Randolph v. Wetzel

• Decision Date: 18 December 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–3396.
• Citation: 987 F.Supp.2d 605
• Parties: Samuel B. RANDOLPH, IV, Plaintiff, v. John WETZEL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

987 F.Supp.2d 605

Samuel B. RANDOLPH, IV, Plaintiff,
v.
John WETZEL, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–3396.

United States District Court,
E.D. Pennsylvania.

Dec. 18, 2013.

[987 F.Supp.2d 610]

Samuel B. Randolph, IV, Graterford, PA, pro se.

Anthony P. Venditti, Pa. Office of Attorney General, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, District Judge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	611
II.	STANDARD OF REVIEW	612
III.	COMMONWEALTH DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	613

A.	All Claims Against Commonwealth Defendants in Their Official Capacity	613
B.	Claims Under the Eighth Amendment Against Commonwealth Defendants for Failure to Intervene as to Plaintiff's Medical Care	614
C.	Claims under the Eighth Amendment for Denial of Food and Water.	614
D.	Claims Under the Eighth Amendment for Refusing to Transport on a Gurney.	615
E.	Claims under the Eighth Amendment for Denial of Visitation Privileges	616
F.	Claims under the Eighth Amendment for the Fluorescent Lighting.	616
G.	Claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act.	617
H.	Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment for Denial of Due Process.	617
I.	Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment for Denial of Access to the Courts.	619
J.	Eighth Amendment Claim Against Defendants Speelman, Lacotta, and Rambler for Excessive Use of Force.	619
K.	Claims under First Amendment for Retaliation against Defendants Speelman and Lacotta.	621
L.	Claims under First Amendment for Retaliation against Remaining Commonwealth Defendants.	623

IV. MEDICAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
623

A.	Claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act.	623
B.	Claims under the Eighth Amendment for Failure to Provide Treatment and for Fluorescent Lighting.	624

1.	SCI–Greene Medical Defendants	625
2.	SCI–Graterford Medical Defendants	626

C.
Claims under the Eighth Amendment for Denial of Food and Water.
626

1.	SCI–Greene Medical Defendants	626
2.	SCI–Graterford Medical Defendants	627

D.	Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment for Denial of Due Process.	627
E.	Claims for Medical Malpractice.	628

V.	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT	628
VI.	CONCLUSION	628

[987 F.Supp.2d 611]

I. INTRODUCTION

Samuel B. Randolph, IV (“Plaintiff”) is an inmate in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's prison system. He filed a pro se eighty-four page complaint (ECF No. 5). In the Complaint, Complaint, Plaintiff brings sundry claims for, inter alia retaliation for the filing of grievances, an alleged assault by correctional officers, an alleged denial of food and water, failure to transport Plaintiff on a gurney, denial of visitation privileges, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Fourteenth Amendment violations, denial of access to the courts, denial of proper medical treatment, and medical malpractice. Plaintiff names a plethora of defendants. For organizational purposes the Court will divide the defendants into two groups: Commonwealth Defendants ¹ and

[987 F.Supp.2d 612]

Medical Defendants.² The Court will generally follow this grouping except where it is necessary to distinguish among the individual defendants.³

Commonwealth Defendants and Medical Defendants have filed separate Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 78, 81). Plaintiff has filed a response to both motions (ECF No. 110) as well as a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Commonwealth Defendants and Dr. Byanchuk Jin (ECF No. 113). Defendants have filed their responses (ECF Nos. 121, 122).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A motion for summary judgment will not be defeated by ‘the mere existence’ of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there is a genuine issue of material fact.” Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

In undertaking this analysis, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. “After making all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.” Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir.2010) (citation omitted).

The standard for addressing cross-motions for summary judgment remains the same as if there were only one motion filed. See

[987 F.Supp.2d 613]

Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.2008).⁴ When confronted with cross-motions for summary judgment the “court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.” Schlegel v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 269 F.Supp.2d 612, 615 n. 1 (E.D.Pa.2003) (quoting 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (1998)).

III. COMMONWEALTH DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Commonwealth Defendants include numerous public officials employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff brings claims against them in both their official and individual capacity.

A. All Claims Against Commonwealth Defendants in Their Official Capacity.

Plaintiff brings each of his claims against the Commonwealth Defendants in their official capacity.

“[S]uits against unconsenting [s]tates” are barred by Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity unless a state has waived its immunity. Sossamon v. Texas, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1657–58, 179 L.Ed.2d 700 (2011) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996)); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54–55, n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 1114. “Where a state agency or department is named as defendant, that too is considered a suit against a state which is barred by the eleventh amendment.” Geis v. Bd. of Educ. of Parsippany–Troy Hills, Morris Cnty., 774 F.2d 575, 580 (3d Cir.1985) (citing Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Association, 450 U.S. 147, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981)); see also Everett v. Schramm, 772 F.2d 1114, 1118 (3d Cir.1985) (“[T]he general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” (citation omitted)). ⁵

Suits against Commonwealth Defendants in their official capacity are suits against the state of Pennsylvania. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against any defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages are barred by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, Commonwealth Defendants, in their official capacities, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's claims for monetary relief.

Hereafter, the Court will examine Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their individual capacities because “[a]lthough,

[987 F.Supp.2d 614]

absent waiver, the Eleventh Amendment bars damage suits against a state or against state officials in their official capacities when damages will have to be paid with state funds, ... it does not bar a damage suit against state officials in their individual capacities.” West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir.1978) (internal citations omitted).

B. Claims Under the Eighth Amendment Against Commonwealth Defendants for Failure to Intervene as to Plaintiff's Medical Care.

Plaintiff claims that Commonwealth Defendants are liable for the allegedly inadequate medical care provided or recommended by Medical Defendants.

In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show personal involvement of defendants by alleging personal direction, actual knowledge, or acquiescence. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988). “[A]s a general matter the [Third Circuit] has been reluctant to assign liability to prison officials based solely on the denial of prisoner grievances.” Carter v. Smith, CIV.A 08–279, 2009 WL 3088428, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 22, 2009). Even if a prison official's review were to constitute personal involvement, “absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir.2004). This is because “[i]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts ... a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff's claims against Medical Defendants do not meet the deliberate indifference standard required. See infra Section IV(B), (C). Accordingly, whether Plaintiff's claim is based on a theory of inadequate supervision of Medical Defendants or actual knowledge by Commonwealth Defendants, the result is the same. Ergo, Commonwealth Defendants cannot be liable as there was no underlying constitutional violation committed by Medical Defendants.

C. Claims under the Eighth Amendment for Denial of Food and Water.

Plaintiff claims that the Commonwealth Defendants failed to provide him with food and water by placing his meal trays outside of his reach. See Compl. ¶¶ 87–90, 112, 140, 155–57, 233, and 317.

“The [Eighth] Amendment ... imposes duties” on prisons to “ensure that inmates receive adequate food.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The failure to provide accommodations to Plaintiff, such as food and water, are governed under the “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” standard. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235–36;see also infra Section IV(C). The “standard requires deliberate indifference on the part of the prison officials and it requires the prisoner's medical needs to be serious.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235–36.

Plaintiff admits that: prison officials regularly brought food and water to Plaintiff's cell, see Comp...