R.G. v. Harris Cnty. Dist. Attorney's Office

• Decision Date: 13 August 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 14-18-00823-CV,14-18-00823-CV
• Parties: R.G., Appellant v. HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

611 S.W.3d 69

R.G., Appellant

v.HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Appellee

NO. 14-18-00823-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinions filed August 13, 2020

Kevin Jewell, Justice

Appellant R.G. appeals the denial of his petition for expunction. Because the record supports the trial court's decision that R.G. failed to meet applicable expunction requirements, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background

Our record reveals the following limited but undisputed facts. Based on a probable cause affidavit, R.G. was arrested and charged with two counts of injury to a child in 1992. According to the affidavit, R.G.'s three-week-old infant daughter suffered a broken right femur, broken ribs, and a skull fracture

. The affidavit further states that R.G. confessed to the affiant that his conduct on or about October 1, 1992, resulted in his daughter's broken leg and that his conduct on or about October 4, 1992, resulted in his daughter's broken ribs.

A single indictment under one cause number (No. 647073) alleged the felony offenses that R.G.:

on or about OCTOBER 1, 1992 recklessly caused serious physical deficiency and impairment to [the Complainant], a child younger than fifteen years of age, by holding the Complainant by the legs against the rail of a play pen.

Count II

... on or about OCTOBER 4, 1992, did then and there unlawfully intentionally and knowingly cause serious physical deficiency and impairment to [the Complainant], a child younger than fifteen years of age, by striking the Complainant with his hand.

Based on a plea agreement, the State dismissed the first count, but R.G. pleaded guilty and served community supervision as to the second count. In February 2004, the district court signed an order discharging R.G. from community supervision based on his satisfactory completion of the conditions.

In June 2018, R.G. filed a petition for expunction in civil district court. R.G. sought to expunge the criminal records and files pertaining to the offense alleged in count one of the indictment—the count the State dismissed. R.G. asserted that he was entitled to expunction because "the indictment or information was presented, but the same was subsequently dismissed or quashed on June 16, 1993." The Harris County District Attorney's Office answered with a general denial.

The trial court conducted an oral hearing on R.G.'s petition. R.G. did not offer or present any evidence at the hearing. The district attorney's office requested the court to take judicial notice of the probable cause affidavit, the indictment, the State's motion to dismiss count one, and the order discharging R.G. from community supervision as to count two. All of these records relate to cause number 647073, and the trial court admitted them without objection.

During the hearing, the district attorney's office argued that both counts of injury to a child arose out of the "same transaction," which, under the applicable provisions of the expunction statute, meant that R.G. was not entitled to expunction of the dismissed count.

After the hearing, the trial court denied R.G.'s petition. R.G. timely appealed.

Analysis

R.G. raises one issue: whether the two counts of injury to a child arose from the same transaction and whether he is entitled to expunction as to the count the State dismissed.

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review

Expunction is a statutory remedy governed by article 55.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Ex parte Scott , 476 S.W.3d 93, 94-95 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). The purpose of the statute is to permit the expunction of records of wrongful arrests. Harris Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office v. J.T.S. , 807 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1991) ; see also In re State Bar , 440 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. 2014). Even though the statute is contained in a criminal code, an expunction proceeding is civil in nature. See In re Expunction , 465 S.W.3d 283, 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) ; Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. J.H.J. , 274 S.W.3d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). The petitioner accordingly bears the burden of proving that all statutory requirements have been met. J.H.J. , 274 S.W.3d at 806 ; see Harris Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Hopson , 880 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). Also, because an expunction is a statutory privilege rather than a constitutional or common law right, the statutory requirements are mandatory and exclusive. See Expunction , 465 S.W.3d at 286 ; J.H.J. , 274 S.W.3d at 806. The trial court has no power to extend equitable relief beyond the clear meaning of the expunction statute. See Ex parte Reed , 343 S.W.3d 306, 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

The expunction statute provides, in pertinent part, and with emphasis on the determinative language:

(a) A person who has been placed under a custodial or noncustodial arrest for commission of either a felony or misdemeanor is entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest expunged if ...

(2) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not resulted in a final conviction and is no longer pending and there was no court-ordered community supervision under Chapter 42A for the offense, ... provided that:

(A) regardless of whether any statute of limitations exists for the offense and whether any limitations period for the offense has expired, an indictment ... charging the person with the commission of any felony offense arising out of the same transaction for which the person was arrested :

(i) has not been presented against the person at any time following the arrest ... or

(ii) if presented at any time following the arrest, was dismissed or quashed, and the court finds that the indictment was dismissed or quashed because: [the person completed a veterans treatment court program, a mental health court program, or a pretrial intervention program;] the presentment had been made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reasons indicating the absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense; or [ ] the indictment was void; or

(B) prosecution of the person for the offense for which the person was arrested is no longer possible because the limitations period has expired.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A), (B) (emphasis added). To meet his burden, R.G. was required to show that he was entitled to expunction under the general conditions of subsection (a)(2), and also was required to prove that the terms of either subsection (a)(2)(A) or (a)(2)(B) were satisfied. See Collin Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Fourrier , 453 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). R.G. attempted to meet the terms of subsection (a)(2)(A). Accordingly, he was required to show that an indictment charging him with any felony offense arising out of the same transaction for which he was arrested either was not presented any time following the arrest, or if presented was dismissed for any reason stated in subsection (a)(2)(A)(ii).

The trial court decided that R.G. failed to meet his burden, and under our standard of review, we must uphold that decision unless the trial court clearly abused its discretion. State v. T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018) ; see Ex parte Cephus , 410 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). A trial court has no discretion, however, in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. See T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d at 620. We therefore review a trial court's legal conclusions under a de novo standard. Id. Likewise, construction of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. See id.

The Code Construction Act controls when interpreting the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Tex. Gov't Code §§ 311.001 -.006. We analyze statutes "as a cohesive, contextual whole" with the goal of effectuating the legislature's intent and employing the presumption that the legislature intended a just and reasonable result. T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d at 620 ; J.T.S. , 807 S.W.2d at 574. Further, our analysis is limited to application of the plain meaning of the statutory language unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd or nonsensical results. T.S.N. , 547 S.W.3d at 621 ; see also Willacy Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd. , 555 S.W.3d 29, 38 (Tex. 2018).

B. Application

R.G. argued in the trial court and argues here that the two counts of injury to a child listed in the indictment did not arise out of the "same transaction" and, thus, an indictment charging him with the commission of any felony arising out of the same transaction for which he was arrested had not been presented against him. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A)(i). The district attorney's office contends, on the other hand, that an indictment was presented charging R.G. with the commission of a felony offense alleged in count two, which arose out of the same transaction for which he was arrested. Id. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii). The district attorney's office suggests that subsection (a)(2)(A)(ii) is not satisfied because count two was not dismissed, but rather R.G. pleaded guilty to count two and received community supervision as part of a plea agreement resulting in the dismissal of count one. According to the district attorney's office, article 55.01 embraces an "arrest based" approach, which means that a person is not entitled to have any records of their arrest expunged when any charge stemming from the arrest results in a final conviction. Because R.G. pleaded guilty to count two and served a community supervision sentence, the district attorney's office says the entirety of his arrest records is not eligible for expunction.

Article 55.01 does not define the phrase "same transaction." We have not located and the parties have not cited a ...