Reanier v. Smith

• Decision Date: 10 January 1974
• Docket Number: 42667,Nos. 42666,42668,42736,s. 42666
• Citation: 517 P.2d 949,83 Wn.2d 342
• Parties: In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Clifford A. REANIER, Petitioner, v. Sidney E. SMITH, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent. In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Frederick G. RINEHART, Petitioner, v. Sidney E. SMITH, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent. In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Chester R. WOODS, Petitioner, v. Sidney E. SMITH, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent. In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Michael A. OLDS, Petitioner, v. Sidney E. SMITH, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 342

83 Wn.2d 342

517 P.2d 949

In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

of Clifford A. REANIER, Petitioner, v. Sidney E. SMITH, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent.

In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

of Frederick G. RINEHART, Petitioner, v. Sidney E. SMITH, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent.

In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

of Chester R. WOODS, Petitioner, v. Sidney E. SMITH, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent.

In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

of Michael A. OLDS, Petitioner, v. Sidney E. SMITH, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent.

Nos. 42666, 42667, 42668, 42668, 42736.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 10, 1974.

Richard Emery, Prison Legal Services Project, Legal Services Center, Seattle, for petitioners.

Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Prediletto, Olympia, for respondent.

HAMILTON, Associate Justice.

The four petitioners in these consolidated applications for writs of habeas corpus are incarcerated in the penitentiary. They seek credit against their maximum and mandatory minimum terms for pretrial detention served because of their inability to post bail. They do not seek such credit against minimum terms as such may be fixed by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles within its discretionary power.

After several prior convictions for which he served time and was variously paroled, petitioner Reanier was arrested on March 21, 1966, for second-degree assault in Kitsap County, Washington. He was confined in the county jail until April 19, 1966, when he was transferred by court order to Western State Hospital. He remained in detention there until he was returned to the county jail on May 31, 1966. He then entered a plea of guilty to the second-degree assault charge and was again transferred to Western State Hospital and retained in confinement there until February 14, 1968, when he was remanded to the county jail. On February 26, 1968, judgment and sentence on his plea of guilty was entered, by the terms of which he received a maximum term of 10 years. It is not disputed that he spent some 23 months in the county jail and Western State Hospital prior to judgment and sentence for which he did not receive credit upon the duration of the maximum term imposed.

Petitioner Rinehart was arrested and taken into custody on December 8, 1969, on a charge of second-degree burglary. Bail was fixed at $3,000, a sum he was unable to post. He remained in jail until trial and entry of judgment and sentence on March 31, 1970, at which time he received a maximum sentence of 15 years. A mandatory minimum of 7 1/2 years was subsequently diminished by the parole board pursuant to RCW 9.95.040. He was not credited on his maximum or mandatory minimum term with approximately 4 months served in the county jail prior to trial.

On October 1, 1969, petitioner Woods was arrested and placed in jail on a narcotics charge. Bail was set at $3,000. He was unable to post that amount and remained incarcerated. He was convicted on March 23, 1970, and sentenced to a maximum term of 20 years with a 5-year mandatory minimum term. The mandatory minimum was later modified by the parole board. He likewise did not receive credit against his maximum or mandatory minimum sentence for the 5 1/2 months of pretrial detention.

Petitioner Olds was arrested and placed in custody on April 4, 1961, charged with first-degree murder and robbery. Because of the nature of the charge, bail was not set, and he remained in jail until his conviction and sentence on January 2, 1962. He received a sentence of life imprisonment. He must serve a mandatory minimum term of 20 years, which mandatory minimum cannot be waived by the parole board. He was not credited on his mandatory minimum term with the 9 months in jail prior to trial, conviction and sentence.

Generally speaking, under the prevailing statutory scheme of indeterminate sentences in the state of Washington, a sentencing court which sentences a convicted felon to state penal servitude must impose the maximum term for the offense where that term is fixed by statute. RCW 9.95.010. ¹ Except where a mandatory minimum term is fixed by statute, the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles is empowered, in the exercise of its discretion, to fix a minimum term of confinement and, in some instances, may modify through the parole process some mandatory minimum terms. RCW 9.95.040. ² Pursuant to RCW 9.95.060, ³ a sentence, absent designated circumstances, ordinarily commences to run from the entry of judgment and sentence.

