Ramirez, In re

• Citation: 39 Cal.3d 931,705 P.2d 897,218 Cal.Rptr. 324
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 26 September 1985
• Parties: , 705 P.2d 897 In re Rudy J. RAMIREZ on Habeas Corpus. Crim. 23684.

Page 324

218 Cal.Rptr. 324

39 Cal.3d 931, 705 P.2d 897

In re Rudy J. RAMIREZ on Habeas Corpus.

Crim. 23684.

Supreme Court of California.

Sept. 26, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 24, 1985.

Michael Satris, San Quentin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Donald Specter and Constance Bakkerud, San Quentin, for petitioner.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci, Ronald E. Niver and Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

LUCAS, Justice.

The issue presented is whether a new statutory plan for awarding sentence reduction credits may be applied, without violation of the ex post facto clauses of the California ¹ or federal ² Constitutions, to prisoners who committed crimes before the effective date of the new scheme. We conclude that it may.

I. Statutory Provisions

Before 1983, former Penal Code ³ sections 2931 and 2932 governed the award of sentence reductions to prisoners. Under former section 2931, prisoners had their sentences reduced both by refraining from certain enumerated offenses and by participating in approved "work, educational, vocational, therapeutic or other prison activities." By refraining from enumerated offenses, prisoners received "good behavior credits" of three months for each eight months served. By participating in the approved activities prisoners received "participation credits" of one month for each eight served.

Both good behavior and participation credits were subject to forfeiture under former section 2931. By committing one of the proscribed acts, a prisoner lost 15, 30, or 45 days of good behavior credit depending upon the seriousness of the act. If a prisoner failed to participate in the approved programs, he lost 30 days of participation credit. Under former section 2932, not more than 90 days of good behavior credit nor more than 30 days of participation credit could be forfeited in any 8-month period.

On January 1, 1983, a new plan (hereafter the 1982 amendments) for awarding sentence reduction credits became effective. ⁴ The new plan applies to prisoners who committed crimes after January 1, 1983, but all other prisoners may waive their right to be governed by the old system and elect the new system. In broad terms, the new method eliminates good behavior and participation credits but provides "worktime credits" of six months for each six months served for "performance in work assignments and performance in elementary, high school, or vocational education programs."

Significantly, for our purposes, the 1982 amendments also change the old plan as applied to prisoners who do not elect to be governed by the new plan. First, a prisoner may lose accumulated good behavior credits for "any act ... which ... could be prosecuted ... as a misdemeanor or a felony, or any act of misconduct described as a serious disciplinary infraction by the Department of Corrections." ( § 2931.) Under the old system only particular enumerated acts resulted in forfeiture. Second, the new provisions increase the credits subject to forfeiture for misconduct to 180 days for felonies, 90 days for misdemeanors, and 30 days for serious disciplinary infractions. ( § 2932.) Third, a "serious disciplinary infraction" committed during an activity for which participation credits are awarded, shall be deemed a failure to participate, subjecting the prisoner to a loss of participation credits as well as good behavior credits. (Ibid.) The prior law did not provide for the forfeiture of participation credits in such a situation. Finally, the new plan eliminates the limit on credits subject to forfeiture during any eight-month period. (Ibid. ) No provision of the 1982 amendments affects credits relating to time served before 1983.

II. Facts

Petitioner, Rudy J. Ramirez, is imprisoned for a crime committed before January 1, 1983. On that date he was incarcerated at the California Men's Colony at San Luis Obispo, and he has not elected to be governed by the new system. In January 1983 he was charged with altering the paperwork relating to a television set, resulting in the loss under the new plan of 95 days of behavior credits. In an administrative appeal the loss was reduced to 48 days. Under the old plan, petitioner would have been subject to a maximum forfeiture of 15 days.

In May 1983 petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the superior court challenging the application of the new system to him. That petition was denied on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court of Appeal affirmed. We remanded this case to the Court of Appeal with instructions to consider the constitutionality of the 1982 amendments in light of Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17. The Court of Appeal, in a published opinion, held that the 1982 amendments may be applied to petitioner without violation of the state or federal ex post facto clauses. We granted the petition for hearing to resolve the conflict between the Court of Appeal decision in this case and the decision in In re Paez (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 919, 196 Cal.Rptr. 401.

