Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., s. 91-1264

• Decision Date: 18 May 1992
• Docket Number: 91-1450,Nos. 91-1264,s. 91-1264
• Citation: 965 F.2d 141
• Parties: 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2509, 122 Lab.Cas. P 10,260 RANDALL DIVISION OF TEXTRON, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, Intervening Respondent. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, Intervening Petitioner, v. RANDALL DIVISION OF TEXTRON, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 141

965 F.2d 141

140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2509, 122 Lab.Cas. P 10,260

RANDALL DIVISION OF TEXTRON, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW,

Intervening Respondent.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner,

and

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, Intervening Petitioner, v. RANDALL DIVISION OF TEXTRON, INCORPORATED, Respondent.

Nos. 91-1264, 91-1450.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 9, 1992.

Decided May 18, 1992.

Hudnall A. Pfeiffer (argued), Todd M. Nierman, Baker & Daniels, Indianapolis, Ind., for Randall Div. of Textron, Inc.

Margaret G. Bezou (argued), N.L.R.B., Contempt Litigation Branch, Aileen A. Armstrong, Howard E. Perlstein, Scott MacDonald, N.L.R.B., Appellate Court, Enforcement Litigation, Washington, D.C., William T. Little, Rik Lineback, N.L.R.B., Region 25, Indianapolis, Ind., for N.L.R.B.

Barry A. Macey, Nora L. Macey, Janice Kreuscher (argued), Segal & Macey, Indianapolis, Ind., for International Union of United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of America, UAW.

Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.

The National Labor Relations Board found that the Randall Division of Textron, Inc. violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (5), by refusing to bargain with the United Auto Workers at Randall's Morristown, Indiana plant. The Board ordered Randall to bargain with the UAW. Randall has petitioned for review of the Board's order, and the Board has cross-petitioned for enforcement. Because we agree with the Board that Randall's previous settlement with the UAW of a refusal to bargain charge obligated Randall to bargain with the UAW for a reasonable time, we deny Randall's petition for review and order enforcement of the Board's order.

I.

In December 1986, American Carco of Indiana, Inc. was forced into bankruptcy. Randall, which had bought parts from American, negotiated a lease-purchase agreement with the bankruptcy court for American's factory in Morristown. Randall began operations in the plant in January 1987.

The UAW had represented American's production, laboratory, and maintenance employees at Morristown since 1978. After Randall took over the Morristown plant, the UAW, insisting that Randall was a successor employer, demanded recognition and bargaining. When Randall refused, the UAW filed an unfair labor practice charge. The NLRB's Regional Director issued a complaint alleging that Randall was a successor to American and that Randall had violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the UAW. The Regional Director also filed suit in district court for an injunction pursuant to § 10(j) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j).

Shortly before the scheduled hearing on the charge, the Administrative Law Judge suggested that Randall and the UAW settle their differences. Representatives of Randall and the UAW agreed with the ALJ's advice and retired to a separate room to negotiate. The UAW wanted immediate recognition and bargaining. While Randall was not averse to recognizing the UAW (all of Randall's other seven plants were organized, two by the UAW), Randall did not want to bargain immediately because it wanted time to expand the Morristown factory facilities and work force free from the pressures of having to negotiate or respond to grievances.

Randall and the UAW eventually struck a written agreement that accommodated each other's concerns. The UAW agreed that all pending charges would be withdrawn and that the district court suit would be dismissed. Randall agreed to recognize the UAW immediately. But immediate recognition did not mean immediate bargaining instead, Randall and the UAW agreed to place a "total moratorium on any obligation by Randall to bargain over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment for a period of eighteen (18) months from the date Randall receives clear title to the Morristown plant...." The agreement also set out a limited grievance and arbitration procedure for discharged non-probationary employees and a provision barring strikes over discharges.

