Ramsey v. State

• Decision Date: 28 October 2015
• Docket Number: NO. PD–0070–15,PD–0070–15
• Citation: 473 S.W.3d 805
• Parties: Donald Lynn Ramsey, a.k.a. Donald Lynn Ramsay, Appellant v. The State of Texas
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

473 S.W.3d 805

Donald Lynn Ramsey, a.k.a. Donald Lynn Ramsay, Appellant

v.The State of Texas

NO. PD–0070–15

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Delivered: October 28, 2015

Milton Troy Bollinger, Plainview, TX, for Appellant.

Stacey Goldstein, Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, TX, for the State.

OPINION

HERVEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., JOHNSON, KEASLER, RICHARDSON, YEARY, and NEWELL, JJ., joined.

Appellant was found guilty of forgery, and on appeal the court of appeals reversed his conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient because there was no proof that Appellant had the intent to defraud or harm another. Ramsey v. State, No. 07–14–00249–CR, 2014 WL 7271488, at *3 (Tex.App.—Amarillo Dec. 17, 2014) (mem.op.) (not designated for publication). The State Prosecuting Attorney filed a petition for discretionary review, which we granted, arguing that the court of appeals did not examine the totality of the evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom.¹ We agree and will reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

FACTS

Jimmie and Jed Owens founded and operated Owens Motor Machine, a company that performed electrical work. However, State's Exhibit 3 includes a signature card for the Owens Motor Machine bank account, which states that the account holder was "J E OWENS DBA OWENS MOTOR MACHINE." It further notes that Owens Motor Machine was a sole proprietorship, that the sole owner of the account was Jimmie, and that Jed was only an authorized agent on the account. When the State showed the exhibit to Jed during his testimony and asked him who the owner of that account was, he responded, "It's my father." When asked if there is a place on the card where it says "owner of the account," he answered, "Yeah. It's J.E. Owens on the owner." Appellant began working for the company in January or February of 2013. At some point after he was hired, he was allowed to move into the business shop, which had a cot, bathroom, and air conditioner. When working around town, Jed would drive himself and Appellant around in his work truck.² At night, Jed parked the truck in the shop where Appellant was living and would leave it unlocked. Appellant was the only employee of the company (other than the owners) for approximately six months before the fraudulent check was passed.

Both Jimmie and Jed were signatories on a checking account for Owens Motor Machine, and the names of record were "J.E. Owens" (Jimmie) and "J.J. Owens" (Jed). Jimmie testified that he usually signed checks "J.E. Owens" but sometimes wrote "Jimmie E. Owens," and in the past had signed them "Jimmie Owens." He also stated that Appellant was always paid by check, and that he would write "contract labor" in the memorandum line. According to Jed, there were two checkbooks for the account; his father had one, and he had the other. He kept his in his work truck and said that, aside from his father, the only other person with access to the checkbook in his truck was Appellant. He did testify, however, that other people occasionally stopped by the shop to talk to him about "electrical business." Jimmie and Jed denied executing the check in question and were adamant that they did not authorize anyone else to do so. Jed testified that he is familiar with his father's distinct handwriting, and the signature on the check was not his father's.

On June 11, 2013, Appellant went to Booger Red Liquor, which was located about a block and a half from the shop where he lived, and tendered to the on-duty clerk a check payable to himself in the amount of $65. The liquor store clerk honored the check because the Owenes had previously authorized it to cash Appellant's paychecks. According to the on-duty clerk, Appellant bought cigarettes and beer, and the balance was given to him as change. The check was signed "Jim E. Owens" and "contract labor" was written in the memorandum line. At the time of the offense, Jimmie was 84 years old.

COURT OF APPEALS

The court of appeals held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Appellant intended to defraud or harm the victim because the State failed to prove that Appellant knew the check was forged. Ramsey, 2014 WL 7271488, at *3. In discussing the intent-to-defraud-or-harm element, it said that mere possession, passage, or presentment of a forged instrument is insufficient to infer intent to defraud, although the requisite intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence. Id. at *1. It went on to discuss our decision in Stuebgen v. State, 547 S.W.2d 29, 35 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), and held that it controlled the outcome of this case based on the following passage:

In the instant case, the record reflects that appellant made no statement from which it could be inferred that he knew the instrument was forged. Appellant was listed as the payee, and appellant did not falsely represent himself. No evidence was introduced to show that anything appearing on the check was in appellant's handwriting. Although appellant had access to [the victim]'s checkbook, and [the victim] normally paid his employees personally, we do not find that this evidence is sufficient to discharge the State's burden of showing that appellant acted with intent "to defraud or harm another."

Id. In its analysis, the court noted that, just as in Stuebgen, Appellant was usually personally paid; he had access to the checkbook, although there was evidence that other people had access to the checkbook as well; there was no evidence that the handwriting on the check was that of Appellant; he was listed as the payee; and he never falsely represented himself. Ramsey, 2014 WL 7271488 at *2 (citing Crittenden v. State, 671 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) ). It also explained that the fact that Jimmie usually signed checks "J.E. Owens" does not constitute proof that Appellant knew the check was forged because, although the forged check bore a different signature, Jimmie had executed checks in at least two other ways before and there is no record evidence that Appellant knew how Jimmie signed his checks. Id. at *3. For these reasons, according to the court, any inference that Appellant knew the check was forged would be based on speculation. Id.

Justice Pirtle, who authored the dissent, would have distinguished this case from our decisions in Stuebgen and Crittenden and held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain the conviction. Id. at *3–4 (Pirtle, J., dissenting). He argued that the critical distinction between Stuebgen, and this case is that, in Stuebgen there was no memorandum on the check stating the purpose for which the check was given. Also, he distinguishes Crittenden based on the fact that, in Crittenden, there was no connection between the stolen check and the defendant, the defendant said nothing from which it could be inferred that he knew the check was stolen, and he did not flee when the bank would not honor the check. Id. at *4. Instead, Justice Pirtle concluded that the outcome of this case is controlled by our decision in Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Tex.Crim.App.1985),

Here, similar to Williams and unlike Stuebgen and Crittenden, Appellant attempted to pass an instrument that clearly stated that it was given for a specific purpose, to-wit: "contract labor." Furthermore, the evidence established that he was a former employee of the purported maker of the check, had access to a checkbook from their account and passed the instrument at a location where he knew his "paychecks" would be honored. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence in this case circumstantially establishes that Appellant passed the check under circumstances inferentially representing the check was given for services rendered.

Ramsey, 2014 WL 7271488, at *4.

THE LAW

When examining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the combined and cumulative force of all admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction to determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex.Crim.App.2012). Beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does not require the State to disprove every conceivable alternative to a defendant's guilt.³ Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525 ; see Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 160–61 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) ; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). The trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence and is permitted to draw any reasonable inference from the evidence so long as it is supported by the record. Inferences based on mere speculation, however, are insufficient to support a criminal conviction. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16–17.

The elements of forgery as alleged in the indictment are that (1) Appellant, (2) acting with intent to harm or defraud, (3) an elderly person, (4) passed, (5) a forged, (6) writing. TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.21(b). The only issue before us, however, is whether Appellant acted with intent to harm or defraud. To prove the requisite intent, the trier of fact must be able to reasonably infer that Appellant knew the instrument was forged beyond a reasonable doubt. Okonkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 695 (Tex.Crim.App.2013).

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

A. The State

The State makes two arguments as to why the court of appeals erred. First, the State asserts that, contrary to the decision of the court of appeals, a jury...