Pulkkinen v. Pulkkinen

• Decision Date: 26 November 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1D12–4688.,1D12–4688.
• Citation: 127 So.3d 738
• Parties: Jyrki Tuono Juhani PULKKINEN, Petitioner, v. Karen Elaine PULKKINEN, n/k/a Karen Elaine Brautcheck, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

127 So.3d 738

Jyrki Tuono Juhani PULKKINEN, Petitioner,
v.
Karen Elaine PULKKINEN, n/k/a Karen Elaine Brautcheck, Respondent.

No. 1D12–4688.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,
First District.

Nov. 26, 2013.

[127 So.3d 740]

J. Reuben Hamlin, Gainesville, for Petitioner.

Jonathan P. Culver of Jonathan P. Culver, P.A. Ocala, for Respondent.

RAY, J.

We have before us a petition for writ of prohibition to restrain a circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction on a petition to modify a Michigan child support order, where Michigan no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order; the party seeking modification is a Florida resident; and the opposing party is a nonresident who objects to Florida's assumption of jurisdiction. The father, Jyrki Tuono Juhani Pulkkinen, was the respondent below. He contends that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”), chapter 88, Florida Statutes, excludes the instant case from the jurisdiction of Florida's courts and binds the circuit court to dismiss the case. The mother, Karen Elaine Pulkkinen, was the petitioner below. She argues that Florida has jurisdiction under the federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (“FFCCSOA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, and therefore must entertain the modification action. We agree with the father. Section 88.6111(1), Florida Statutes (2010), which was enacted pursuant to a federal mandate, precludes jurisdiction over the modification proceeding in this case, and federal law does not conflict with this state law. Accordingly, we grant the petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The material facts are undisputed. In 2007, a Michigan court dissolved the parties' marriage and ordered the father to pay the mother child support. In March 2010, after having moved to Florida with the parties' two minor children, the mother petitioned the Florida circuit court to domesticate and modify the Michigan child support order. The father, who now lives in California, requested that the order be registered in Florida under the UIFSA, but only for enforcement purposes. Concerned that the order could not be modified if it were registered under the UIFSA, the mother argued that the order should instead be domesticated under the United States Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause and not with respect to any particular statute or constitutional provision. Ultimately, the court registered the order under the UIFSA, which is the applicable law.

Thereafter, the mother filed an Amended Supplemental Petition to Modify Final Judgment, and the father moved to dismiss the modification proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, while conceding that the court had personal jurisdiction over him. The father relied on the UIFSA, which grants jurisdiction to modify a foreign child support order only when the moving party is not a Florida resident, with certain exceptions not at issue in this case. § 88.6111(1). The mother argued that modification in Florida is proper because the FFCCSOA removes the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a state that has issued a child support order when neither the child nor any of the parties continue to reside in the issuing state, as is the case here. The circuit court agreed with the mother, concluding that the

[127 So.3d 741]

FFCCSOA provides jurisdiction and preempts the UIFSA on this subject. The father requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction over this modification action.

LAW AND ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review

A writ of prohibition is the proper vehicle for preventing a court from exercising jurisdiction it lacks or from exceeding its jurisdiction. Roberts v. Brown, 43 So.3d 673, 677–78 (Fla.2010) (quoting English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293, 296–97 (Fla.1977)). This Court has previously issued such a writ to preclude modification of another state's child support order where a circuit court lacked jurisdiction to make the modification. State, Dep't of Revenue v. Fleet, 679 So.2d 326, 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

To decide the question presented in this case, we must determine whether the UIFSA conflicts with the FFCCSOA concerning a state's jurisdiction to modify a foreign child support order when the issuing state has lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction; the petitioner is a resident of the state in which the action is brought; and the respondent is a nonresident who has not consented to the state's exercise of jurisdiction over the proceeding. This issue implicates federal preemption doctrine and is a matter of first impression in Florida.¹ However, because all fifty states have enacted the UIFSA at Congress' behest, Trissler v. Trissler, 987 So.2d 209, 210 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), state courts across the nation have encountered this issue. Those courts have reached divergent conclusions.² We review this issue of statutory construction, federal preemption, and subject matter jurisdiction de novo. State v. Rubio, 967 So.2d 768, 771 (Fla.2007) (statutory construction and constitutionality); State v. Harden, 938 So.2d 480, 485 (Fla.2006) (preemption); Dep't of Revenue ex rel. Smith v. Selles, 47 So.3d 916, 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (subject matter jurisdiction).

B. Preemption Doctrine

Under federal preemption doctrine, which derives from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, a state law is void to the extent it conflicts with a

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valid federal law. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746–47, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981); U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The United States Supreme Court has instructed that “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996)).

Congress can manifest intent to preempt state law in three ways. First, Congress can overtly displace state authority with explicit preemption guidelines. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95–98, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983)). Second, when no explicit guidelines exist, Congress can engage in implied field preemption. Id. Such preemption occurs where the federal regulatory scheme is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” or because the federal interest in regulating the field is so dominant as to preclude the enforcement of state laws in the same field. See id. at 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). Third, even in circumstances where a federal scheme does not occupy an entire regulatory field, Congress has the power to supersede state law that actually conflicts with federal law. Id.

The federal statute at issue in the instant case, the FFCCSOA, does not contain explicit preemption guidance, nor does it exhibit the preclusive effect of field preemption. Therefore, we must consider the third category of preemption: implied conflict preemption. Conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal requirements or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” English, 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)); Maryland, 451 U.S. at 747, 101 S.Ct. 2114.

C. Application of Preemption Doctrine to the FFCCSOA and the UIFSA

To apply these concepts, we begin with the plain language of the two acts, which is the best evidence of legislative intent. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990); Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362, 367 (Fla.2013). To understand the meaning of any particular provision of either statute, we consider the provisions of the whole law and do not interpret words or sentences in isolation. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984); Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d 1260, 1265 (Fla.2008). If the language of a statute reveals an unambiguous meaning, we need not resort to any other sources to understand it. See Sebelius v. Cloer, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1886, 1896, 185 L.Ed.2d 1003 (2013); ContractPoint, 986 So.2d at 1265.

The FFCCSOA provides a framework for each state to give full faith and credit to child support orders issued by other states. Its first provision announces that each state “shall enforce according to its terms a child support order made consistently with this section by a court of another State.” § 1738B(a)(1). The FFCCSOA then provides plainly that states “shall not” modify other states' child support orders “except in accordance with subsections (e), (f), and (i).” § 1738B(a)(2). These two provisions establish the general rule of the FFCCSOA as requiring enforcement

[127 So.3d 743]

without modification of the child support orders of other states. Id.

The mother claims that the exception identified in subsection (e) applies to this case. The FFCCSOA's subsection (e) permits a court of another state to modify a child support order only if:

(1) the court has jurisdiction to make such a child support order pursuant to subsection (i); and

(2) (A) the court of the other State no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the child support order because that State no longer is the child's State or the residence of any individual contestant; or

(B) each individual contestant has filed written consent with the State of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction for a court of another State to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order.

Under these provisions, in order for State B to modify a child support order issued by State A, State A must...