Ratliff v. McDonald

• Decision Date: 18 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. A13A1906.,A13A1906.
• Citation: 756 S.E.2d 569,326 Ga.App. 306
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: RATLIFF v. McDONALD et al.

326 Ga.App. 306

756 S.E.2d 569

RATLIFF

v.McDONALD et al.

No. A13A1906.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 18, 2014.

Greer, Klosik & Daugherty, Thomas Richard Mondelli, Cumming, for Appellant.

Deborah Lynn Dance, Lauren Smith Bruce, for Appellees.

McMillian, Judge.

Sarah Kyle Ratliff appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Cobb County Sheriff Neil Warren and six of his deputies ¹ in Ratliff's suit for personal injuries arising out of an incident at the Cobb County Adult Detention Center (the “ADC”). We affirm for the reasons set forth below.

[O]n appeal from a grant of a motion for summary judgment, we review the evidence de novo in the light most favorable to the nonmovant to determine whether a genuine issue of fact remains and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

(Citation omitted.) Burnside v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 309 Ga.App. 897, 898, 714 S.E.2d 606 (2011).

Viewed in the light most favorable to Ratliff, the evidence shows that on April 2, 2009, Ratliff went to the ADC with her friend, Tansy Collor, to pick up Collor's boyfriend, Yusef Umrani, who was being released from custody. At the same time, Willie Marie McDonald, Umrani's ex-girlfriend and the mother of his children, also arrived at the ADC to pick up Umrani.

McDonald had begun making phone calls and sending text messages to Collor after Umrani went to jail. In these calls and text messages, McDonald threatened both Ratliff and Collor and admonished that they were “sticking [their noses] in the wrong business” and that they would “get what's coming [to them].” McDonald told Collor that she would send Umrani to jail before she let Collor have him and that she would kill Collor. As a result, Ratliff and Collor were concerned about what McDonald might do that day when they saw her at the ADC.

Ratliff and Collor went inside one of the ADC's buildings (the “First Building”) to determine where in the ADC complex Umrani would be released, and they asked two deputies for help, explaining that the mother of Umrani's children was outside and that they had previous problems with her. The deputies told the women that they could not help, but directed them to the visitor's center, where the deputies said Umrani would be released. Ratliff and Collor passed McDonald on the way out the door, without speaking.

Collor walked up to the visitor's center, while Ratliff drove there. Inside, Ratliff and Collor asked Sergeant Alvin Sutherland and Deputy Chester Coachman if Umrani would be released there, but the officers told them that Umrani would be released in the First Building. Ratliff and Collor also told Sutherland and Coachman that they needed help because McDonald was in the parking lot and they did not feel safe. According to Ratliff, the officers said that they were familiar with McDonald and that she was “crazy.” The officers told the women that they would follow them back down to the First Building to make sure nothing happened.²

Ratliff and Collor left the visitor's center and drove back down to the First Building, while the two deputies drove over in their car. Ratliff parked, and the two women got out of the car, while the deputies were paused at a stop sign. Meanwhile, McDonald had backed her diesel truck out of a parking space and was sitting between Ratliff's and the deputies' cars. Four other deputies were standing nearby. Ratliff said that she screamed at Sutherland and Coachman that they needed to stop McDonald, but the deputies standing in the area told the women that McDonald was not going to do anything and the women could go ahead and cross over the parking lot to the First Building. ³ As Ratliff and Collor began walking toward the building, however, Ratliff heard McDonald yell something about “killing,” and a deputy heard her yell, “Bitch, if you go down there, I'll run your ass over.” As Ratliff and Collor crossed toward the building, McDonald “gunned it,” striking both women. Ratliff stated that all of these events—from Ratliff and Collor leaving the visitor's center to the collision—happened within seconds.

