II, the PSRS claims that the trial court erred in granting the MCHR's motion for summary judgment, denying the PSRS's petition for a writ of mandamus, in which it sought, inter alia, an order of the circuit court setting aside the right-to-sue letter issued by the MCHR to Taylor, with respect to the age-discrimination complaint she filed against the KCSD and the PSRS. They claim the court erred because a dispute exists as to whether the MCHR, as required by MCHR regulations and state statute, as conditions precedent for the issuance of a right-to-sue letter: (1) notified the PSRS of Taylor's complaint, in order to give them the opportunity to present to the MCHR an oral or written statement of its position; and, (2) promptly investigated the complaint.

Pursuant to Rule 74.04, to be entitled to summary judgment, the movant must show that: (1) there is no genuine dispute as to the material facts on which the movant is relying for summary judgment; and (2) based on those undisputed facts, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 74.04; ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 380; Childress Painting & Assocs., Inc. v. John Q. Hammons Hotels Two, L.P., 106 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Mo.App.2003). A movant's right to judgment as a matter of law differs significantly depending on whether that movant is a "claimant" or a "defending party." Mo. Employers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 149 S.W.3d 617, 623 (Mo.App. 2004). If the movant is a defending party:

a prima facie case for summary judgment can be established by employing one or more of three means: (1) showing undisputed facts that negate...