Quintana v. Board of Administration

• Decision Date: 29 January 1976
• Citation: 54 Cal.App.3d 1018,127 Cal.Rptr. 11
• Parties: Ronald L. QUINTANA, Petitioner and Respondent, v. BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent and Appellant. Civ. 47131.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 11

127 Cal.Rptr. 11

54 Cal.App.3d 1018

Ronald L. QUINTANA, Petitioner and Respondent, v. BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent and Appellant.

Civ. 47131.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Jan. 29, 1976.

As Modified Feb. 19, 1976.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Melvin R. Segal, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent and appellant.

Satzman & Smolen and Geffner & Satzman, by Michael J. Smolen, Los Angeles, for petitioner and respondent.

COMPTON, Associate Justice.

Ronald Quintana joined the California Highway Patrol in March of 1965. In February of 1966, while operating a Highway Patrol vehicle, he was involved in an accident and suffered physical injuries. He was off duty for a period of three months, assigned to limited duty for seven to eight months and thereafter returned to full duty, the first two months of which he served on regular patrol duty.

For the ensuing five years he was assigned to special public relations and investigative position not involving regular patrol duty. Then in November of 1972, he was reassigned to patrol duty and in August of 1973, he filed an application for disability retirement.

Quintana contended, and in the administrative hearings, testified and offered medical evidence to the effect that, because of a pathology in his neck caused by the previous accident, he was unable to operate a patrol car for the extended periods of time required for patrol duty. On the other hand a doctor who was appointed to examine Quintana testified in those administrative proceedings that, while he detected the presence of a minimal or mild cervical disc disease he found no pathology that would interfere with the performance of the duties of a member of the California Highway Patrol.

The hearing officer found that the evidence failed to establish Quintana's incapacity to perform his duties. The decision of the hearing officer recites that 'Although the evidence establishes that respondent suffers pain caused by driving a patrol car, it does not establish that he is unable to carry out a substantial portion of the duties required of Highway Patrolmen.' The Board of Administration Public Employees' Retirement System (the Board) ¹ adopted the decision of the hearing officer and denied Quintana's application.

On Quintana's petition, the superior court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the Board to vacate its decision and to grant Quintana's application for disability retirement. The Board has appealed.

The trial court in its written findings declared that the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence but that in the court's independent judgment the evidence preponderated in favor of Quintana's claim of disability.

At issue is whether the decision of the Board substantially affects a fundamental Vested right. If it does then the trial court correctly applied its independent judgment as to the weight of the evidence. (Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal.3d 130, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242.) If it does not, and the matter involves merely the seeking of a right not yet possessed, then '. . . since the administrative agency must engage in the delicate task of determining whether the individual qualifies for the sought right, the courts have deferred to the administrative expertise of the agency,' (Bixby, p. 144, 93 Cal.Rptr. p. 244, 481 P.2d p. 252) and the 'substantial evidence' test applies.

The general purpose of the California State Retirement System as set forth in Government Code section 20001 ² is to prevent hardship to state employees who because of age or disability are replaced by more capable employees. The pension system serves as an inducement to enter and continue in state service (Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal.3d 32, 89 Cal.Rptr. 61, 473 P.2d 765) and the provisions for disability retirement are also designed to prevent the hardship which might result when an employee who, for reasons of survival, is forced to attempt performance of his duties when physically unable to do so.

As a member of the California Highway Patrol, Quintana had a vested right to continued employment absent the existence of a legal cause for termination. (Salyer v. County of Los Angeles, 42 Cal.App.3d 866, 116 Cal.Rptr. 27; Brush v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal.App.3d 120, 119 Cal.Rptr. 366.) During his employment he had a right to participate in the pension system and, by satisfactory completion of specific years of service and the attainment of a specified age, qualify for a pension. (Gov.Code, § 20950; also see Kern v. City of Long Beach, 29 Cal.2d 848, 179 P.2d 799.)

Additionally, Quintana had a right to receive a pension at an earlier date 'If the medical examination and other available information Show to the satisfaction of the board, that (he) is incapacitated physically or mentally for the performance of his duties . . ..' (Emphasis added.) (Gov.Code, § 21025.)

Government Code section 21020 states:

'As used in this part, 'disability' and 'incapacity for performance of duty' as a basis of retirement, mean disability of permanent or extended and uncertain duration, as determined by the board on the basis of competent medical opinion.'

In Strumsky v. San Diego County, 11 Cal.3d 28, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29, the widow of a deputy county marshal sought a service connected death benefit under Government Code section 31787, which benefit would be greater than what she would receive in the case of a non-service connected death. The Supreme Court there held that the determination of whether the death was or was not service connected required a judicial determination as to the weight of the evidence produced in the administrative proceedings.

The court in Strumsky pointed out that until the happening of the contingency upon which either benefit was payable, in that case the death of the husband, the wife had no vested right in the pension but upon the happening of that event she acquired a vested right in one or the other.

Here the contingency that would give rise to a right to receive pension payments is the existence of a disability and in one sense that right is not 'vested' until the disability is established in the appropriate administrative proceedings. (Brophy v. Employees Retirement System, 71 Cal.App.2d 455, 162 P.2d 939.)

It is to be noted, however, that in Strumsky the right to the Higher award was not 'vested' until a determination of 'service connected' was made. The same considerations that led the court in Strumsky to require a judicial determination of the issue of service versus...