Reals v. Courson

• Citation: 164 S.W.2d 306,349 Mo. 1193
• Decision Date: 28 July 1942
• Docket Number: 37992
• Parties: William H. Reals, Charles P. Ballard and Maxwell Fineberg v. June S. Courson, Secretary of the Board of Education, School District of University City, and Harry A. Frank, T. Frank Wood, John J. Fitzwilliam, Walter L. Metcalf and O. D. Norwine, Members of and Constituting the Board of Education, School District of University City, St. Louis County, Missouri, Appellants
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

164 S.W.2d 306

349 Mo. 1193

William H. Reals, Charles P. Ballard and Maxwell Fineberg v. June S. Courson, Secretary of the Board of Education, School District of University City, and Harry A. Frank, T. Frank Wood, John J. Fitzwilliam, Walter L. Metcalf and O. D. Norwine, Members of and Constituting the Board of Education, School District of University City, St. Louis County, Missouri, Appellants

No. 37992

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 28, 1942

Rehearing Denied September 8, 1942.

Appeal from Circuit Court of St. Louis County; Hon. John J Wolfe, Judge.

Affirmed.

M P. Phillips for appellants.

(1) A classification of counties by population wherein the language used in the statute is as follows: "The boards of directors of school districts, formed of cities and towns in counties having more than 200,000 inhabitants and less than 450,000 inhabitants and of consolidated school districts in such counties, shall have authority to borrow money and to issue bonds in the manner and subject to the conditions specified in existing law for the purpose of providing funds for general school purposes," does not freeze the class at the present population but is of continuing import and admits or includes any county depending upon the population at the time the power granted by the statute is sought to be exercised. Ex parte Lucas, 61 S.W. 218, 160 Mo. 218; Ex parte Loving, 77 S.W. 508, 178 Mo. 194. (2) Since education is such an important concern of the community and state, legislation sponsoring it should receive a most favorable interpretation. State ex inf. Wright v. Morgan, 187 S.W. 54, 268 Mo. 265. Statute authorizing formation of consolidated school districts and grant of state aid thereto. (3) The constitutional inhibition is not against the General Assembly doing the things specified in Article IV, Section 53 of the Missouri Constitution, but is against the doing thereof by special laws. State ex rel. Hollaway v. Knight, 21 S.W.2d 767, 323 Mo. 1241. (4) An act of Legislature based on a classification of counties or cities by population, although only applying to one county or city in the State at the time of its enactment, is not a special or local law in violation of Article IV, Section 53 of the Missouri Constitution, if other counties and cities may in the future come within the terms of the law. State ex rel. Hollaway v. Knight, 21 S.W.2d 767, 323 Mo. 1241; Thomas v. Buchanan County, 51 S.W.2d 95, 330 Mo. 627; Roberts v. Benson, Collector, 142 S.W.2d 1058; Davis v. Jasper County, 300 S.W. 493, 318 Mo. 248. (5) The proviso in H. B. 445, under the second section thereof, is as follows: "but the tax for retirement of the bonds issued pursuant hereto shall not in any year exceed one-fifth of one per centum upon all the property of the district at its assessed valuation." If invalid does not constitute such an integral part of the bill as to render the whole invalid for it may be deleted and there would still remain a complete legislative act. The attempted limitation following the conjunction "but" is a proviso independent of the act, the remainder of which would have been passed by the Legislature even had it recognized the attempted limitation as invalid. State ex rel. Audrain County v. Hackmann, 205 S.W. 12, 275 Mo. 534. (6) Under the general school laws imposing the responsibility for public education upon the Board of Education of the several school districts, the School District has authority, under the constitutional provision, Article X, Section 12, as a grant of authority, to incur bonded indebtedness by and with the consent of the voters where its bonded indebtedness does not exceed 5 per cent of its assessed valuation and the bonds are to be retired within twenty years from date of issue, so that, assuming H. B. 445 in particular is unconstitutional, the Board still had authority, since it is for a public school, to submit the proposition of incurring a bonded indebtedness to the voters under existing constitutional and statutory provisions. State ex rel. Gilpin v. Smith, 96 S.W.2d 40, 339 Mo. 194; State ex rel. Clark County v. Hackmann, 280 Mo. 686, 218 S.W. 318.

Harold C. Ackert and Albert Krause for respondents.

