Bates v. Harris

• Citation: 144 Ky. 399,138 S.W. 276
• Parties: BATES et al. v. HARRIS et al. [1]
• Decision Date: 21 June 1911
• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky

138 S.W. 276

144 Ky. 399

BATES et al. v. HARRIS et al. ^[1]

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 21, 1911

Appeal from Circuit Court, Madison County.

Action by Belle D. Harris and another against Margaret A. Bates and another. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

R. H Crooke and J. T. Cobb, for appellants.

C. H Breck and C. C. Wallace, for appellees.

CLAY C.

On November 8, 1909, appellant Margaret A. Bates and appellee Giles Harris, as agent of his wife, Belle D. Harris, entered into the following agreement: "Article of agreement made and entered into, this November 8, 1909, between Giles Harris as agent of his wife, Belle D. Harris, of the first part, and Mrs. Margaret Anne Bates, of the second part, both parties of Madison County, Kentucky, witnesseth: The said Bates of the second part has this the above date bargained and sold her Muddy creek farm to said Harris first part for the consideration of $90.00 per acre. The farm embraces 113 acres one hundred and thirteen acres. Possession to be given the 1st day of January, 1910, when the payment conditions are complied with as verbally agreed upon. All the purchase money to be paid in the year 1910 of six months intervals. Giles Harris. Margaret A. Bates. Witness: S.W. Bates." At the same time another copy of the agreement was prepared, wherein the contracting parties were Giles Harris, as agent of his wife, Belle D. Harris, of the first part, and W. H. Bates and his wife, Margaret A. Bates of the second part; with this exception the two writings are substantially the same. As appellant Margaret A. Bates declined to convey the land in accordance with the agreement, appellees, Belle D. Harris and her husband, Giles Harris, brought this action to enforce a specific performance. Upon the submission of the case, the chancellor adjudged them the relief sought, and Margaret A. Bates appeals.

Three grounds are relied upon for reversal: (1) The writing does not sufficiently identify the property and the terms of sale to take it out of the statute of frauds. (2) It was a condition precedent to the agreement taking effect that it should be signed by appellant's husband, W. H. Bates, and, as he never signed the agreement, it was not binding on appellant. (3) There was no tender of the purchase money before suit was brought.

1. The description is as follows: "Her Muddy creek farm. *** The farm embraces 113 acres one hundred and thirteen acres." Is this description sufficient? The rule is that where the writing within itself, or by reference to other writings, contains sufficient data so that by the aid of parol evidence no question as to the intention of the parties can arise, it is sufficient. The most specific and precise description of the property requires some parol proof to complete its identification. A more general description requires more. When all the circumstances of possession, ownership, situation of the parties, and their relations to each other and to the property, as they were when the negotiations took place and the writings made, are disclosed, if the meaning and application of the writing, read in the light of those circumstances, are certain and plain, the parties will be bound by it as a sufficient written contract or memorandum of their agreement. Wood on Statute of Frauds, § 353; Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass. 413, 15 Am.Rep. 110; Hyden v. Perkins, 119 Ky. 188, 83 S.W. 128, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 1099.

This court, in the case of Moayon v. Moayon, 114 Ky. 855 72 S.W. 33, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1641, 60 L.R.A. 415, 102 Am.St.Rep. 303, used the following language: "In Warvelle on Vendors, § 135, it is said that a description as 'my house and lot' imports a particular house and lot, rendered certain by the description that it is the one that belongs to 'me.' The following descriptions have been held sufficient: 'My lot on the plat in the town of S., on the plat of said town, on the river bank' ( Colerick v. Hooper, 3 Ind. 316, 56 Am.Dec. 505); the 'Snow farm' (Hollis v. Burgess, 37 Kan. 487, 15 P. 536); 'H.'s lace at S.' (Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn. 12, 18 A. 979, 7 L.R.A. 87); the 'Knapp home property' (Goodenow v. Curtis, 18 Mich. 298); an agreement to convey land described as 'occupied' by the vendor or a third person ( Angel v. Simpson, 85 Ala. 53, 3 So. 758; Towle v. Carmelo Land & Coal Co., 99 Cal. 397, 33 P. 1126; Doctor v. Hellberg, 65 Wis. 415, 27 N.W. 176). In all such cases parol evidence was admitted, not to identify, but to designate, the subject-matter, already identified in the minds of the parties, in the language of the contract when read in the light of the facts. In this state, in Overstreet v. Rice, 4 Bush, 3, 96 Am.Dec. 279, the expression, 'We have swapped farms,' naming the terms, but without further description of either farm, was held sufficient, after the parties had themselves identified the lands intended to be affected, by taking possession of them. In Ellis v. Deadman's Heirs, 4 Bibb, 466, the writing was: '4 January, 1808. Received of Jesse Ellis $___, in part pay for a lot he bought of me in the town of Versailes; it being the cash part of the purchase of said lot. Nathan Deadman.' This court said: 'Had the receipt specified the terms of the agreement, there would have been no doubt of the propriety of decreeing the specific execution.' It is as essential that the terms be specified as the description of the property. 'Ten acres adjoining him on the north,' in a bond for title to land of the vendor adjoining the vendee, was held sufficient in Hanly v. Blackford, 1 Dana, 2, 25 Am.Dec. 114. In Henderson v. Perkins, 21 S.W. 1035, 94 Ky. 211, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 782, the description was, 'My home place and storehouse.' It was held sufficient, on the authority of Ellis v. Deadman's Heirs, supra, and Hanly v. Blackford, supra. In the case of Varnum v. State, 78 Ala. 28, the description was: 'My entire crop of every description, raised by me, or caused to be raised by me, annually till this debt is...