In August 1987, Randall received clear title to the Morristown plant. Eighteen months came and went, and the UAW asked Randall to bargain. But despite the settlement agreement, Randall withdrew recognition from the UAW and refused to bargain, claiming that it had a good faith doubt about whether the UAW represented a majority of the plant's employees. The UAW filed another unfair labor practice charge against Randall, and the Regional Director filed another complaint alleging that Randall violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to bargain. This charge proceeded to a hearing, after which the ALJ decided that Randall had violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5). The ALJ found that the settlement agreement required Randall to bargain upon request after 18 months from the date Randall received clear title to the plant. Randall could not avoid this bargaining obligation by asserting a good faith doubt about the UAW's majority status because the agreement gave the UAW an "irrebuttable presumption" of majority status for a reasonable time beginning at the end of the 18-month bargaining moratorium. The ALJ also found that, in any event, Randall had not shown it had an objectively based good faith doubt about whether a majority of the Morristown employees supported the UAW.

The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision on two bases. First, although the Board found it unnecessary to pass on the ALJ's use of the term "irrebuttable presumption," it nevertheless found that Randall's settlement of the earlier refusal to bargain charge imposed a duty on Randall to bargain for a reasonable period of time during which Randall could not question the UAW's majority status. Second, the Board found that Randall failed to establish it had a good faith doubt about the UAW's majority status. The Board ordered Randall to bargain with the UAW at the UAW's request. Randall asks us to review this order; the Board asks us to enforce it.

II.

A.

Congress has delegated to the National Labor Relations Board the principal responsibility for deciding labor disputes. See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, 494 U.S. 775, 786, 110 S.Ct. 1542, 1549, 108 L.Ed.2d 801 (1990). Consequently, our review of Board decisions in unfair labor practice cases is deferential. The Board's factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); David R. Webb Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 888 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir.1989); Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 78, 81 (7th Cir.1985). Substantial evidence is evidence that " 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' " Operating Engineers, 755 F.2d at 81 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). Similarly, we will uphold the Board's legal conclusions " 'unless they are irrational or inconsistent with the [Act].' " David R. Webb, 888 F.2d at 503 (quoting NLRB v. Parents and Friends of the Specialized Living Center, 879 F.2d 1442, 1448 (7th Cir.1989)); see also Operating Engineers, 755 F.2d at 81.

The Board held that Randall was obligated to bargain with the UAW for a reasonable time regardless of whether a majority of the Morristown employees supported the UAW. As Randall correctly points out, recognizing and bargaining with a minority union usually violates §§ 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act. See Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 81 S.Ct. 1603, 6 L.Ed.2d 762 (1961); Bellwood General Hospital v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 98, 102 (7th Cir.1980). Allowing employers to recognize and bargain with minority unions is thought to impair the employees' rights guaranteed by §§ 7 and 9(a) of the Act to freely choose their own bargaining representatives, or to choose not to be represented at all, through the exercise of majority rule. See Garment Workers, 366 U.S. at 737, 738-39, 81 S.Ct. at 1607-08; 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 (ensuring employees the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice, or to refrain from collective bargaining) and 159(a) (providing that the collective bargaining representative chosen by a majority of employees in a unit shall be the employees' exclusive representative). Therefore, an employer may usually justify its refusal to bargain with an established union by showing the union no longer represents a majority of employees. Also, to ameliorate the dilemma that faces an employer that is not sure of the union's continued majority support (because bargaining will be an unfair labor practice if the union turns out not to represent a majority, and refusing to bargain will be an unfair labor practice if the union does represent a majority), the Board generally will allow an employer to justify a refusal to bargain with an established union by showing that at the time it refused to bargain it had a good faith doubt about whether the union represented a majority of employees. See Bellwood, 627 F.2d at 102. Where an employer demonstrates that it held a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status, the burden shifts to the Board to produce evidence that on the date the employer refused to bargain, the union did represent a majority of the employees. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 804, 110 S.Ct. at 1558 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Orion Corp. v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 81, 85 (7th Cir.1975) (per curiam).

Despite the rule generally prohibiting bargaining with minority unions, the Board has decided, with court approval, that in some circumstances the interests of industrial peace and stability in bargaining relationships are better served by not allowing an employer to question a union's majority status for a reasonable...