Thomas v. Buchanan County

• Decision Date: 03 June 1932
• Docket Number: 31465
• Citation: 51 S.W.2d 95,330 Mo. 627
• Parties: H. L. Thomas, W. C. Call, T. A. Wolfe, Harry E. Euler and W. L. Weisenborn v. Buchanan County, Missouri, and Harvey J. Boyle, William P. Allison and Franklin P. Dunn, Judges of the County Court of Buchanan County, Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

51 S.W.2d 95

330 Mo. 627

H. L. Thomas, W. C. Call, T. A. Wolfe, Harry E. Euler and W. L. Weisenborn v. Buchanan County, Missouri, and Harvey J. Boyle, William P. Allison and Franklin P. Dunn, Judges of the County Court of Buchanan County, Appellants

No. 31465

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 3, 1932

Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court; Hon. Sam Wilcox, Judge.

Reversed.

Mayer Conkling & Sprague for appellants.

(1) Every reasonable intendment should be made to sustain legislative enactment. No act should be declared unconstitutional unless it appears very clearly so. State v. Ward, 40 S.W.2d 1076. (2) The act contains a single subject which is clearly expressed in the title of the act. (a) The object and purpose of Section 28 of Article IV of the Missouri Constitution was to kill "log-rolling" and to prevent incongruous, disconnected matters which had no relation to each other from being joined in one bill. However, it has always been recognized that all matters that are germane to the principal subject might properly be incorporated in the same bill. State v. Brodnax, 228 Mo. 54; O'Connor v. Transit Co., 198 Mo. 633; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495. It is a fixed rule that where all the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it then the subject is single, and if it is sufficiently expressed in the title, the statute is valid. Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 71; State v. Ward, 40 S.W.2d 1076. The Supreme Court of Missouri has uniformly given a broad and liberal construction to said section of our Constitution relating to the subject-matter and title of an act. State v. Ward, 40 S.W.2d 1076; Star Square Auto Supply Co. v. Gerk, 30 S.W.2d 453; State ex rel. v. Terte, 324 Mo. 405; State v. Mullinix, 301 Mo. 390; State ex rel. v Miller, 100 Mo. 444. (b) The "subject" of an act, in the constitutional sense, is the matter to which the act relates and which forms the groundwork of the act. 25 R C. L. sec. 90, p. 844; 25 R. C. L. sec. 88, p. 842; 36 Cyc. 1022; Lewis, Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2 Ed.) sec. 116; McNeely v. Oil Co., 52 W.Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508, 62 L. R. A. 576. The matter to which the act at bar relates and which forms the groundwork of said act is the "management of the fiscal affairs of counties," and the act wholly relates to that one subject. While its provisions set up the machinery for county courts to borrow money necessary to carry on the functions of the county government by means of tax anticipation notes, and the machinery for county courts to control the expenditures of county officers in the purchase of supplies by prescribing and clarifying the manner in which counties' supplies shall be procured -- these matters are but two aspects or phases of the one general subject of the management of the fiscal affairs of counties. This fact constitutes no constitutional objection to the act, when it as an entirety relates to but one subject. State ex rel. v. Miller, 33 S.W.2d 124; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 281 Mo. 639; Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo. 204. (c) The requirement that the subject must be "clearly expressed" in the title of an act, does not mean that the subject must be specifically stated, but it is sufficient if the subject is stated in general terms, and the title fairly embraces the subject-matter covered by the act. In re Burris, 66 Mo. 446; State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 29; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 445; State ex rel. v. Terte, 324 Mo. 406. The courts, in determining what is the subject of an act, are bound to accept what either is expressly stated or is spelled out by the details expressed. The title is sufficient if the general subject can be inferred from the details set out therein. While the general subject of the management of the fiscal affairs of counties is not specifically stated in the title of the act at bar, the details which are expressed therein clearly spell out such a general subject. State v. Smith, 233 Mo. 255. (3) The act is a general and not a special or local law. (a) The act at bar does not apply exclusively to Buchanan County, but it is general in its terms and applies to all counties in the State having or hereafter acquiring a population of between 95,000 and 150,000 inhabitants. It is well established in this State that the classification of counties by population, so that other counties may come within the terms of the law in the future, does not make the act a special law in violation of Section 53 of Article IV of our Constitution, although such act only applies to one county in the State at the time of its enactment, because the population thereof is the only one within the limits fixed by the act at the time of its passage. State ex rel. v. Knight, 323 Mo. 1245; State ex inf. v. Armstrong, 315 Mo. 310; Forgrave v. Buchanan County, 282 Mo. 607; State ex inf. v. Southern, 265 Mo. 286; State ex rel. v. County Court, 128 Mo. 442. (b) A reasonable classification of counties can be made by the Legislature. State ex inf. v. Armstrong, 315 Mo. 312. The Legislature has power to furnish to densely populated counties legislation as conditions require, which would be unnecessary or impracticable to the smaller counties of the State. Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo. 216; State ex inf. v. Southern, 265 Mo. 287; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 450. The act at bar relates to counties having a certain population as a class, and not to particular counties of a class; the classification is made upon a reasonable basis, and not upon a mere arbitrary division made for legislative purposes, and hence is a general law and not special legislation. Davis v. Jasper County, 318 Mo. 253; State ex rel. v. Lee, 319 Mo. 993; State ex rel. v. Knight, 323 Mo. 1249. (4) The act does not violate Section 12 of Article X of the Constitution. This provision of our Constitution permits the county court to anticipate the revenue for any given year and to contract indebtedness within such anticipated revenue. Trask v. Livingston County, 210 Mo. 592; Andrew County v. Schell, 135 Mo. 39; Bank v. Earl, 87 Mo. 252. An indebtedness is valid if, at the time of its creation, it is within the income which may reasonably be anticipated. Watson v. Kerr, 312 Mo. 549. The act at bar forbids the issuance of any tax anticipation notes until after the anticipated revenue for the year shall have been estimated, and then limits their issuance to ten per cent of the total estimated revenue in any one month, and to ninety per cent of the total anticipated revenue in any one year. The act clearly does not violate the consitutional limitation of a county's indebtedness, but, on the contrary, expressly provides that the indebtedness authorized by it shall be within the limit imposed by our State Constitution. (5) The act does not violate Section 47 of Article IV of the Constitution. It does not authorize the county to lend its credit or to grant any public money in aid of any one, or to become a stockholder in any corporation, and clearly does not come within either the purview or the inhibition of this provision of our organic law.

