PIERSON, Justice.
Certified question from the Honorable Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourth Supreme Judicial District. The statement and question are as follows:
"This suit for divorce and settlement of the property rights of the parties was instituted and tried in the One Hundred and Third District Court of Willacy County. From a judgment granting a divorce in favor of Edna Reasonover against her husband, B. L. Reasonover, and adjusting their property rights, the latter has appealed. We are confronted at the outset with an attack upon the jurisdiction of the court which tried the cause.
"By an Act approved August 17, 1921, the Thirty-seventh Legislature created a Criminal District Court for the counties of Nueces, Kleberg, Kenedy, Willacy, and Cameron, then comprising the Twenty-eighth Judicial District. Chapter 8, 1st Called Sess., p. 12. By the terms of the Act it was provided that the newly created Criminal District Court `shall have and exercise all of the criminal jurisdiction now vested in and exercised by the District Court of the Twenty-eighth Judicial District of Texas and said Criminal District Court shall try and determine all causes for divorce between husband and wife and adjudicate property rights in connection therewith in said counties.' * * * It was further provided by the Act that from and after the taking of effect thereof the District Court of said 28th District `shall cease to have and exercise any criminal jurisdiction in either of said counties and shall cease to have and exercise any jurisdiction of divorce cases in either of said counties.'
"The Thirty-ninth Legislature reorganized the 28th Judicial District [Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 199, subds. 28, 103; Acts 1925, c. 79] so as to exclude therefrom the counties of Willacy and Cameron, and created the 103d Judicial District, to be composed of those two counties thus excluded from the 28th District. By the terms of the same Act it was provided that `There is hereby continued as established for the counties of Nueces, Kleberg, Kenedy, Willacy and Cameron a criminal district court, which shall have and exercise all of the criminal jurisdiction now vested in and exercised by the district court of the Twenty-eighth Judicial District of Texas, and said Criminal District Court shall try and determine all causes for divorce between husband and wife and adjudicate property rights in connection therewith in said counties,' * * * and that `From and after the time when this Act shall take effect, the District Court of the Twenty-eighth Judicial District composed of the counties of Nueces, Kleberg and Kenedy, and the District Court of the One Hundred and Third Judicial District Court, composed of the counties of Willacy and Cameron, shall cease to have and exercise any criminal jurisdiction in either of said
counties, and shall cease to have and exercise any jurisdiction of divorce cases in either of said counties.' * * * This Act is still in effect.
"It will be seen, therefore, that by express statutory enactment jurisdiction over actions for divorce and the settlement of property rights growing out of divorce cases was taken from the District Courts of the 28th and 103d districts and placed exclusively in the Criminal District Court embracing the counties composing those districts, including Willacy County. Applying the terms of the Act to this case jurisdiction thereover rests exclusively in the Criminal District Court of Willacy County, and the suit was not properly maintainable in the 103d District Court, in which it was brought and tried.
"It is contended by appellee that the provision in the Act in question which seeks to deprive the District Court of the One Hundred and Third Judicial District of Willacy County of jurisdiction in divorce cases and the settlement of property rights in connection therewith, and to confer exclusive jurisdiction in such causes upon the Criminal District Court of said county, is prohibited by the Constitution, and is therefore ineffectual. Although the Act as it relates to the District Court of the Twenty-eighth Judicial District was passed ten years ago, and as it affects the District Court of the One Hundred and Third District, eight years ago, its validity does not appear to have ever been questioned until it was raised in this appeal. Upon original submission this Court held, in accordance with the attached opinion, that the Act was a valid exercise of the powers conferred upon the Legislature in Section 1, art. 5, of the Constitution, as amended by vote of the people of the State in 1891. The appeal is still pending in this Court upon appellee's motion for rehearing."
"Because of the importance of the question, and because of the conflicting dicta, and lack of authoritative decision of the Supreme Court upon the subject, the Court of Civil Appeals in and for the Fourth Supreme Judicial District of Texas deem it advisable to certify for your decision the following question arising from the case stated:
"Question: Did the Legislature have the power, in the Act establishing the Criminal District Court of Willacy County and the District Court of the One Hundred and Third Judicial District in said County, to withhold from the latter court jurisdiction of `all causes for divorce between husband and wife and adjudicate property rights in connection therewith in said counties,' and to confer exclusive jurisdiction of said causes upon the Criminal District Court of said County?
"In connection with the question we respectfully refer Your Honors to the cases of Lytle v. Halff, 75 Tex. 128, 12 S. W. 610; St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 98 Tex. 480, 85 S. W. 786; Harris County v. Stewart, 91 Tex. 133, 41 S. W. 650; Cockrell v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 326, 211 S. W. 939; Jones v. Soch (Tex. Civ. App.) 277 S. W. 171."
We answer the question in the negative.
Section 1, article 5, of the Constitution of Texas, reads as follows:
"Section 1. The judicial power of this state shall be vested in one supreme court, in courts of civil appeals, in a court of criminal appeals, in district courts, in county courts, in commissioners' courts, in courts of justices of the peace, and in such other courts as may be provided by law.
"The criminal district court of Galveston and Harris counties shall continue with the district, jurisdiction and organization now existing by law until otherwise provided by law.
"The legislature may establish such other courts as it may deem necessary, and prescribe the jurisdiction and organization thereof, and may conform the jurisdiction of the district and other inferior courts thereto." (Section 1, art. 5, adopted election August 11, 1891; proclamation September 22, 1891.)
Section 8 of article 5 expressly sets out and makes provision for original jurisdiction of the district court, and, among other provisions, provides that said court shall have original jurisdiction "of all cases of divorce." This...