Petitioners contend that failure to provide for and credit their statutory maximum and mandatory minimum terms with time served in detention prior to trial, conviction and sentencing violates their rights, under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, to due process of law, equal protection under the law, and freedom from multiple punishment. We agree.

Fundamental fairness and the avoidance of discrimination and possible multiple punishment dictate that an accused person, unable to or precluded from posting bail or otherwise procuring his release from confinement prior to trial should, upon conviction and commitment to a state penal facility, be credited as against a maximum and a mandatory minimum term with all time served in detention prior to trial and sentence. Otherwise, such a person's total time in custody would exceed that of a defendant likewise sentenced but who had been able to obtain pretrial release. Thus, two sets of maximum and mandatory minimum terms would be erected, one for those unable to procure pretrial release from confinement and another for those fortunate enough to obtain such release. Aside from the potential implications of double jeopardy in such a situation, ⁴ it is clear that the principles of due process and equal protection of the law are breached without rational reason.

In the federal system of criminal justice, credit for pretrial detention has been provided. Prior to 1960, section 3568, Title 18, of the United States Code provided that the sentence of a federal prisoner did not begin to run until he was received at the place of confinement. No statutory provision existed for pretrial detention credit. An amendment was added in 1960 which provided Only that credit for detention prior to trial for want of bail would be given where imposition of a mandatory minimum was required. In Stapf v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 367 F.2d 326 (1966), the constitutionality of the statutory limitation of the amendment to mandatory minimum sentences was challenged by a federal prisoner who had been sentenced to a statutory maximum term of 5 years. He did not receive credit for 5 months' detention prior to trial arising from his inability to post bail. The Stapf court held that despite the absence of legislative authority for the administrative allowance of such credit, it was incumbent upon the sentencing court to exercise its sentencing authority consistently with constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection. Accordingly, the cause was remanded for the appropriate allowance of pretrial detention credit.

The rationale of Stapf has been acknowledged and followed in a number of federal circuits. Holt v. United States, 422 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1970); Davis v. Willingham, 415 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Whitfield, 411 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1969); Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1969); Lee v. United States, 400 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Jones, 393 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1968); Bryans v. Blackwell, 387 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Smith, 379 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 993, 88 S.Ct. 491, 19 L.Ed.2d 486 (1967); Dunn v. United States, 376 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1967).

In Sobell v. United States, Supra, that court took an additional step. It held that Stapf rationale to be applicable to statutory maximum sentences imposed prior to the 1960 amendment of section 3568, Title 18, of the United States Code, and this despite a provision in the amendment that it was not to be given retroactive effect.

Furthermore, with respect to the federal system, it is notable that Congress again amended section 3568, Title 18, of the United States Code in 1966, so that it now provides for the administrative crediting of pretrial detention time in all instances involving commitment to a penal facility. This congressional step is in line with recommendations of the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association contained respectively in the Model Penal Code § 7.09 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961) ⁵ and Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 3.6 (Approved Draft, 1968). ⁶

Bearing more directly upon the obligation of a state in the area of pretrial detention credit it the case of Culp v. Bounds, 325 F.Supp. 416 (D.N.C.1971). There the state of North Carolina refused to credit the petitioner, Culp, with pretrial detention time on two consecutive statutory maximum sentences of 10 years. In granting relief, the court referred to and quoted from North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), wherein it was held that credit must be given for time spent in detention during a review process which resulted in a new trial, a second conviction and a resentencing. The Culp court said at page 419 of 325 F.Supp.:

The Pearce rationale, applied to include the facts of this particular case, suggests that Culp should be given credit for time spent in custody prior to commitment where he has been given a maximum sentence. Pre-trial detention is nothing less than punishment. An unconvicted accused who is not allowed or cannot raise bail...