Pueblo v. Haas

• Decision Date: 28 December 2021
• Docket Number: 357577
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
• Parties: CARRIE PUEBLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RACHEL HAAS, Defendant-Appellee.

CARRIE PUEBLO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RACHEL HAAS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 357577

Court of Appeals of Michigan

December 28, 2021

UNPUBLISHED

Kalamazoo Circuit Court LC No. 2020-006382-DC

Before: Gadola, P.J., and Swartzle and Cameron, JJ.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, Carrie Pueblo, appeals as of right the trial court's order granting defendant, Rachel Haas, summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) and (8) of plaintiff's complaint for child custody. We affirm.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff and defendant were in a romantic relationship from sometime in the early 2000s until 2012 or 2014. The parties were not married to each other, nor did they marry after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Obergefell v Hodges, 576 U.S. 644; 135 S.Ct. 2584; 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015).^[1] During the relationship, defendant underwent in-vitro fertilization and in November 2008, gave birth to a child. The parties agree that plaintiff has no biological relationship to the child, and that after the child was born plaintiff did not adopt the child. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that after the child was born both parties parented the child, even after the parties' relationship ended. According to plaintiff, in 2017 defendant demanded that plaintiff have no further contact with the child.

In 2020, plaintiff initiated this action under the Child Custody Act of 1970 (CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq., seeking joint legal and physical custody of the child, and arguing that the child's

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best interests were supported by the parties sharing custody. In her answer to the complaint, defendant asserted that plaintiff lacked standing to seek custody of the child under the CCA because she had neither a biological nor adoptive relationship with the child. Defendant thereafter moved for summary disposition of plaintiff's complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(5) and (8), asserting that plaintiff lacked standing to seek custody of the child and also had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion and dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. Defendant moved for reconsideration, contending that she was entitled to have plaintiff's complaint dismissed with prejudice. Upon reconsideration, the trial court agreed and entered an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for reconsideration, contending that this Court's then newly-released opinion in LeFever v Matthews, ___Mich App ___; ___N.W.2d ___(2021) (Docket No. 353106), dictated a finding that plaintiff had standing to bring the custody action. The trial court disagreed, finding LeFever to be factually distinct and concluding accordingly that it had not palpably erred by granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 159; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) is properly granted when "[t]he party asserting the claim lacks the legal capacity to sue."^[2] When reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(5), this Court considers the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and other

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documentary evidence submitted by the parties. UAW v Central Mich. Univ Trustees, 295 Mich.App. 486, 493; 815 N.W.2d 132 (2012). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. El-Khalil, 504 Mich. at 159. When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), we accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 160. A motion for summary disposition is properly granted under MCR 2.116(C)(8) when, considering the pleadings alone, the claims alleged are clearly unenforceable as a matter of law and no factual development could justify recovery. Id.

Whether a party has standing is a legal question that we review de novo. Barclae v Zarb, 300 Mich.App. 455, 467; 834 N.W.2d 100 (2013). Similarly, whether a party has sufficient basis to assert parental rights under the equitable-parent doctrine is a question of law that we review de novo. Lake v Putnam, 316 Mich.App. 247, 250; 894 N.W.2d 62 (2016). We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation and constitutional questions. LeFever, ___Mich App at ___; slip op at 3. We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny reconsideration for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Sanders v McLaren-Macomb, 323 Mich.App. 254, 264; 916 N.W.2d 305 (2018). We also observe that with regard to the resolution of a child custody dispute under the CCA, "all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue." MCL 722.28; Lake, 316 Mich.App. at 250.

B. STANDING

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiff's custody claim on the basis that plaintiff lacks standing to seek custody because she is not a parent of the child. Plaintiff argues that she has standing to seek custody under the CCA because the parties were "equitably married" at the time the child was conceived and born, and she therefore is the child's "natural father." Plaintiff thus urges that we extend the existing equitable-parent doctrine to create a new legal concept of "equitable marriage." We decline to extend existing law in that manner.

Generally, the term "standing" refers to the plaintiff's right initially to invoke the power of the trial court to adjudicate a claimed injury. Federated Ins Co v Oakland Co Rd Comm, 475 Mich. 286, 290; 715 N.W.2d 846 (2006). A party generally has standing if the party has a real interest in the cause of action or the subject matter of the cause of action. Lake, 316 Mich.App. at 250. In the context of child custody, however, the concept of standing is less broad when considering disputes involving a party other than a parent. Id.

In Michigan, the CCA governs custody, parenting time, and child support issues for minor children; it is the exclusive means by which to pursue child custody rights. MCL 722.24(1); LeFever, ___Mich App at ___; slip op at 3. The CCA is equitable in nature and is to be liberally construed. MCL 722.26(1). The CCA provides the following parental presumption:

If a child custody dispute is between the parents, between agencies, or between third persons, the best interests of the child control. If the child custody dispute is between the parent or parents and an agency or a third person, the court shall

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presume that the best interests of the child are served by awarding custody to the parent or parents, unless the contrary is established by clear and convincing evidence. [MCL 722.25(1).]

The CCA defines "parent" as "the natural or adoptive parent of a child." MCL 722.22(i). The CCA does not define "natural parent," but this Court has defined that term as meaning that the person is a parent related to the child by "blood" rather than by adoption. See Stankevich v Milliron (On Remand), 313 Mich.App. 233, 236; 882 N.W.2d 194 (2015). More recently, this Court has expanded the meaning of natural parent as used in the statute to include a parent related to the child "by birth," regardless of a genetic connection. See LeFever, ___Mich App at ___; slip op at 4 (including in the definition of natural parent a woman who gives birth to a child as a surrogate).

In addition, a person may also be deemed a natural parent under the equitable-parent doctrine. Under the equitable-parent doctrine, a husband who is not the biological father of a child born or conceived during wedlock nevertheless may be considered that child's natural father if (1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge their father-child relationship, or the child's mother cooperated in the development of that father-child relationship before the divorce proceedings commenced, (2) the husband expresses a desire to have parental rights to the child, and (3) the husband is willing to accept the responsibility of paying child support. Van v Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320, 330; 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999). Our Supreme Court in Van, however, specifically declined to extend the equitable-parent doctrine outside the context of marriage. Id. at 331.

The CCA defines a "third person" as "an individual other than a parent." MCL 722.22(k). Under the CCA, a third person "does not have...