(1) House Bill 445 is unconstitutional and void in that it violates Article IV, Section 53 (particularly subsections (2), (19) and (32)) of the Constitution of the State of Missouri. (a) A legislative act which by its terms can apply to only one county in the State is invalid. State ex inf. Gentry v. Armstrong, 315 Mo. 298, 286 S.W. 705; Rose v. Smiley, 296 S.W. 815; State ex inf. Barker v. Southern, 265 Mo. 275, 177 S.W. 640; State ex inf. Mueller v. Fry, 300 Mo. 541, 254 S.W. 1084. (b) An act which attempts to classify counties on a basis fixed as of the time of enactment without providing for the inclusion of other counties that may thereafter come within the same classification is invalid. State ex inf. Gentry v. Armstrong, supra; State ex inf. Barker v. Southern, supra. (c) Likewise, where the attempted classification is based upon population as of a single census, the legislation is unconstitutional. Since the act expires by its own express limitation January 1, 1946, the classification can rest only on the census of 1940. Wiles v. Williams, 232 Mo. 68, 133 S.W. 1; Hardin v. Jefferson County, 147 S.W.2d 643. (d) The exclusion of certain counties having similar economic problems and the further exclusion of certain school districts in St. Louis County renders House Bill 445 unconstitutional for the test of a special law is the appropriateness of its provisions to the objects which it excludes. Colley v. Jasper County, 85 S.W.2d 57; Hull v. Baumann, 131 S.W.2d 721; State ex rel. Hollaway v. Knight, 21 S.W.2d 767; State ex rel. Saline County v. Wilson, 288 Mo. 315, 232 S.W. 140. (e) The classification by population used in House Bill 445 fails to have any reasonable relation to the purposes intended to be covered by the act and is, therefore, invalid. State v. Logan, 268 Mo. 169, 186 S.W. 979. (f) Even if the classification used in House Bill 445 could be said to be reasonable, the act nevertheless violates the Missouri Constitution inasmuch as there is no apparent reason why a general law could not been adopted and, being a judicial question, this court must determine whether a general law instead of this special law could have been adopted. State v. Logan, supra; Mo. Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 53. The provision in the act limiting the amount of tax that can be levied in any one year for retirement of bonds violates Section 12 of Article X of the Missouri Constitution and said provisions, being an integral part of the act, makes the whole of the legislation unconstitutional. Thomas v. Buchanan County, 51 S.W.2d 95; State v. Allison, 66 S.W.2d 547; State ex rel. Audrain County v. Hackman, 205 S.W. 12. (3) House Bill 445 must be held invalid because it indirectly attempts to evade Article X, Section 11, of the Missouri Constitution, the purpose of which was to correct previously existing conditions and to place operating expenses upon an annual cash basis subject to constitutional limits. Book v. Earl, 87 Mo. 246; Lamar Water & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, 31 S.W. 756. (4) Article X, Section 12 of the Missouri Constitution is not a self-enforcing grant of power authorizing the issuance of bonds irrespective of the legislation here under attack. (a) The language used in the Constitution precludes such construction. Missouri Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 12. (b) Such a construction would render the Constitution self-contradictory. Mo. Constitution, Article X, Secs. 11, 12.

Barrett, C. Westhues and Bohling, CC., concur.

OPINION

BARRETT

The Sixty-first General Assembly enacted the following legislation designed to permit the issuance of bonds so as to provide additional funds for general school purposes (Laws Mo. 1941, pp. 555-556):

"Section 1. The boards of directors of school districts, formed of cities and towns in counties having more than 200,000 inhabitants and less than 450,000 inhabitants and of consolidated school districts in such counties, shall have authority to borrow money and to issue bonds in the manner and subject to the conditions specified in existing law for the purpose of providing funds for general school purposes.

"Section 2. The board of directors of a district issuing bonds under the authority contained in section 1 hereof are authorized to make an estimate for the levy of a tax for the retirement of such bonds and of a tax to pay interest thereon, but the tax for retirement of the bonds issued pursuant hereto shall not in any year exceed one-fifth of one per centum upon all the property of the district at its assessed valuation.

"Section 3. The county clerk of the county in which any school district levying the taxes herein authorized is located, upon receipt of the estimate of the taxes from the board of directors of the district, shall proceed to assess the taxes so returned, in addition to all other taxes upon the property of the district, in the same manner as other taxes are assessed.

"Section 4. The provisions of this act shall expire January 1, 1946."

Seeking to take advantage of the provisions of the act the School District of University City called a special election to test the wishes of the district's voters as to whether or not they desired to authorize an additional bonded indebtedness in the amount of $ 80,000 for the purpose of providing further funds for general school purposes. The plaintiff resident taxpayers brought this action to enjoin the holding of the election and the decisive question on this appeal is whether the legislation is unconstitutional as a special or local law (Const. Mo., Art. IV, Sec. 53 (2) (19) (32)) because...