Rands v. Clarke County

• Decision Date: 15 April 1914
• Parties: RANDS v. CLARKE COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

139 P. 1090

79 Wash. 152

RANDS v. CLARKE COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

April 15, 1914

Appeal from Superior Court, Clarke County; R. H. Back, Judge.

Taxpayer's action by E. M. Rands against the county of Clarke and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Donald McMaster, of Vancouver, for appellant.

Bates &amp Burnett and Miller, Crass & Wilkinson, all of Vancouver, for respondents.

FULLERTON J.

The Legislature of the state of Washington, at the biennial session of 1913, passed an act (Laws 1913, p 168) empowering the state of Washington, or any county, city or town therein, 'to jointly or separately join with any adjoining state, county, city or town in the purchase, construction, control, operation and maintenance of any bridge or bridges over or across any river, stream or body of water being within or constituting the boundary line of the state or of any county therein.' Section 6 of the act provided that, whenever the board of county commissioners of any county shall deem it for the interest of such county to engage in or aid in the construction of a bridge under the provisions of the act, and to incur an indebtedness to meet the cost thereof and the expenses connected therewith, and issue bonds of the county for the payment of such indebtedness, such county is authorized and empowered, by and through its board of county commissioners, to engage in or aid in such work, and to incur an indebtedness for such purpose to an amount which, together with the then existing indebtedness of such county, shall not exceed 5 per cent. of the taxable value of the taxable property of such county, as shown by the last preceding assessment roll thereof for state and county purposes, and to issue negotiable bonds of the county for such indebtedness; provided that the commissioners shall have first submitted the question of incurring such indebtedness to the voters of the county, at a general or special election, and three-fifths of the voters voting upon the question shall have voted in favor of incurring the same. Section 11 of the act reads as follows: 'That whenever it is deemed advisable by the common council of any city or town and the county commissioners of any county in this state to purchase or construct a bridge within or partly within such city or town, the council and commissioners are authorized and empowered to enter into an agreement for the construction of such bridge, upon such terms as may be mutually agreed upon, each contributing such sum towards the purchase or construction of the same as may be determined to be just and proper, and enter into contract for the construction of such bridge and to spend public funds thereon, and if deemed necessary may bond the county or city or town in the manner herein specified. The contracts for letting the same and notice given to bidders, and all other matters pertaining to the construction shall be governed by the laws in force governing the construction of bridges by county commissioners in the state of Washington, provided the payments to be made on the contract by the respective municipal corporations be made direct to the contractor.' The laws in force governing the construction of bridges by county commissioners referred to in the section quoted, in so far as they are pertinent to the inquiry, empower such board to enter into contracts for the construction of such bridges in behalf of the county, and to superintend and control the construction thereof, as if the matter were the business solely of the county disconnected entirely from state business.

Acting in pursuance of the powers granted in the statute cited, the board of county commissioners of Clarke county, Wash., on July 9, 1913, adopted a resolution, in which it was recited that the board deemed it for the interests of Clarke county that it, together with the city of Vancouver, join with the county of Multnomah, in the state of Oregon, in the construction of an interstate toll bridge across the Columbia river, which formed the boundary line between the two counties, and that Clarke county should incur a bonded indebtedness in the sum of $500,000 to meet the cost thereof and the expenses connected therewith. The board thereupon ordered that the question whether or not such indebtedness should be incurred by submitted to voters of the county at a special election called for August 12, 1913, and directed that the notice thereof be given in the manner required by law. Notice was given, and an election held on the day named in the resolution, at which more than three-fifths of the legal voters voting thereat favored the incurring of the indebtedness for the purposes expressed in the resolution.

Thereafter the board of county commissioners entered into negotiations with the proper officers of the county of Multnomah, in the state of Oregon, and reached a tentative agreement for the construction of a bridge across the Columbia river extending southerly from a point in the southern boundary of the city of Vancouver to a point on the Oregon shore; such bridge to cost approximately $1,250,000, of which sum Clarke county is to contribute $500,000, and Multnomah the balance of the total cost. Before any such bonds were issued, however, and before any contract for the construction of the bridge was entered into, the present action was begun by the appellant, who is a resident and taxpayer of Clarke county, to enjoin the board from issuing the bonds, and from entering into any contract for the construction of the bridge. The complaint is based on the contentions that the proposed bond issue is illegal, because proposed to be issued for a purpose prohibited by the Constitution, and because of defects and irregularities in the proceedings leading up to the issuance; and that the board of county commissioners are without power to enter into a contract for the construction of the bridge, because the act of the Legislature under which they are proceeding vests such power solely in the state highway board, even where the county of itself, without the aid of the state, creates the fund necessary for the construction of the bridge. At the trial the lower court ruled against the contentions of the complainant, and entered a judgment to the effect that he take nothing by his action. This appeal followed.

Article 8, § 7, of the state Constitution provides: 'No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money or property, or loan its money or credit, to or in aid of any individual, association, company, or corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company, or corporation.'

It is argued by the appellant that, since the bridge is to be built in conjunction with the county of Multnomah, in the state of Oregon, that municipal corporation will be aided by the money applied by Clarke county to the construction of the bridge, and the proposed act of the county commissioners is thus within the prohibition of the Constitution quoted. But it will be noticed that the prohibition is against the giving or loaning of money to or in aid of any individual, association, company, or corporation, and it is clear that, unless the word 'corporation' can be held to include a county in a foreign state, the county of Multnomah is not included within the prohibition. We think the word cannot be held to have this meaning. Plainly, by the terms which precede it, the framers had in mind individuals, associations, companies, and corporations engaged in purely private enterprises, or enterprises only quasi public, not to enterprises carried on by the corporations whose functions are wholly public, such as the federal or state government, or some branch thereof. This we determined in Lancey v. King County, 15 Wash. 9, 45 P. 645, 34 L. R. A. 817, where we held that King county could appropriate money in the aid of a ship canal proposed to be constructed in that county; in State ex rel. School District v. Grimes, 7 Wash. 273, 34 P. 836, where we held that this provision of the Constitution did not prohibit the state from investing the irreducible school fund in bonds of school districts; and perhaps in Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 126 P. 628, 127 P. 580, where we held that the public nature of an improvement was not destroyed because it was the purpose to let to private individuals for a limited time a part of the improvements when constructed.

The appellant cites, as holding contrary to the principle here announced, the case of State ex rel. Potter v. King County, 45 Wash. 519, 88 P. 935. The syllabus of that case does support the contention, but it will be...