Davison v. State
| Decision Date | 02 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-19-00092-CR,06-19-00092-CR |
| Citation | 602 S.W.3d 625 |
| Parties | Craig Deallen DAVISON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Lew Dunn, Law Offices of Lew Dunn, Longview, for Appellant.
Brendan W. Guy, Assistant District Attorney, Tom Watson, Gregg County District Attorney, Longview, for Appellee.
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
The main participants in this sordid tale of kidnapping and murder are Craig DeAllen Davison, Dustin Bennett, Patricia Baker (a/k/a Crickett), Dakeilen Nelson, and Kevin Stephenson. Nelson and Stephenson are the victims. Bennett confessed to kidnapping and murdering Nelson and Stephenson, and Baker pled guilty to assisting Bennett in kidnapping them. The present case involves the State's aggravated kidnapping charges against Davison.
The State's theory at trial was that Davison, "acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense[s], ... solicit[ed], encourage[ed], direct[ed], aid[ed] or attempt[ed] to aid" Bennett and Baker in kidnapping Nelson and Stephenson and was therefore guilty of aggravated kidnapping under the law of parties. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2). At trial, Davison did not contest that Bennett kidnapped and murdered Nelson and Stephenson or that Baker assisted Bennett in kidnapping them; rather, he simply denied that he was involved in those offenses. A Gregg County jury disagreed and found Davison guilty of two counts of aggravated kidnapping,1 and the trial court assessed him a punishment of fifty-four years' imprisonment after finding the State's enhancement allegations to be true.
On appeal, Davison challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions under the law of parties, contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of certain extraneous wrongful acts, and contends that the trial court reversibly erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding the law of parties in the application portion of its jury charge. Because we find (1) that legally sufficient evidence supports Davison's conviction, (2) that Davison was not egregiously harmed by the trial court's jury-charge error, and (3) that (a) Davison's complaints regarding the admission of extraneous wrongful acts evidence were forfeited in some instances and, (b) as for the preserved complaints, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
In his first and second issues, Davison challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions on two counts of aggravated kidnapping. "In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Williamson v. State , 589 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref'd) (citing Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Hartsfield v. State , 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref'd) ). "Our rigorous legal sufficiency review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented." Id. (citing Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). "We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’ " Id. (quoting Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ) (citing Jackson , 443 U.S. at 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ; Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ). In drawing reasonable inferences, the trier of fact "may use common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life." Duren v. State , 87 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. struck) (citing Manrique v. State , 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J., concurring)). As the trier of fact, the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and may "believe all of a witnesses' testimony, portions of it, or none of it." Thomas v. State , 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We give "almost complete deference to a jury's decision when that decision is based on an evaluation of credibility." Lancon v. State , 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
In our review, we consider "events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act." Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Cordova v. State , 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ). It is not required that each fact "point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction." Id. Since circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone. Ramsey v. State , 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) ; Hooper , 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Guevara v. State , 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ). Further, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, whether it was properly admitted or not. See Moff v. State , 131 S.W.3d 485, 489–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
"Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge." Williamson , 589 S.W.3d at 298 (quoting Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ). "The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’ " Id. (quoting Malik , 953 S.W.2d at 240 ).
Under the statute and the indictment, to obtain the convictions for aggravated kidnapping, the State was required to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that on or about March 22, 2016, (1) Davison (2) intentionally or knowingly (3) abducted Nelson and Stephenson (4) by restricting the movements of Nelson and Stephenson without their consent so as to interfere substantially with their liberty by moving them from one place to another, with the intent to prevent their liberation, (5) by secreting or holding them in a place where they were not likely to be found, and (6) that Davison did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit, a firearm, during the commission of the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.01(1) – (2) (Supp.), § 20.04(b). "A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a). "A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if[,] ... acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense."2 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) ; In re State ex rel. Weeks , 391 S.W.3d 117, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Therefore, in this case, we must determine whether there is legally sufficient evidence to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Davison, (1) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offenses, (2)(a) solicited, (b) encouraged, (c) directed, (d) aided, or (e) attempted to aid (3) Bennett and/or Baker to commit the offenses. In determining whether Davison was a party to the offenses, we may consider "events before, during, and after the commission of the offense." Gross v. State , 380 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Wygal v. State , 555 S.W.2d 465, 468–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ). "While an agreement of the parties to act together in a common design seldom can be proved by direct evidence, reliance may be had on the actions of the parties, showing by either direct or circumstantial evidence, an understanding and common design to do a certain act." Barnes v. State , 585 S.W.3d 643, 649 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. granted) (quoting Barnes v. State , 62 S.W.3d 288, 297 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref'd) ); see Ransom v. State , 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (op. on reh'g) (citing Cordova v. State , 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ). "Evidence is sufficient to convict under the law of parties if the defendant is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages its commission by words or other agreement." Barnes , 585 S.W.3d at 649 () (citing Ransom , 920 S.W.2d at 302 ).
The evidence showed that Davison owned a house in Hallsville, Texas, where many people came and went. There were allegations of rampant drug use and prostitution occurring at Davison's house. Several witnesses testified that Davison claimed to be a member of the Bandidos motorcycle gang, although it was later established that he was not. Although Davison was thirty-one years older than Baker, the two of them were in a relationship of some sort. The record seems to show that Baker was at times Davison's lover, and at other times, she was a prostitute working for him in exchange for drugs. Many witnesses...
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