Rakowski v. Wagoner
| Decision Date | 13 July 1909 |
| Citation | 103 P. 632,24 Okla. 282,1909 OK 190 |
| Parties | RAKOWSKI v. WAGONER, County Judge. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
If a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, that should be adopted which gives the statute the effect evidently intended by the Legislature, especially if the other construction would render the same invalid.
In the act of the Legislature of 1909, entitled "An act providing for holding county court at the town of Prague, in Lincoln county," the words "term" and "session" are used interchangeably.
A local and special law authorized by section 13, art. 7 (Bunn's Ed. § 185; Snyder's Ed. p. 221), does not come within the inhibition of section 59, art. 5 (Bunn's Ed. § 132; Snyder's Ed. p. 181), of the Constitution, providing that "where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted."
Where a special or local law has been passed by the Legislature after notice of the intended introduction of said bill has been published and verified proof thereof filed with the Secretary of State, under the terms of section 32, art. 5 (Bunn's Ed. § 105; Snyder's Ed. p. 149), of the Constitution, and a certified copy thereof from the Secretary of State is filed with the record in this court, and the sufficiency of such notice is not questioned, it will be deemed here to have been sufficient.
A statute will not be declared invalid as being repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution, unless such repugnancy is clear and appears beyond a reasonable doubt.
Original application for a writ of prohibition by Casper Rakowski against Fred A. Wagoner, County Judge. Writ denied.
E. A Foster, C. B. Wilson, Jr., and J. B. A. Robertson, for plaintiff.
M. D Owen and John J. Davis, for defendant.
The issue in this case involves the validity of an act of the Legislature of 1909, know as "House Bill No. 460," entitled "An act providing for holding county court at the town of Prague, in Lincoln county." Said act was passed by virtue of the authority of section 13, art. 7 (Bunn's Ed. § 185; Snyder's Ed. p. 221), of the Constitution of Oklahoma, which provides: "*** The county court shall be held at the county seat, but the Legislature may provide for holding sessions of the county court at not more than two additional places in the county Provided, that alternate session of county court in La Flore shall be held at Talihina." It is insisted by the plaintiff that said act is void, for the reason that it appears that it was the intention thereby to establish a separate county court at Prague, and one of the reasons given in support of this contention is the use of the word "term" in place of the word "session."
It is a well-settled rule of construction, in determining the meaning of an act, to consider the entire act in the light of its context. Now, it was clearly the purpose of the Legislature to provide for holding county court at the town of Prague, in Lincoln county. Such court is a creature of the organic law, and not of the Legislature. Section 11, art. 7 (Bunn's Ed. § 181; Snyder's Ed. p. 219), of the Constitution, provides: It is a settled rule of construction that if there are two reasonable interpretations to be placed upon an act, one rendering it valid and the other invalid, that is to be adopted which tends to validity. The purpose of this act being for holding county court at the town of Prague, if it was contemplated to provide for holding sessions of the county court except in addition to the county seat, it would be void, for two separate and independent county courts cannot be created by the Legislature for a county. We are to construe this act as an entirety, with a view to give effect to each portion thereof, if practicable, but, if not, to let that part fall which cannot be reasonably harmonized with the apparent intention of the lawmakers.
"There shall be held equal number of terms of the county court in the town of Prague with the county seat of Lincoln county." When an equal number of terms of county court are held at the town of Prague, in Lincoln county, why is not that, in the light of this act as an entirety, equivalent to "alternative sessions of the county court in Lincoln county to be held at Prague"? Whilst the word "term" is more comprehensive than the word "session," yet in this act they seem to have been used interchangeably. In section 4 it is provided: "*** and the jurors to serve at a session of court held at Chandler shall be drawn out of the box containing the 'Chandler Jury List' and the jurors to serve at a session of court held at Prague shall be drawn out of the box containing the 'Prague Jury List."' Under the most technical construction, a term of court cannot be held at Prague without a session of court being held there. It is provided: ' etc. These lists being delivered to the county judge, what court does he hold? None but the county court. And when he holds court at Prague it can but be the county court, and can only be done by virtue of the act of the Legislature, as authorized by section 13, art. 7, of the Constitution.
Construing this act, in view of the context, including the constitutional provisions relating to county courts, to give effect to the intention of the lawmakers, and permit same to stand, if reasonably practicable, if from the act, including its title, and the sections of the Constitution authorizing such act, it is apparent that a word or words are used not in their technical, but familiar or popular sense, and by the adoption of the former meaning the act falls, but by the latter it stands, such familiar or popular meaning will be adopted. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 366; U.S. v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 18 L.Ed. 830; Nance v. Southern Ry. Co., 149 N.C. 366, 63 S.E 116; Massey v. Dunlap, 146 Ind. 358, 44 N.E. 641; Robinson v. Varnell, 16 Tex, 882; Waller v. Harris, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 555, 32 Am. Dec. 590; Corning v. Meade County, 102 F. 57, 42 C. C. A. 154. The case of Ravenscraft et al. v. Board of County Commissioners, 5 Idaho, 178, 47 P. 943, sustains the use of the words "term" and "session," in view of the context, as interchangeable. See, also, State v. Vicknair, 118 La. 963, 43 So. 635; MacNaughton v. Southern, etc., R. Co. (C. C.) 19 F. 881; Com. v. Brown, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 370; Doles v. Hilton, 48 Ark. 308, 3 S.W. 193; Helm v. Chapman, 66 Cal. 291, 5 P. 352; Edwards v. Morton, 92 Tex. 152, 46 S.W. 792; In re Matthews (D. C.) 109 F. 618; Gilbert v. Morgan,...
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