Queen City Hoop Co. v. Barnett
Decision Date | 21 November 1921 |
Docket Number | 22027 |
Citation | 127 Miss. 66,89 So. 819 |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Parties | QUEEN CITY HOOP CO. v. BARNETT et al |
APPEAL from circuit court of Sunflower county, HON. S. F. DAVIS Judge.
Action by the Queen City Hoop Company against Milton Barnett and others. Judgment of dismissal on demurrer, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
This is a suit by the appellant, Queen City Hoop Company, against the appellees, Cohn Bros. & Barnett, a partnership, for damages for the breach of an alleged contract of purchase by the appellant from the appellees of stumpage or standing timber. Appellees interposed a demurrer to the declaration, which was sustained by the court below on the ground that the alleged contract for the purchase of the timber in question was insufficient and void under the statute of frauds. The appellant having declined leave granted to amend its declaration, final judgment was entered dismissing the suit from which appellant prosecutes this appeal.
The averments of the declaration setting out the contract, which is the basis of the suit, and the breach thereof, are contained in the second paragraph of the declaration, which is in this language:
It will be seen from the declaration that appellant claims to have purchased from the appellees "all of the elm and hackberry timber then on the land of defendants (appellees) at or near Lorenzen, Miss." The alleged contract is embodied alone in the correspondence between the appellant and appellees consisting of six letters, two of which were written by the appellees and four by the appellant: These letters were made exhibits to the declaration, and are in the following language:
At the present time, the larger part of this tract is under from one to two feet of water, and it will be impossible to log same for at least sixty to ninety days. Therefore, we are pleased to make the following offer for this timber:
May 19, 1920.
Percy Bell, for appellant.
Is the description insufficient under the statute of frauds? In some states a sale of timber to be cut is regarded as a sale of personal property and a contract therefor does not fall under the statute of frauds. This is not the case in Mississippi where growing timber is held to be a part of the realty and a contract therefor, is well within the statute.
We can find cases in Mississippi in which land described purely as to ownership has been held to be insufficiently described. We also find authorities that land described by location alone is insufficiently described and we suppose the learned court below was led astray by these cases. It will be noted, however, that neither of them applies to the case at bar in which the land is described not only by location but by ownership. We find no case of this kind in the Mississippi authorities, but do find it in other authorities and wish to cite them for the benefit of the court.
In 25 R. C. L., page 653, paragraph 285, we find the following: "The rule upholding the sufficiency of the description where it may be fitted by extrinsic evidence to a particular lot or tract of land has been applied where the land was described as all of or a certain interest in all of the land owned by the vendor."
In Moayon v. Moayon, 102 A. S. R. 303, the court holds that a contract by a person to convey one-third of his estate acquired under a will or otherwise acquired or owned by him is good under the statute, the idea being that the property is easily identified. There was this sustention of a description merely by words of ownership. In the same authority, we find that the description has been upheld as to a tract of land located at a certain place.
In the case of Hodges v. Kowing, 71 L. R. A. 87, cited in the note, the land was described in terms of ownership as well as locality which is the case here.
In the next case cited in the notes Colerick v. Hooper, 56 Am. Dec. 505, the land was described by location and possession as in the case at bar.
In the next case Bates v. Harris, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) page 154, the land is described by possession and acreage, the court holding, we think properly, that parol testimony could be introduced to show that the vendor owned but one tract in the place mentioned containing the acreage specified. We refer the court to the opinion in this case and the note as being thorough and illuminative. Wood, Stat. Fr. sec. 353; Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass. 413, 15 Am. Rep. 110; Hyden v. Perkins, 119 Ky. 188, 83 S.W. 128.
In the next case cited, Bogard v. Barhan, 132 A. S. R. 676, the farm conveyed is described as possession, as "my fifteen acre farm located one mile north of Woodburn, in Marion County, Oregon."
In the case at bar, in letter one, defendants refer to "our timber." In the letter number two, plaintiffs state that they were at Lorenzen and refer to "your timber tract." In letter number three, plaintiffs referred to the timber you own at Lorenzen, and in letters...
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