Rankin v. State

• Decision Date: 30 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2872, Sept. Term, 2005.,2872, Sept. Term, 2005.
• Citation: 174 Md. App. 404,921 A.2d 863
• Parties: Donald E. RANKIN v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

921 A.2d 863

174 Md. App. 404

Donald E. RANKIN v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 2872, Sept. Term, 2005.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 30, 2007.

Juan P. Reyes (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.

Robert Taylor, Jr. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.

Panel JAMES R. EYLER, SHARER, and WOODWARD, JJ.

WOODWARD, J.

This case comes to us as an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Charles County denying a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence. We shall affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹

Donald Rankin, appellant, was charged in the Circuit Court for Charles County with first degree burglary, first degree sex offense, two counts of second degree sex offense, conspiracy to commit first degree burglary, and conspiracy to commit a second degree sex offense.

On June 21, 1999, appellant entered into a plea agreement with the State. The prosecutor explained that appellant would enter a plea to the count charging conspiracy to commit a second degree sex offense. The prosecutor proffered: "The only limitation on sentence is the Court had bound itself to an active cap of no more than three years."

The trial court told appellant:

Okay. I'm told that the agreement is if that plea is accepted that the State will dismiss all the other counts at the time of sentencing. In addition, the active portion of the sentence, that's the portion that's not suspended, cannot exceed three years. The Court could, however, as part of the sentence, impose the sentence where the suspended portion exceeds three years.

Appellant told the trial court that he understood. The trial court set a date for sentencing, and the court indicated it would ask that the presentence investigation report be received at least three days earlier.

At sentencing, on August 13, 1999, the prosecutor told the trial court that "[t]he victim has indicated to me that she wants absolutely no contact with the defendant whatsoever and I would ask that it be extended not only to the victim but the victim's family, her children and her parents." Defense counsel merely said, "Your Honor, I believe [appellant] wants to submit to the mercy of the Court." Asked if he wanted to say anything, appellant said,² "No, sir." The trial court then told appellant: "And I warn you that if you violate probation you will run the risk of doing substantially all of the back up time. Do you understand that?" Appellant stated that he did.

The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years, with all but three years suspended, followed by a period of five years probation. He then advised appellant of the terms of his probation and his appeal rights. Afterward, the prosecutor nol prossed the remaining counts. Defense counsel told the trial court: "Thank you, Your Honor. I [will] read his order for probation to him as we sit back at the chairs now, if I may."

The "Plea/Sentence Agreement" filed on June 21, 1999 provides: "Defendant will plead guilty to:" and, handwritten on the form is "Conspiracy to Commit 2° Sex Offense (Amended count # 7) (Alford plea)."³ The form recites "State will dismiss other charges/cases as follows:", with everything after charges crossed out. It also states: "Court will," (then in handwriting,) "impose an active cap of no more than 3 years. Court may impose additional suspended time." On the next line is printed: "There is no other sentencing limitation except that provided by law." The agreement is signed by the prosecutor, appellant, appellant's trial counsel, and Judge Henderson, and dated "6/21/99."

Appellant was released from incarceration on January 28, 2000, and on February 22, 2001, the court was informed by the Department of Parole and Probation that appellant had committed a new offense. On January 8, 2003, appellant admitted violating probation and was sentenced to serve ten years of the suspended sentence to run consecutive to the new sentence imposed on the case forming the basis for appellant's violation of probation. On January 13, 2006, appellant filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, claiming that the plea agreement did not include any term of probation. The trial court denied the motion on January 24, 2006, in a Memorandum and Order, stating that the agreement "made no comment about the length or terms of probation" and that the terms imposed "were within the limits provided for by statute." This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The Parties' Contentions

Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion. He argues, as he did below, that the plea agreement did not include a period of probation and that the trial court's adding the probation to his sentence rendered the sentence illegal. He asks that we strike the probation from his sentence.

The State responds that probation is implicit in every suspended sentence. It also asserts that, should we conclude that the plea agreement did not include probation, the proper remedy is to void the agreement in its entirety and to have appellant tried on the original charges.

