Ralston v. State
| Decision Date | 27 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 84142-4-I |
| Citation | 522 P.3d 95 |
| Parties | Jennifer RALSTON, Caleb McNamara and the Estate of McNamara; Braeden Simon, Abie Ekenezer, Jesse Hughey, Tim Kauchak, Jordan Pickett, Daniel Pierce, Sean Swanson, Joey Wieser, Quinn Zoschke, Jeff Cushman, Appellants, v. STATE of Washington, a governmental entity, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Karen Kathryn Koehler, Stritmatter Kessler Whelan Koehler Moore, 3600 15th Ave. W. Ste. 300, Seattle, WA, 98119-1330, Garth L. Jones, Stritmatter Kessler Koehler Moore, 413 8th St., Hoquiam, WA, 98550-3607, Robert S. Peck, Center for Constitutional Litigation PC, 2117 Leroy Place Nw., Washington, DC, 20008, for Appellants.
Kristin Beneski, Attorney at Law, 800 Fifth Ave. Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, Harry H Schneider Jr., Perkins Coie LLP, 1201 3rd Ave. Ste. 4900, Seattle, WA, 98101-3095, Lia Elise Pernell, Office of the Attorney General, 800 Fifth Ave. Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, for Respondent.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶1 Several plaintiffs bring this putative class action lawsuit against the State. They claim that it has underfunded the Washington courts in violation of its constitutional duties, that the ensuing court congestion has delayed their civil cases and thereby caused them harm, and that they represent a class of plaintiffs similarly harmed. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
¶2 We affirm, concluding that only the judiciary may use its inherent power to compel the legislature to better fund the courts and that no other power allows the plaintiffs their requested remedy.
¶3 This case is a putative class action brought by a number of plaintiffs. Each is also plaintiff in a separate civil action. They claim that those underlying civil lawsuits have seen their trials delayed because of systemic court underfunding. They bring this action against the State in an attempt to compel greater funding for the judiciary.
¶4 The underlying actions are varied and their trial dates have been postponed for a number of reasons. Jennifer Ralston and Caleb McNamara filed their case in 2015. That case still awaited trial as of the filing of the complaint in this putative class action because the court granted a defense motion to continue brought on account of claimed complications in discovery. The order allowed the parties to file a motion for expedited trial, though it is unclear from the record whether they did.
¶5 Braeden Simon commenced his case in September, 2020. After a judicial reassignment, trial was rescheduled by the court from September 7, 2021 to February 16, 2022, the next available jury trial date, because of a "scheduling conflict."
¶6 Abie Ekenezer, Jessey Hughey, Tim Kauchak, Jordan Pickett, Daniel Pierce, Sean Swanson, Joey Wieser, and Quinn Zoschke, along with around 45 other individuals, are plaintiffs in a lawsuit filed in September, 2020 and amended in April, 2021. Trial was moved forward a year and a half, from September 27, 2021 to February 21, 2023, after the defendants asked for a three-year continuance because of the complexity of the case, which involves voluminous discovery and more than 500 disclosed witnesses.
¶7 Jeff Cushman initiated his underlying lawsuit in October, 2020. The matter was consolidated with other similar cases and a third amended complaint was filed in August, 2021. The court moved the trial date to March, 2022.
¶8 Together, these plaintiffs sue the State on behalf of a larger putative class of plaintiffs suffering the impact of delays in their civil trials. They do so because the State plays a role in funding the courts1 and, they allege, it is failing to fulfil that role. They contend that their trials’ continuances harmed them and were ultimately caused by the State's failure to adequately fund the courts. They seek a declaration of their rights and injunctive relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), ch. 7.24 RCW, requesting that the judiciary compel greater court funding from the legislature.
¶9 The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss the action with prejudice. The plaintiffs sought direct review from the Washington Supreme Court, which declined review by a June 8, 2022 order.
¶10 A trial court's decision to dismiss a case under CR 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Kinney v. Cook, 159 Wash.2d 837, 842, 154 P.3d 206 (2007). "Dismissal is warranted only if the court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, the plaintiff cannot prove ‘any set of facts which would justify recovery.’ " Kinney, 159 Wash.2d 837 at 842, 154 P.3d 206 (quoting Tenore v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 136 Wash.2d 322, 329-30, 962 P.2d 104 (1998) ). "The court presumes all facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint are true and may consider hypothetical facts supporting the plaintiff's claims." Kinney, 159 Wash.2d at 842, 154 P.3d 206.
