Ramirez v. State, No. 4-05-00322-CR (Tex. App. 10/4/2006)
| Decision Date | 04 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-05-00322-CR.,4-05-00322-CR. |
| Parties | ANTHONY RAMIREZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the 81st Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas, Trial Court No. 04-05-0079-CRW, Honorable Stella Saxon, Judge Presiding.
AFFIRMED.
Sitting: Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice, Rebecca SIMMONS, Justice.
In a two paragraph indictment, Appellant Anthony Ramirez was charged with the murder of Paul Guajardo under Sections 19.02(b)(1) and 19.02(b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 19.02 (b)(1), (2) (Vernon 2003). The jury returned a verdict finding Ramirez "guilty of murder, as charged in the indictment" and sentenced Ramirez to twenty-eight years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and assessed a fine in the amount of $10,000.00. Ramirez now contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to establish that he acted with the requisite intent or knowledge. Additionally, Ramirez contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by making statements to the jury that lowered the State's burden of proof.
In points of error one and two, Appellant Ramirez complains that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to prove the requisite culpable mental state for murder.
As in most cases, when there is no direct evidence of a defendant's intent, the State must establish the necessary intent by circumstantial evidence. See Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). In a legal-sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Kingv. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence. Sutherlin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant's intent must be presumed, in favor of the prosecution, even without affirmative proof on the record that the trier of fact resolved any such conflict. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In a factual sufficiency review, we examine all of the evidence neutrally and ask whether proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination or so greatly outweighed by contrary proof as to indicate that a manifest injustice has occurred. See Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). When there is evidence both supporting the verdict and evidence contrary to the verdict, we consider whether the contrary evidence is so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 485. Under Zuniga, evidence of guilt "can 'preponderate' in favor of conviction but still be insufficient to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." In other words, we must determine whether the evidence supporting guilt outweighs the contrary proof. Id. We must, however, avoid substituting our judgment for that of the fact-finder, the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
The Penal Code defines murder as intentionally or knowingly causing the death of an individual. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1) (Vernon 2003). A person commits the offense of murder under Section 19.02(b)(2) if he intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(2) (Vernon 2003). "Serious bodily injury" is bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any "bodily member or organ." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05); Ferrel v. State, 55 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the requisite mental state. The record reflects otherwise.
On November 14, 2003, Appellant Anthony Ramirez and his friend Paul Guajardo spent the day eating, drinking, listening to music and doing "lines of crank." Somewhere between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., Ramirez and Guajardo arrived at Ramirez's grandmother's residence. According to Ramirez, he possessed a single-action . 357 revolver and as Guajardo "twirled" the loaded firearm and spun it around, the firearm discharged and hit Guajardo. Without contacting any medical or emergency service, Ramirez dragged Guajardo through the house and into his vehicle. At approximately 4:50 p.m., Ramirez delivered Guajardo to the Wilson County Hospital's emergency room where Guajardo was pronounced dead approximately one hour later. Ramirez informed hospital personnel that Guajardo had been shot on a dirt road and then, over the objection of hospital personnel, Ramirez left the hospital.
According to the record, Ramirez went to Guajardo's residence where he met Guajardo's brother. Ramirez informed Guajardo's brother that Guajardo had been shot while they were cruising around town. Thereafter, Ramirez went to a local bar, "the Bud," where he started calling his friends in an apparent attempt to help him dispose of his vehicle and obtain a ride away from the bar. Additionally, while at the Bud, Ramirez unloaded the bullets from the firearm and threw them into the river.
At approximately 11:00 p.m., Ramirez and his attorney went to the Wilson County Police Department where Ramirez gave officers a third version of the incident, which he described as an unfortunate accident. Ramirez claimed that Guajardo grabbed the firearm, with his non-dominant hand, and was "twirling" it around when the firearm discharged. This version, however, contradicted the forensic evidence. Specifically, the medical examiner's testimony was that the gunshot residue, the tattooing on the body and the angle of the wound all indicated a homicide and not a self-inflicted wound.
In addition to the forensic evidence, the State highlighted several discrepancies in Ramirez's story, including: the minimal blood on his shirt was dried and crusted by the time he arrived at the hospital; while Guajardo was presumably bleeding to death in the vehicle, Ramirez took the necessary time to go back into the house to retrieve the firearm and locate the shell casing in question; Ramirez's failure to call police or the hospital, although he had a cell phone in his possession; the inconsistent stories Ramirez told about the incident—to the hospital, to the family and to the officers; the fact that Ramirez left the hospital when emergency personnel asked him to stay; and finally, an unexplained bag of methamphetamine apparently placed on Guajardo's body. Oddly, Ramirez kept the shell casing from the bullet that killed Guajardo, even through changes of clothes and a shower. As he offered the shell casing to the officer, Ramirez stated "I got something you probably want to see but I want you to promise I can get it back . . . I want it back."
The jury was charged under Sections 19.02(b)(1) and 19.02(b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code, including both intentionally causing the death or intending to cause serious bodily injury and committing an act clearly dangerous to human life. Taking into consideration Ramirez's actions and conduct, a rational jury could have reasonably inferred that Ramirez either intended to shoot and kill Guajardo or that Ramirez intended to cause serious bodily injury to Guajardo and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life. West v. State, 846 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, pet. ref'd).
Intent is a question of fact and therefore within the sole purview of the jury for which the jury may rely on its collective common sense and apply common knowledge and experience. Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Rodriguez v. State, 90 S.W.3d 340, 355 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, pet. ref'd). Additionally, intent may be inferred from the circumstantial evidence surrounding the incident including the acts, words and conduct of the accused. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). When the weapon used is a deadly weapon per se, the actor's intent to kill may be presumed as a matter of law. Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 580-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
Importantly, however, to commit murder under Section 19.02(b)(2) the intent to kill is not required. See Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 638 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). It is sufficient to show only the intent to cause serious bodily injury and commit a clearly dangerous act. Rodriguez v. State, 146 S.W.3d 674, 676 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). As such, "twirling" or pointing a loaded firearm in the direction of an individual is sufficient for a jury to find a defendant guilty under Section 19.02(b)(2). Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (); Goodin v. State, 726 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987) aff'd, 750 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ().
The jury was free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness and evidently chose to believe the State's witnesses, and we will not invade this realm. Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Rodriguez v. State, 644 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no pet.)(denial of intent presented fact issue...
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