S. A., In re

• Decision Date: 01 April 1970
• Citation: 85 Cal.Rptr. 775,6 Cal.App.3d 241
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re S.A., a minor. S.A., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. D'Orvil JAMES, Deputy Juvenile Probation Officer of Alameda County, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 26496.

Page 775

85 Cal.Rptr. 775

6 Cal.App.3d 241

In re S.A., a minor.

S.A., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. D'Orvil JAMES, Deputy Juvenile Probation Officer of Alameda County, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 26496.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

April 1, 1970.

Jack H. Lipian, Oakland, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen. of State of California, Robert R. Granucci, William D. Stein, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

ELKINGTON, Associate Justice.

Appellant S.A. is a minor, now 19 years of age. From three petitions, contemporaneously filed by her in the juvenile court, the following appears. On three occasions, the first on May 24, 1965, she was adjudged by that court to have come under the provisions of Welfare and institutions Code, section 601. The conduct which formed the basis of the adjudications was, consecutively, staying away from home overnight, truancy and battery, and possession of narcotics. She alleged that probation granted by the court has now terminated and that she 'is not serving a sentence for any offense, nor is under charge of commission of any crime, and has since said termination of said probation, lived an honest and upright life, and has conformed to and obeyed the laws of the land.' Each of her petitions prayed 'that the finding of guilt be set aside, and that a plea of not guilty be entered, and that the court dismiss this action pursuant to section 1203.4 of the Penal Code.' The requested relief being denied, she appeals from the order denying each of the three petitions.

Her contention is that the provisions of Penal Code, section 1203.4 relating to the release from penalties and disabilities of one convicted of crime should apply to her case. ¹ The supporting argument is that one convicted of crime may promptly upon completion of probation apply for release from the penalties and disabilities of his offense, while she, a lesser noncriminal offender, now released from probation, must under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 781, wait until she reaches the age of 21 before she may apply for substantially similar relief. ² This result, she insists, is unreasonable and unfair, inconsistent with due process (see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527), and a 'denial to a minor of a constitutional right of the guaranty afforded by law to an adult.' (See In re Contreras, 109 Cal.App.2d 787, 789--790, 241 P.2d 631.) She points out, as further illustration and support of her contention, that had her offenses been deemed more aggravated, bringing about her commitment to the California Youth Authority, then upon 'honorable discharge' from its control she, under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 1772, would automatically be released from 'all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime for which (she) was committed.' ³

We find the contention to be without merit.

Penal Code, section 1203.4 relates to persons who have been convicted of crime. Appellant has not been convicted of a crime; she was adjudged to be a ward of the juvenile court. 'An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding.' (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 503). Any application of Penal Code section 1203.4 to her juvenile court proceedings would clearly be violative of the express terms of that statute and contrary to legislative intent.

Nor do we observe any constitutional infirmity in Welfare and Institutions Code, section 781.

The Juvenile Court Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 500--945), the Youth Authority Act (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 1700--1835), and the Penal Code, serve three separate and distinct legislative purposes.

The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is set out in Welfare and Institutions Code, section 502 in this manner: 'The purpose of this chapter is to secure for each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the State; to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety and protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and, when the minor is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents. This chapter shall be liberally construed to carry out these purposes.'

The Youth Authority Act sets forth its purpose in Welfare and Institutions Code, section 1700 as follows: 'The purpose of this chapter is to protect society more effectively by substituting for retributive punishment methods of training and treatment directed toward the correction and rehabilitation of young persons found guilty of public offenses. To this end it is the intent of the Legislature that the chapter be liberally interpreted in conformity with its declared purpose.' (Emphasis added.)

And, of course, the Penal Code relates generally to the criminal law and criminal procedure of this state.

The legislative classification brought about by the three statutes we have discussed is clearly based upon some difference in the classes having a substantial relation to a legitimate object to be accomplished. 'The equality guaranteed by the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions, and among persons similarly situated. The Legislature may make a reasonable classification of persons and businesses and other activities and pass special legislation applying to certain classes. The classification must not be arbitrary, but must be based upon some difference in the classes having a substantial relation to a legitimate object to be accomplished.' (3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (7th ed.), p. 1934, and see authorities there cited.) There is a presumption in favor of a classification based on legislative experience, and it will not be rejected unless plainly arbitrary. (Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209--210, 55 S.Ct. 187, 79 L.Ed. 281.

Clearly Welfare and Institutions Code, section 781 does not deny to appellant, or juvenile court wards generally, the equality guaranteed by the equal protection clause.

Nor do we see, in the problem presented to us, any fundamental unfairness or other conceivable violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. Welfare and Institutions Code, section 827 provides that juvenile court records are closed to inspection except as to 'court personnel, the minor who is the subject of the proceeding, his parents or guardian, and the attorneys for such parties and such other persons as may be designated by court order of the judge of the juvenile court upon filing a petition therefor.' The criticized section 781 (quoted in full, ante, fn. 2) sets up a procedure under...