¶11 As a threshold procedural matter, the State contends that this action constitutes a collateral attack by the plaintiffs on their underlying cases and therefore improperly asks one court to interfere in proceedings not before it. We disagree.
¶12 The common law priority of action rule "provides that the first court to obtain jurisdiction over a case possesses exclusive jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts."
Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Wash. App. 296, 302, 153 P.3d 211 (2007). "[I]ts authority continues subject only to the appellate authority until the matter is finally and completely disposed of." State ex rel. Greenberger v. Superior Court for King County, 134 Wash. 400, 401, 235 P. 957 (1925). But the rule applies only where there is "identity of subject matter, relief, and parties between the actions." Am. Mobile Homes of Wash., Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 115 Wash.2d 307, 317, 796 P.2d 1276 (1990).
¶13 Here, there is no identity of subject matter, requested relief, or parties between the actions. The plaintiffs do not ask the court to decide the issues of fact or law that are the subject of their underlying cases or directly interfere in those proceedings in any way. What relief the plaintiffs do request is systemic in nature, rather than targeted at their preexisting cases. Furthermore, the parties among the cases are also not identical; the State is the only named defendant here. The priority of action rule therefore does not bar this lawsuit.
¶14 We are asked whether private litigants who assert that their trials have been delayed because of an underfinanced court system's lack of capacity may sue the State in order to compel the judiciary's more ample funding by the legislature. We conclude that they may not. The judiciary possesses the inherent power to compel the legislature to better fund the courts. But exercise of this power is necessarily limited by the careful balance of powers between the branches. These limitations express themselves in part by allowing only one entity to bring this sort of lawsuit: the judiciary. More generally, no other right or power permits the plaintiffs’ requested remedy. A lawsuit brought by members of the public to compel specific legislative exercise of its power over funding may only be sustained under our state constitution's public education mandate, not under the provisions relied on by the plaintiffs in this case.
¶15 The doctrines of separation of powers, checks and balances, and inherent judicial powers are "three interrelated ... constituents of our governmental framework" that inform determinations of when one branch may interfere with the actions of another. In re Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wash.2d 232, 237-38, 552 P.2d 163 (1976). The judiciary is empowered by these doctrines to compel the legislature to provide greater funding for the courts when they are unconstitutionally under resourced. Id. at 245, 552 P.2d 163. The plaintiffs contend that they fall within a "zone of interest" arising from this power that supports their lawsuit because court underfunding "impairs [the judiciary's] existence as a co-equal branch, in violation of the constitutional guarantee of separation of powers." The State, on the other hand, contends that these doctrines entirely prohibit the plaintiffs’ lawsuit because any exercise of this power constitutes a disfavored judicial interference in legislative functions. We hold that only the judiciary may wield its inherent power to compel the legislature to better fund the courts.
¶16 The three doctrines are as much philosophical and political constructs as they are legal ones. Juvenile Director, the seminal Washington case addressing them, conducts an examination of their history and purpose and is the basis for much of the following analysis. Id. at 236-51, 552 P.2d 163. That being so, a brief summary of the case's facts is appropriate. It concerned the appeal from a superior court order enjoining the board of county commissioners of Lincoln County to pay a court-appointed employee, the director of juvenile services, a higher wage. Id. at 234-35, 552 P.2d 163. The case was brought by the superior court of Lincoln County but heard by a superior court judge from another county. Id. at 233, 552 P.2d 163. The Washington Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Utter, reversed the superior court's order because the judicial plaintiffs had not met the high burden needed for the judiciary to compel another branch to fund the courts. Id. at 251, 552 P.2d 163.
¶17 To start, "[a]ny inquiry into the propriety of court action to compel funding of its own functions must begin with an examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrines of separation of powers, checks and balances, and inherent judicial power." Id. at 237, 552 P.2d 163. The separation of powers doctrine was first expressed in its modern form by eighteenth century English and French...
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