Rector v. North Carolina Sheriffs' Educ. and Training Standards Com'n

• Decision Date: 14 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 9021SC1134,9021SC1134
• Citation: 406 S.E.2d 613,103 N.C.App. 527
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Polly A. RECTOR, Michael E. Cranford, Petitioners-Appellees, v. NORTH CAROLINA SHERIFFS' EDUCATION AND TRAINING STANDARDS COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant. . Heard

Page 613

406 S.E.2d 613

103 N.C.App. 527

Polly A. RECTOR, Michael E. Cranford, Petitioners-Appellees, v. NORTH CAROLINA SHERIFFS' EDUCATION AND TRAINING STANDARDS

COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 9021SC1134.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Heard May 14, 1991.

Governor's Advocacy Council For Persons With Disabilities by Judy J. Burke, Raleigh, and Wright, Parrish, Newton & Rabil by Carl F. Parrish and Nils E. Gerber, Winston-Salem, for petitioners-appellees.

Atty. Gen. Lacy H. Thornburg by Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen. Ralph B. Strickland, Jr., Raleigh, for respondent-appellant.

COZORT, Judge.

Petitioners are handicapped deputy sheriffs in Forsyth County who were denied basic law enforcement training certification by the respondent North Carolina Sheriffs' Education and Training Standards Commission. The Superior Court of Forsyth County reversed the Commission's decision as arbitrary and capricious, finding petitioners had satisfied the minimum training requirements specified by law. We affirm.

The Commission establishes the minimum hiring, training, and retention standards for deputy sheriffs and sheriffs' jailers in North Carolina. After evaluating applications for compliance with minimum standards, the Commission denies or grants certification. In order to be certified, employment applicants must complete Basic Law Enforcement Training (BLET) within one year of employment. The North Carolina Criminal Justice Education and Training Standards Commission (Criminal Justice Standards Commission) administers BLET courses on a statewide basis.

In 1984, R. Shelton Jones, School Director of Forsyth Technical Institute (Forsyth Tech), Gary Rector, Area Coordinator of the North Carolina Department of Community Colleges, Ron Barker of the Forsyth County Sheriff's Department, and R.W. Phipps of the Winston-Salem Police Department met to establish a BLET course at Forsyth Tech in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. At this meeting, the parties present discussed whether petitioners Polly Rector and Michael Cranford should be excluded from the course because of their physical conditions. Ms. Rector is paralyzed in both legs and uses two crutches for walking. Mr. Cranford is paralyzed in one leg and uses one crutch for walking. Because of the school's "open door" policy it was decided that petitioners would be admitted to the course.

Both petitioners attended the BLET course during the period September 24, 1984 through December 22, 1984. The BLET course included eighteen training sections in which each trainee was required to obtain a minimum score of seventy percent. Mr. Cranford attended the entire course. Ms. Rector attended only the firearms and driver training sections of the course because she had previously attended an earlier BLET course in the spring of that year.

At the end of the course, R.W. Phipps, assistant administrator of the BLET course, filled out the post-delivery report listing each of the trainee's scores in the eighteen areas of testing and noting successful completion of the course. Mr. Phipps listed Ms. Rector and Mr. Cranford as having successfully completed the course. Mr. Jones, the school director, signed the report indicating that those who had successfully completed the course possessed the "minimum degree of general attributes, knowledge and skill to function as an inexperienced law enforcement officer." Mr. Jones then sent the report to the Criminal Justice Standards Division.

The following day Mr. Gary Rector, the Area Coordinator of the North Carolina Department of Community Colleges, telephoned Mr. Jones and questioned him concerning the inclusion of the petitioners on the post-delivery report. Following his conversation with Mr. Rector, Mr. Jones called Mr. David Cashwell, the Associate Program Administrator of the Criminal Justice Standards Division, and requested the return of the post-delivery report for correction. Upon the return of the report, Mr. Jones struck through the names of Ms. Rector and Mr. Cranford with the intent of removing the petitioners from the list of those who had successfully completed the course. He then returned the report to Mr. Cashwell.