Approximately two years later, Ratliff filed suit asserting claims for assault and battery against McDonald ⁴ and claims for negligence and recklessness against Warren and the Deputies. At some point, she apparently refined her claims against the Deputies to base them on theories of premises liability, recklessness and the public duty doctrine and to base her claim against Warren on respondeat superior. Warren and the Deputies subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The trial court found that the claims against the Sheriff were barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The trial court also found that Ratliff failed to establish elements of her claims for premises liability and recklessness. Accordingly, the trial court found that Ratliff's claims for respondeat superior against the Sheriff also failed. Finally, the trial court concluded that Ratliff's claims under the public duty doctrine were barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

1. Before considering the merits of Ratliff's claims, we first address the issue of whether Warren and the Deputies are protected by immunity. See Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 124(1), 126(3), 549 S.E.2d 341 (2001) (issues of sovereign and official immunity are generally threshold issues to be decided before addressing the merits of a plaintiff's claims), citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (official immunity is an “entitlement not to stand trial” rather than “a mere defense to liability”) (citations omitted); McCobb v. Clayton County, 309 Ga.App. 217, 217–218(1)(a), 710 S.E.2d 207 (2011) (“Under Georgia law, sovereign immunity is an immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense to liability, and, therefore, whether a governmental defendant has waived its sovereign immunity is a threshold issue.”) (citations omitted).

Ratliff brought suit against Warren only in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Cobb County, asserting liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. And “[s]overeign immunity is the immunity provided to governmental entities and to public employees sued in their official capacities.” Stone v. Taylor, 233 Ga.App. 886, 887–888(1), 506 S.E.2d 161 (1998).

The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which the Sheriff has raised as a defense, bars any claims against him in his official capacity. Under the Georgia Constitution, as amended in 1991, “sovereign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and agencies. The sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver.” [Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (e).] Sovereign immunity has been extended to counties and thus protects county employees who are sued in their official capacities, unless sovereign immunity has been waived.

(Citations omitted.) Butler v. Carlisle, 299 Ga.App. 815, 818(1), 683 S.E.2d 882 (2009). And “[any] waiver of sovereign immunity must be established by the party seeking to benefit from that waiver.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McCobb, 309 Ga.App. at 218(1)(a), 710 S.E.2d 207. Ratliff failed to carry this burden, however, as she does not argue on appeal, nor did she establish below, that the General Assembly has waived sovereign immunity for the claims raised in this case.⁵

Thus, Ratliff's claim against Warren for respondeat superior is barred by sovereign immunity.

A county may be liable for a county employee's negligence in performing an official function [only] to the extent the county has waived sovereign immunity. Because in this case, there is no evidence that the county has waived its sovereign immunity, the grant of summary judgment on the respondeat superior claim was appropriate.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Russell v. Barrett, 296 Ga.App. 114, 120(2), 673 S.E.2d 623 (2009). See also Robinson v. DeKalb County, 261 Ga.App. 163, 165(2), 582 S.E.2d 156 (2003) (same); Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga.App. 159, 160(1), 573 S.E.2d 417 (2002) (same).⁶

Similarly, to the extent that Ratliff asserts claims against the Deputies in their official capacities, those claims, too, are barred by sovereign immunity in the absence of a waiver. Coffey v. Brooks County, 231 Ga.App. 886, 889(2)(a), 500 S.E.2d 341 (1998), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Rowe v. Coffey, 270 Ga. 715, 716, 515 S.E.2d 375 (1999) (deputy entitled to sovereign immunity for claims asserted against him in his official capacity); Hicks v. McGee, 283 Ga.App. 678, 681(3), 642 S.E.2d 379 (2007) (same for clerks of courts). And as no waiver exists in this case, any such claims would be barred.

Moreover, contrary to Ratliff's argument, the public duty doctrine does not create a separate exception to sovereign immunity; rather, it is an additional restriction on governmental liability:

The public duty doctrine does not act as a judicially created exception to the state's sovereign immunity. Indeed, because sovereign immunity has constitutional status, it cannot be abrogated by the judiciary. Rather, the public duty doctrine simply defines the scope of a governmental entity's duty to provide police protection to individual citizens, and provides that liability generally can exist only where there is a special relationship between the injured party and the alleged governmental tortfeasor. Thus, the [public duty] doctrine serves to restrict the liability of governmentalentities in those situations where sovereign immunity has otherwise been waived or is inapplicable (e.g., where a municipality has purchased liability insurance)—it does not act as an exception to sovereign immunity where such immunity has not been waived.

(Citations omitted.) Dept. of Human Res. v. Coley, 247 Ga.App. 392, 394(1),...