Reardon v. Lemoyne

• Decision Date: 23 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 82-183,82-183
• Citation: 122 N.H. 1042,454 A.2d 428
• Parties: , 8 Ed. Law Rep. 714 Sister Honora J. REARDON et al. v. Brother Roger LEMOYNE et al.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 428

454 A.2d 428

122 N.H. 1042, 8 Ed. Law Rep. 714

Sister Honora J. REARDON et al. v. Brother Roger LEMOYNE et al.

No. 82-183.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Dec. 23, 1982.

Shaines, Madrigan & McEachern P.A., Portsmouth (John H. McEachern, Portsmouth, on brief and orally, Dan W. Thornhill and Alice K. Page, Portsmouth, on brief, for plaintiffs.

Burns, Bryant, Hinchey, Cox & Shea and Ouellette, Hallisey, Dibble & Tanguay, Dover (James H. Schulte, Dover, on brief and orally, and Dennis L. Hallisey, Dover, on the brief), for defendants.

BOIS, Justice.

These are cross-appeals from a Superior Court (Nadeau, J.) decision granting a motion to dismiss declaratory judgment proceedings against three of the defendants, and denying the motion as to the remaining defendants, for whom the trial court rendered a favorable ruling on the merits. We hold that the trial court erred in dismissing two of the parties defendant and in failing to hold a hearing with respect to the plaintiffs' rights against the defendants who were not dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a hearing on the merits to determine the plaintiffs' rights, if any, vis-a-vis these defendants.

The plaintiffs, members of a religious order which is part of the laity of the Roman Catholic Church, are four nuns who worked at the Sacred Heart School, a private parochial institution in Hampton. Three of the plaintiffs were teachers, while the fourth plaintiff was the principal of the school. As part of the parochial school system of the Diocese of Manchester, the school is administered and operated by the defendants, the Bishop of the Diocese of Manchester, the Diocesan Superintendent of Schools, the Diocesan School Board, and ten individual members of the Sacred Heart School Board. The plaintiffs have each taught for over twenty-five years in the diocese and have each spent between five and twelve years at the Sacred Heart School.

In April 1981, the plaintiffs signed similar written contracts of employment with the Sacred Heart School, as required by the Diocese of Manchester. The contract form was provided by the Diocesan School Board. According to part one of the contracts, the school agreed to employ each plaintiff for the 1981-82 school year, which was to expire no later than June 30, 1982. Under part four, which incorporated by reference the "Diocese of Manchester, School Policy Handbook" (handbook), each plaintiff agreed "to conform and comply with all laws, rules, regulations and policies" of the diocese, relating, inter alia, to "absences, leaves, salary guides, hiring practices, certification, evaluation, separation, dismissal [and] faculty meetings ...."

The contracts contained specific provisions relating to the termination of employment. Although part one of the contract clearly delineated that the employment relationship was to last only for the 1981-82 school year, part five provided that the parties could terminate the contract by mutual consent at any time. Part seven stated that "[t]his contract shall terminate upon the retirement of the teacher [or principal]" which was to occur at the end of the school year following the employee's seventieth birthday. In addition, under part eight, the Sacred Heart School Board could unilaterally terminate the contract if the employee's position was eliminated or if the school was reduced in size or shut down.

The handbook, incorporated by reference under part four of the contract, contained provisions governing the renewal of the employment relationship. It stated that participation in certain activities constituted a condition of employment for the following year. It also stated that if the contract of a teacher or principal was not to be renewed, then the individual had to be notified in writing before March 15, and be given well-documented reasons for the non-renewal.

Finally, the contract provided detailed procedures for the dismissal of employees. It stated that the Sacred Heart School Board could dismiss a teacher or principal for any one of eight listed reasons, such as professional incompetence, failure to obtain the requisite certification, or failure to profess a philosophy of life consistent with Catholic beliefs. According to part six of the contract, a teacher or principal could not be dismissed before the expiration date of the contract unless she received written notification of the cause for such dismissal. Upon making a timely request, an employee faced with dismissal had a right to a hearing before the Sacred Heart School Board. If aggrieved by the board's decision, the employee could then appeal to the Diocesan School Board.