III. Discussion

The Florida statute at issue in Weaver reduced the amount of good time credits prisoners could earn but did not disturb credits earned prior to its effective date. The Florida scheme did not contemplate additional credit for work assignments but did provide discretionary credits for "some outstanding deed" or particularly skillful or industrious performance of work assignments. The Supreme Court of the United States held the statute invalid as ex post facto. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, observed that an ex post facto law "must be retrospective ... and it must disadvantage the offender...." (Weaver, supra, 450 U.S. at p. 29, 101 S.Ct. at p. 964.)

Florida contended that the statute was not retrospective because it affected only future credits and because the good time system was not an integral part of the prisoner's sentence. The Supreme Court concluded instead that the statute was retrospective because it changed the "legal consequences" of crimes committed before its effective date and was part of the prisoner's "punitive conditions" even though not technically part of his sentence. (Weaver, supra, 450 U.S. at pp. 31, 32, 101 S.Ct. at pp. 965, 966.) The court found that the prisoner was disadvantaged because he earned less credit for the same conduct. The Supreme Court also rejected Florida's argument that the new scheme was not disadvantageous because it provided the opportunity to earn more credits than under the old scheme on the grounds that to earn such credits the prisoner must perform in a superior fashion and that such awards were discretionary in any event. (Id., at p. 35, 101 S.Ct. at p. 967.)

We addressed the question of ex post facto laws in a similar context in In re Stanworth (1982) 33 Cal.3d 176, 187 Cal.Rptr. 783, 654 P.2d 1311. There we found ex post facto the application of the Determinate Sentencing Act ⁵ parole guidelines to prisoners sentenced under the earlier Indeterminate Sentence Law. ⁶ In deciding whether the new system was disadvantageous to the prisoner, we noted, following Weaver, that the issue was not the actual application to the petitioner, "but whether the standards ... have been altered to [the prisoner's] detriment." (Id., at p. 186, 187 Cal.Rptr. 783, 654 P.2d 1311, italics added.)

In Paez, the Court of Appeal held that the 1982 amendments, which are at issue here, are ex post facto laws. The Attorney General raised two contrary arguments. First, he argued that Weaver is distinguishable because the credits there were reduced regardless of the prisoner's good conduct. Under the 1982 amendments the credits for good behavior remain the same; only subsequent misconduct results in the new sanctions. Second, he contended that because the credit forfeitures were punishments for improper prison conduct rather than additional sanctions for the original crime, the new system was not retrospective. The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments holding, as to the first, that the credit system was a legal consequence of the original crime, even if the system's deleterious effect was only triggered by later events. (Paez, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 922, 196 Cal.Rptr. 401.) The court likewise rejected the Attorney General's second argument on the ground that the forfeiture of credits in no way precluded a criminal prosecution for the same action. Because the state did not charge the prisoner with a new crime, the forfeiture could not be punishment for that crime; rather it was an administrative sanction that must relate to the original crime. (Id., at p. 923, 196 Cal.Rptr. 401.)

A. Disadvantageous

The first issue is whether the 1982 amendments are disadvantageous to petitioner. If we were unencumbered we would be tempted to find that any disadvantage stems from petitioner's own action and that the 1982 amendments are not disadvantageous on their face. Weaver, however, held that a prisoner's control over the increased sanctions of the new plan is irrelevant to whether that plan is deemed disadvantageous. (Weaver, supra, 450 U.S. at p. 33, 101 S.Ct. at p. 966.) In Stanworth, we analyzed the new system not by examining whether the prisoner had actually been disadvantaged but by determining whether the system itself had been altered to the prisoner's detriment. (Stanworth, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 186, 187 Cal.Rptr. 783, 654 P.2d 1311.)

Turning to the 1982 amendments, as we have stated, (1) the acts that may result in a forfeiture of good behavior credits have been expanded, (2) the amount of credits forfeitable for disciplinary violations has been increased, (3) an act punishable by loss of good behavior credits may now sometimes result in a loss of participation credits as well, and (4) the limit on the credits forfeitable over an eight-month period has been deleted. All of these changes, of course, are disadvantageous to petitioner. Accord...