Radich v. Kruly

• Decision Date: 28 April 1964
• Citation: 38 Cal.Rptr. 340,226 Cal.App.2d 683
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Risto P. RADICH, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lepa J. KRULY, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 27427, 27523.

Page 340

38 Cal.Rptr. 340

226 Cal.App.2d 683

Risto P. RADICH, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lepa J. KRULY, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 27427, 27523.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

April 28, 1964.

Lemaire & Mohi, by Cy H. Lemaire, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Robert K. Garst, Ventura, for respondent.

ROTH, Justice.

Respondent sued his daughter for support and maintenance under Civil Code, section 206. ¹ The trial court found that respondent is a poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, who has no substantial assets, no income except $135.00 per month old age benefits 'which were terminated when * * * defendant [appellant] * * * agreed to pay $150.00 per month for * * * plaintiff until the trial of this action.' That appellant is able to support and maintain respondent; that respondent was without funds to prosecute the action; and that '[t]he plaintiff, in the performance and non-performance of his duties as a father of the defendant, has at times in the past neglected to support and to maintain the defendant during her minority while he had the ability to do so, * * * The plaintiff has physically abused defendant and has caused her mental distress, and has falsely circulated that she was unchaste at the time of her marriage * * *. During the minority of defendant plaintiff often required defendant to work in the fields and orchards * * *, so that her entry into school was delayed, although plaintiff had the physical ability to support the defendant and arrange for her timely entry into school.'

The trial court concluded however, in spite of its findings of the conduct of respondent during appellant's minority set out above, that the only defense appellant could made against this action was that permitted by section 206.5, to wit: abandonment for a minimum period of two years before a child reaches the age of 18. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment against appellant in the sum of $300.00 per month support money and for $1,000.00 as a reasonable amount to cover respondent's legal costs and expenses.

Appellant appealed from this judgment.

Subsequent to this appeal respondent moved for support, maintenance and expense money pending appeal. Respondent asked for 'reasonable financial support and maintenance,' and expense money. The court granted this motion ordering the appellant to pay forthwith to the respondent $500.00 a month pending appeal and $1,000.00 expense money on appeal.

Appellant appealed from said order made pendente lite. Both appeals have been consolidated for purpose of this opinion.

Appellant urges that this proceeding is an equitable action and that the evidence shows and the trial court in effect found that respondent comes into court with unclean hands.

Section 206.5 of the Civil Code indicates and the trial court held that abandonment is the only defense to an action by a parent against a child under section 206.

Section 206 appears to be a codification of a principle of equity, and a suit in equity appears to be the means of enforcing rights under section 206. (Paxton v. Paxton, 150 Cal. 667, 89 P. 1083.) In Paxton, it was held (150 Cal. at page 672, 89 P. at page 1085) 'that the duty and right established by section 206 of the Civil Code may be enforced by an action in equity like the one at bar, and that in such action a court of equity has full jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment * * *.'

The fact that a court of equity is the proper court for the enforcement of section 206, however, does not necessarily dictate the conclusion that the doctrine of clean hands is a complete defense. It is well settled that public policy may favor the non-application of the doctrine as well as its application. (Dominguez v. Dominguez, 136 Cal.App.2d 17, 288 P.2d 195.)

There can be no doubt that the state is an interested party in an action under section 206 since the public is relieved of the burden of support by such action. (Duffy v. Yordi, 149 Cal. 140, 84 P. 838; Woolams v. Woolams, 115 Cal.App.2d 1, 251 P.2d 392; Britton v. Steinberg, 208 Cal.App.2d 358, 24 Cal.Rptr. 831.) When the state is an interested party and application of the doctrine would defeat the state's interest, the application of the doctrine, although for the protection of the integrity of the court, is not legally imperative. (Katz v. Karlsson, 84 Cal.App.2d 469, 191 P.2d 541.)

The duty and rights established by section 206 were nonexistent at common law. They were created by legislative mandate as a condification of a moral right, and primarily as a relief to the public. Since the only defense provided by the legislature is that of abandonment during the minority of a child found in section 206.5, this court is not disposed to subvert the public policy established by section 206 and section 206.5, by holding that the doctrine of unclean hands is a complete defense to an action brought under section 206. (cf. Mendelsohn v. Mendelsohn, 192 Misc. 1014, 80 N.Y.S.2d 913; Ketcham v. Ketcham, 176 Misc. 993, 29 N.Y.S.2d 773; 70 C.J.S. Paupers § 60g, page 112.)

However, while we are not disposed to accept the doctrine of unclean hands as a complete defense to a suit under Civil Code, section 206, in our opinion the prior conduct of a parent is a relevant factor in determining the standard of support owed by a child to a parent.

A child who has the means, has a legal duty to relieve the public of the burden of support, of an indigent parent. When, however, the findings of the trial court are such as to warrant a conclusion of unclean hands as is the situation in the case at bar, it seems to us that a child has no moral or equitable obligation of support, and that the obligation is purely legal and statutory.

When, therefore there is a finding of fact which amounts to unclean hands, the guide lines set out in §§ 241-254 of the Civil Code insofar as they fix the obligations of a child to a parent, are modified by the doctrine of unclean hands. When unclean hands is found to exist, the boligation of support of a child to a parent should be limited to a sum which will take care of the minimum needs of the parent and yet will be as close to a...