In January 1982, the defendant superintendent of schools for the Diocese of Manchester delivered to each of the plaintiffs a notice stating that he was recommending that the Sacred Heart School Board not rehire them. The notice listed seven reasons which formed the basis for the superintendent's recommendation. On February 23, 1982, the superintendent wrote a letter to the Sacred Heart School Board, informing the board of his objection to the "renewal" of the plaintiffs' contracts. In accordance with section 4112.1 of the handbook, the letter stated that the local school board did not have the authority to retain any teacher or principal over the superintendent's objections. One day later, on February 24, 1982, the Sacred Heart School Board notified each of the plaintiffs in writing that their contracts were not to be "renewed" for the 1982-83 school year because of the superintendent's expressed objections.

On March 1, 1982, the plaintiffs informed the Sacred Heart School Board that they considered the board's letter of February 24 to be a dismissal and that they therefore requested a public hearing before that board pursuant to the terms of their contracts. The board denied this request, stating that the letter constituted a notice of non-renewal for which a public hearing was not required. The plaintiffs' subsequent request for a hearing before the Diocesan School Board was never granted.

On March 2, 1982, the plaintiffs filed a petition for declaratory judgment in superior court, requesting the court to construe their employment contracts. In the petition, they first sought a declaration that the defendants' decision to end their respective employment relationships constituted a "dismissal" which entitled them to the procedural safeguards outlined in their contracts. Second, they asked the court to find that the defendants had violated their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. Third, they sought a ruling that they could only be dismissed for cause based upon substantial evidence, and that the cause in this case was not sufficient. Finally, in the event that the trial court found that the defendants' action constituted "non-renewal" of the contracts, the plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the reasons given by the diocesan superintendent, in his January letter to the plaintiffs, were "not sufficient."

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, inter alia, that the court's assumption of jurisdiction in the matter as well as any relief it might grant, would violate the constitutionally mandated provision regarding separation of church and State. See U.S.Const. amend. I. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court ruled that the first amendment to the United States Constitution precluded the court's assumption of jurisdiction over the Bishop, the superintendent, and the Diocesan School Board. The court therefore dismissed the proceedings against these defendants. The court found that it could exercise jurisdiction over members of the Sacred Heart School Board, however, it ruled, without holding further proceedings, that the plaintiffs could not prevail on the merits against these defendants. The plaintiffs and all the defendants appeal from this decision.

The appeals raise three central issues. The first and most complex question relates to the propriety of the trial court's jurisdictional rulings. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in ruling that the first amendment precluded the court from assuming jurisdiction over the Bishop and the superintendent. The plaintiffs apparently accept the view that the Diocesan School Board was not a legal entity which could be sued, and therefore they do not challenge the court's finding that jurisdiction did not exist over that body. The defendants, for their part, argue that, not only did the trial court correctly rule that it lacked jurisdiction over the Bishop, the superintendent and the Diocesan School Board, but that it should have further ruled that jurisdiction did not exist over the Sacred Heart School Board members.

The first amendment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, requires us to maintain the separation of church and State. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511-12, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). The constitutional mandate prohibits the courts from intervening in religious disputes involving matters of doctrine, discipline, faith, or internal organization. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3024, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979); Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2380, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871).

Religious entities, however, are not totally immune from responsibility under the civil law. In religious controversies involving property or contractual rights outside the doctrinal realm, a court may accept jurisdiction and render a decision without violating the first amendment. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602, 20 L.Ed. 66; see Graffam v. Wray, 437 A.2d 627, 631 (Me.1981); Baugh v. Thomas, 56 N.J. 203 208, 265 A.2d 675, 677-78 (1970); W. Pa. Conf., U. Meth., Ch. v. Everson E. Ch., 454 Pa. 434, 439, 312 A.2d 35, 38 (1973). As one commentator has recognized, it...