Plea Agreements

We review the question of whether a plea agreement has been violated de novo. Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 482, 845 A.2d 1215 (2004). In Tweedy, the Court of Appeals noted:

"Plea agreements are an accepted procedure throughout the United States and are recognized as an important component of the criminal justice system."

Id. at 484, 845 A.2d 1215 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) stating that plea bargaining "is an essential component of the administration of justice"). The Court noted the Santobello Court's holding that "`when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.'" Id. at 484, 845 A.2d 1215, (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499).

"[T]he law is well settled that, in the absence of any jurisdictional defect, such agreements are based on contract principles and must be enforced." Hillard v. State, 141 Md.App. 199, 207, 784 A.2d 1134 (2001).⁴ "[S]everal courts have noted that the terms of the plea agreement are to be construed according to what a defendant reasonably understood when the plea was entered." Tweedy, 380 Md. at 482, 845 A.2d 1215. In addition, "[t]he words employed in the contract are to be given their ordinary and usual meaning, in light of the context within which they are employed." Ridenour v. State, 142 Md.App. 1, 6, 787 A.2d 815 (2001). We construe the agreement as a whole, to give effect to all parts of the contract. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook, 386 Md. 468, 497, 872 A.2d 969 (2005). In determining a defendant's reasonable understanding of the agreement at the time he entered into it, "we consider terms implied by the plea agreement as well as those expressly provided." United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir.1998). See also People v. Manzanares, 85 P.3d 604, 608 (Colo.App.2003) (stating that "terms of a plea agreement may be implied as well as expressed plainly on the agreement's face.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 2004 WL 500849 (Colo. 2004); State v. Brooke, 134 Idaho 807, 10 P.3d 756 (2000).

Suspended Sentence

Md.Code, Article 27 § 641A, effective at the time of appellant's sentencing, provided, in part:⁵

Suspension of sentence or imposition of probation following judgment.

(a) In general. — (3) The court may impose a sentence for a specified period and provide that a lesser period be served in confinement, suspend the remainder of the sentence and grant probation for a period longer than the sentence but not in excess of 5 years.

Thus the language of the statute indicates that, when a trial court suspends a sentence, it will impose probation as a matter of course. The connection between a suspended sentence and probation is also illustrated, albeit in a different context, in Moats v. Scott, 358 Md. 593, 751 A.2d 462 (2000). There, the Court of Appeals explained the options available to a sentencing judge, including imposing a "split sentence":

A third option-one that is frequently used-is the "split sentence" provided for in § 641A(a)(3). That subsection allows a court to "impose a sentence for a specified period and provide that a lesser period be served in confinement, suspend the remainder of the sentence and grant probation for a period longer than the sentence but not in excess of 5 years."

Id. at 595, 751 A.2d 462; see also Cathcart v. State, 397 Md. 320, 327, 916 A.2d 1008 (2007)(stating that if a court imposes a split sentence, "there must be a period of probation attached to the suspended part of the sentence").

The significance of the probationary period is explained in State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 602 A.2d 1185 (1992): "The trial court, upon its determination that a probationer has violated one or more conditions of probation, enjoys many options. `These options vary from continuing the probation to reimposing the full remaining term of a suspended sentence.'" Id. at 678, 602 A.2d 1185 (quoting Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 107, 532 A.2d 1066 (1987)).

Application To Plea Agreement

In the case sub judice, it is clear that a probationary period was implicit in the terms of the plea agreement. Although the prosecutor did not specifically discuss probation, he told the trial court that the only sentencing limitation in the agreement was that the "active cap," i.e., the executed portion of the sentence, was three years. The written agreement recited that there could be additional suspended time and that there was "no other sentencing limitation except that provided by law." Thus the agreement gave the trial court the authority to suspend part of the sentence and impose probation, which it did.

Appellant cites Laurie v. State, 29 Md. App. 609, 349 A.2d 276 (1976), arguing that this Court found the imposition of the "implied suspended sentence" void. Appe...