W. J. Boyd for respondents.

(1) The sole question presented for determination on this appeal is the constitutionality of House Bill No. 514, enacted by the Fifty-sixth General Assembly of the State of Missouri (Laws 1931, pp. 292 to 296, inclusive). Said act violates Section 28, of Article IV of the Constitution, which provides that: "No bill . . . shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." (2) Said act offends against Sub-division 2, of Section 53, or Article IV of the Constitution, in that said act is local and special in character and applies solely and exclusively to Buchanan County and undertakes to regulate solely and exclusively the affairs of Buchanan County. (a) Said act is in violation of Subdivision 15, of Section 53, of Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri, for that, while it applies solely and exclusively to Buchanan County and is purely local and special in character, it undertakes to create and constitute the County Court of Buchanan County a purchasing agent of said county and undertakes to prescribe the powers and duties of said county court and also to prescribe the powers and duties of said county court acting in the capacity of a purchasing agent or board. (b) The classification of the county or counties to which said acts should be, or become, applicable is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to lead to the undeniable conclusion that such act is purely local and special in its nature and character and, therefore, offends against the letter and spirit of Section 53, of Article IV of the Constitution. Davis v. County, 318 Mo. 248, 300 S.W. 493; State ex inf. v. Armstrong, 315 Mo. 298, 286 S.W. 705. (c) Said act violates Subdivision 32, of Section 53, of Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri, in that it is wholly local and special in its character and deals exclusively with Buchanan County in matters concerning which a general law, applying to all counties of the State of Missouri or to a reasonable classification of counties, could have been made applicable. (3) Said act is in violation of that portion of Section 12, of Article X of the Constitution of the State of Missouri, which provides that: "No county . . . shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year, without the consent of two-thirds of the voters thereof voting on such proposition at an election to be held for that purpose."

OPINION

Ellison, J.

The respondents, as axpaying citizens, brought this suit against Buchanan County and the three judges of the county court to enjoin the issuance and...