Upon completion of the BLET course, both Ms. Rector and Mr. Cranford received diplomas indicating successful completion of the course.

Nearly two and one-half years later, in mid-April 1987, Ms. Georgia Lea, then Director of the Commission, notified Ms. Rector and Mr. Cranford of the denial of their certification. Both petitioners appealed the decision and requested an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 150B of the North Carolina General Statutes.

After a hearing, the Chief Administrative Law Judge Robert A. Melott (ALJ) recommended on 18 October 1988 that petitioners be certified. In his proposal Judge Melott concluded that both petitioners met all requirements for certification.

The Commission rejected the recommendation and denied both petitioners' applications for certification. The Commission concluded, in orders filed 3 May 1989 that both petitioners had not satisfied the minimum training requirements set forth in the North Carolina Administrative Code and that Mr. Cranford had not satisfactorily completed a commission-accredited basic training course within one year of his probationary appointment as deputy sheriff. Both petitioners appealed the final agency decision to the Superior Court of Forsyth County.

On appeal, Superior Court Judge James J. Booker reversed the Commission, concluding (1) that the petitioners had passed the minimum training requirements and satisfactorily completed a commission-accredited basic training course within one year of their probationary appointments as deputy sheriffs; (2) that any influence by Mr. Rector resulting in the changing of the post-delivery report which was initially based on the evaluation by the instructors was an improper procedure; and (3) that the Commission's decision not to certify the petitioners because of their handicap, despite their instructors' positive evaluation, was arbitrary and capricious. In an order on 21 July 1990, Judge Booker ordered the Commission to issue certifications to the Commission, effective 15 January 1985. Pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 150B-52 (1987), the Commission appealed the superior court's decision to this Court.

On appeal, the Commission brings forward four major arguments. The Commission first contends that the trial court exceeded its authority by making findings of fact which were not contained in either the ALJ's proposal for decision or the final agency decision. In its next three arguments, the Commission contends the trial court erred by concluding (1) that petitioners met minimum requirements, (2) that petitioners were not certified because they were handicapped, and (3) that the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious. Before addressing the Commission's arguments, we first summarize the rules applicable to judicial review of final agency decisions.

N.C.Gen.Stat. § 150B-51 (1987) governs the scope of judicial review of final agency decisions in the superior court. Pertinent to this proceeding, subsection (b) provides:

[The court] may also reverse or modify the agency's decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

* * * * * *

(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150B-29(a), 150B-30, or 150B-31 in view of the entire record as submitted; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious.

In reviewing the agency's decision, the superior court applies the "whole record" test, which requires the examination of all competent evidence to determine if the administrative agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Henderson v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 91 N.C.App. 527, 530, 372 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1988). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" and "is more than a scintilla or a permissible inference." Lackey v. Dep't of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 238, 293 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1982). In its role as an appellate court, the superior court reviews the agency's decision but is not allowed to replace the agency's judgment with its own when there are two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could have reached a different result upon de novo review. Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977). However, "the 'whole record' rule requires the court, in determining the substantiality of evidence supporting the Board's decision, to take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the Board's evidence. [T]he court may not consider the evidence which in and of itself justifies the Board's result, without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn." Id. Upon determining that the agency's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, the superior court may make additional findings of fact in order to show the insubstantiality of the evidence relied upon by the agency. See Star Automobile Co. v. Saab-Scania of America, Inc., 84 N.C.App. 531, 535, 353 S.E.2d 260, 263 (1987).

The whole record test is also applied when determining whether a decision is arbitrary and capricious. Brooks, Comm'r of Labor v. Rebarco, Inc., 91 N.C.App. 459, 463, 372 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1988). "Administrative agency decisions may be reversed as arbitrary or capricious if they are 'patently in bad faith,' or 'whimsical' in the sense that 'they indicate a lack of fair and careful consideration' or 'fail to indicate "any course of reasoning and the exercise of judgment." ' " Lewis v. N.C. Dept. of Human Resources, 92 N.C.App. 737, 740, 375 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1989) (citing Comm'r of Ins. v. Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 420, 269 S.E.2d 547, 573 (1980)) (citation omitted).

We now turn to the issues...