Pugh v. State
| Decision Date | 25 April 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. A89A0001,A89A0001 |
| Citation | 191 Ga.App. 394,382 S.E.2d 143 |
| Parties | PUGH v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Harry M. Moseley, for appellant.
Rafe Banks III, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Appellant is charged with the offense of voluntary manslaughter of her husband. The district attorney was advised that Mrs. Pugh intended to raise the "battered woman" syndrome as a defense. The State filed a motion in limine "to require a specific proffer of evidence from the defendant on said Syndrome and to rule such evidence inadmissible...." Pugh's response admitted she would offer such evidence as one of her defenses. The State filed an amended motion in limine to "totally exclude evidence of the 'battered woman' syndrome if tendered by the defendant as part of a defense of justification by self-defense ... and ... the defendant not be allowed to tender evidence of the 'battered woman' syndrome for any other purpose unless the dictates of Rule 31.4 of the Uniform Court Rules [] are complied with in full." The trial court held that "[a]lthough this characterization of one suffering from the 'battered woman syndromne' does not conclusively fall within the scope of insanity, mental incompetence, or mental illness contemplated by the Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.4, it does suggest the possibility of a mental deficit which might fall within any of the three areas of diminished capacity mentioned in the rule." The trial court granted the and we granted interlocutory appeal to review this issue. Held:
The effect posited by the approval of the State's motion is to totally exclude any evidence of appellant as to whether she comes within the parameters of the "battered woman" syndrome. Appellant is charged with the voluntary manslaughter of her husband. A possible defense is self-defense. " ' "To establish [a] plea of self- defense, the defendant must show that the circumstances were such as to excite the fears of a reasonable man that his life was in danger; a mere unreasonable apprehension or suspicion of harm being insufficient." ' " Wells v. State, 186 Ga.App. 62, 63, 366 S.E.2d 397. In Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678, the Supreme Court thoroughly examined the "battered woman" syndrome and concluded "that the battered woman becomes increasingly afraid for her own well-being, and that the primary emotion of a battered woman is fear." Id. at 614, 277 S.E.2d 678. The battered woman syndrome evidence was found admissible. This same issue was re-examined in Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, in which it was stated: "We have held that under appropriate circumstances a woman who kills her husband or boyfriend and raises the defense of self-defense may, as evidence of whether she acted in fear of her life, have an expert witness describe the 'battered woman syndrome,' apply that model to the facts, and conclude that the woman falls within the profile." Id. at 74, 303 S.E.2d 13. Hence, if appellant intends to raise the defense of self-defense (OCGA § 16-3-21(a)), evidence of the "battered woman" syndrome would be relevant.
The Supreme Court has also held, in Chapman v. State, 258 Ga. 214, 216, 367 S.E.2d 541, that "[a] defendant claiming self-defense based on the battered woman syndrome may, by her own testimony, coupled with that of an expert, make the prima facie showing required for the admission of the victim's general character for violence." Thus, if a defendant can establish she is a "battered woman," the Supreme Court has held the "primary emotion of a battered woman is fear," and because "fears of a reasonable" person is relevant to establish a claim of self-defense, such evidence is admissible. Sanders, supra.
The State argued to the trial court that "the Supreme Court in Smith [and Chapman ] missed the mark" and "[t]he battered woman syndrome defense is, therefore, really a defense of diminished responsibility and although Georgia does not recognize the defense under that name it is implicit in the authorized verdict of Guilty But Mentally Ill pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-131." The trial court granted the State's motion which excludes all evidence of the battered woman sydrome, even if appellant raises the issue of self-defense.
We need not determine whether the "battered woman syndrome" also raises an issue of insanity, mental illness, or mental incompetency, because the Supreme Court has specifically held that evidence of the battered woman syndrome is independently admissible in conjunction with a claim of self-defense.
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Pickle v. State, No. A06A0502.
...other grounds, Smith v. State, supra, 268 Ga. at 200, n. 5 ; Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); Pugh v. State, 191 Ga.App. 394, 382 S.E.2d 143 (1989). However, self-defense is not an issue in this trial, where the criminal acts were directed toward non-aggressor victim......
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Graham v. State
...Smith v. State, supra, 268 Ga. at 200, n. 5, 486 S.E.2d 819; Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); Pugh v. State, 191 Ga.App. 394, 382 S.E.2d 143 (1989). However, self-defense is not an issue in this trial, where the criminal acts were directed toward non-aggressor victim......
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Butts v. State, A89A1107
...admission under one or more other theories of admissibility. Boatright v. State, 192 Ga.App. 112(6), 385 S.E.2d 298; Pugh v. State, 191 Ga.App. 394, 395-396, 382 S.E.2d 143. See Wyatt v. State, 206 Ga. 613, 616-617, 57 S.E.2d 914. Moreover, we will not reverse a correct decision of the tria......
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Parrish v. State, A98A1796.
...Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 386 S.E.2d 129 (1989); Cox v. State, 216 Ga.App. 86, 87(2), 453 S.E.2d 471 (1995); Pugh v. State, 191 Ga.App. 394, 382 S.E.2d 143 (1989). In this case, however, the State used Dr. Nagleberg's testimony as an "affirmative weapon" against Parrish. See Sanders v.......